# Patch Management Policy Template Set, 10 Documents Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Patch management policy template Ten patch management policy templates are free under CC BY 4.0: one general policy, seven variants (small business, SaaS, enterprise, HIPAA, PCI DSS, FedRAMP, MSP), a procedure and an exceptions clause. Every patch window names the framework clause it comes from, read on 19 Nov 2026, or says it is a suggested default. ### Which template to start from Start with the [general patch management policy](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-management-policy-template/) unless one row below describes you. Each variant replaces only the sections that change, so you adopt the general text and paste the variant over the matching numbered sections. | Your situation | Start from | What the variant changes | |---|---|---| | Under 50 people, no security staff | Small business | One 14 day window for critical or high updates, taken from Cyber Essentials v3.3 | | Cloud-first software company | SaaS company | Images and containers rebuilt instead of patched in place; shared responsibility for managed services | | Large estate with many teams | Enterprise | Maintenance groups, rings and delegated sign-off after NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 | | Covered entity or business associate | HIPAA | Current rule sets no number; the 2025 proposal would set 15 and 30 days | | Systems in PCI DSS scope | Payment card | One month from release for critical vulnerabilities, per PCI SSC FAQ 1597 | | Cloud service provider under FedRAMP | FedRAMP | Class based timeframes in the 2026 rules; legacy 30, 90 and 180 days | | Patching other companies' estates | Managed service provider | Client consent, client windows, evidence per client | | You have a policy and need the steps | Procedure | Who does what, in order, and the records each step leaves | | Your policy has no exceptions language | Exceptions clause | Request fields, maximum duration, signers, re-check | Template chooser. Windows are summarized from the clause rows on each template page, read 19 Nov 2026. ### What the set cannot cite Four frameworks people expect in a patch policy could not be read at source on 19 Nov 2026, so no template quotes them. The PCI DSS v4.0.1 standard PDF returned HTTP 403 and only the Council's FAQ 1597 and its v4.0.1 blog post were read ([PCI SSC FAQ 1597](https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/faqs/1597), [PCI SSC blog](https://blog.pcisecuritystandards.org/just-published-pci-dss-v4-0-1)). ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A 8.8 sits behind a paywall and iso.org returned 403. The SOC 2 Trust Services Criteria download needs an account, so CC7.1 and CC8.1 were not read. The Australian Essential Eight maturity model did not load by curl or WebFetch. Where a template touches one of these, it carries a bracketed note telling you to check the clause in your own licensed copy. The [method page](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/method/) lists every source and the 5 of 38 clause rows in the dataset that are empty for this reason. ### License, citation and downloads The templates are the site's own drafting, released under CC BY 4.0: copy, change and redistribute them with credit. Cite as: Patch Management Policy Template Set, version of 19 Nov 2026, CC BY 4.0, https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/. - General policy: [.docx](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-management-policy-template.docx) and [PDF](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-management-policy-template.pdf) - Procedure: [.docx](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-management-procedure.docx) and [PDF](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-management-procedure.pdf) - Exceptions clause: [.docx](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-exceptions-clause.docx) and [PDF](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-exceptions-clause.pdf) - The 38 framework clause rows behind every window: [CSV](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/clauses.csv) and [JSON](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/clauses.json) Before you adopt a template, fill every bracketed placeholder, then compare each window with the frameworks that bind you using the [patch window table](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/). The nine headings used in every template are explained one by one in [the policy sections](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/). The terms for reuse and reliance are on the [terms of use](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/terms/) page. ### Questions **patch management policy template word** Each template is offered as a .docx file as well as a PDF, so you can edit it in Word. The .docx keeps the numbered sections and the window table. Fill the square-bracket placeholders first, then check each window against the frameworks that bind you. **patch management policy pdf** A PDF of the general policy, the procedure and the exceptions clause is linked above. The PDF is for reading and signing; edit the .docx. Both carry the version date of 19 Nov 2026 and the CC BY 4.0 notice. ### Sources - [PCI Security Standards Council blog, Just Published: PCI DSS v4.0.1 (11 June 2024)](https://blog.pcisecuritystandards.org/just-published-pci-dss-v4-0-1), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Federal Register, HIPAA Security Rule to Strengthen the Cybersecurity of ePHI, 90 FR 898 (6 January 2025), proposed 164.308(a)(4)](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/06/2024-30983/hipaa-security-rule-to-strengthen-the-cybersecurity-of-electronic-protected-health-information), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Planning (April 2022)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NCSC, Cyber Essentials Requirements for IT Infrastructure v3.3, Security Update Management](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/sites/default/files/2026-11/Cyber-Essentials-Requirements-for-IT-Infrastructure-v3-3.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [FedRAMP, Consolidated Rules for 2026, Rev5, Vulnerability Detection and Response](https://www.fedramp.gov/2026/providers/rev5/rules/vulnerability-detection-and-response/), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [General Patch Management Policy Template, Full Text](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-management-policy-template/) - [How the Patch Policy Templates Were Written](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/method/) - [Patch Management Policy Sections: The Nine to Include](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/) - [Patch Window Table: Deadlines in 12 Frameworks](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/) --- # General Patch Management Policy Template, Full Text Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-management-policy-template/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Patch management policy template The general policy has nine numbered sections and one annex. Its windows are 3 days for known exploited internet-facing systems, 14 for critical, 30 for high, 90 for medium and 180 for low, each traced below to a clause read on 19 Nov 2026 or marked as the site's suggested default. ### Where each window comes from No single framework sets all five classes, so the table below says, per window, which text it follows and whether that text binds you. A number is a framework requirement only when the right-hand column says so; the rest are this site's suggested defaults chosen to sit inside the stricter of the figures read. | Class | Window | Clause it follows | Status of the clause | |---|---|---|---| | 1. Known exploited, internet-facing | 3 days | CISA BOD 26-04, Table 1, shortest timeline (3 days, with forensic triage for the highest-risk rows) | Binds U.S. federal agencies only; the table has 16 rows and was read from an image. Default elsewhere | | 1. Known exploited, other | 14 days | BOD 26-04 Table 1, 14 day tier | Same. The BOD assigns rows by four factors; this template uses one (internet exposure) | | 2. Critical | 14 days | Cyber Essentials v3.3: 14 days of release for critical or high updates | Required for in-scope systems of a Cyber Essentials applicant; also inside the 15 days proposed for HIPAA and the one month PCI SSC FAQ 1597 gives for critical | | 3. High | 30 days | HIPAA Security Rule proposal, 90 FR 898: 30 calendar days for high risk; FedRAMP legacy: 30 days | The HIPAA text is a proposal, not in force on 19 Nov 2026 | | 4. Medium | 90 days | FedRAMP legacy playbook: Moderate risks within 90 days of discovery | Legacy FedRAMP text only | | 5. Low | 180 days | FedRAMP legacy playbook: Low risks within 180 days of discovery | Legacy FedRAMP text only | | Routine baseline | Monthly or more often | CIS Controls v8, safeguards 7.3 and 7.4 | A recommended practice, not a regulation | Window sources, all read 19 Nov 2026. See the [patch window table](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/) for every framework. Note: Not read on 19 Nov 2026: PCI DSS v4.0.1 requirement text (the one-month figure and the number 6.3.3 come from PCI SSC FAQ 1597, not from the standard), ISO/IEC 27001 Annex A 8.8, and SOC 2 CC7.1 and CC8.1. The template makes no claim to satisfy them beyond what the other clauses show. ### Why the clock starts at release Cyber Essentials counts 14 days from release of the update, the HIPAA proposal counts from identifying the need to patch, FedRAMP's legacy text counts from discovery and BOD 19-02, now revoked, counted from initial detection. Section 4.2 of the template picks vendor release, because it is the only start date a third party can check from the vendor's own advisory. If your auditor works from a different start date, change 4.2 and say so in the cover note. ### Which clause answers which requirement - Section 1.3 (unsupported software) answers Cyber Essentials v3.3, which requires software to be licensed and supported and removed when unsupported. - Section 3.1 (inventory fields) follows the characteristics listed in NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 section 3.2, including who administers the asset and any contractual restriction on patching. - Sections 4.4 and Annex A answer DORA RTS Article 10(4)(d), which asks for set deadlines and escalation procedures when they cannot be met, and NIS2 Implementing Regulation point 6.6.2, which asks for a documented reason when a patch is not applied. - Section 5 answers NIS2 point 6.6.1(b), testing before production, and the canary approach in NIST section 3.5.1. - Section 9.1 answers the 12 month review and test cadence in the HIPAA proposal (164.308(a)(4)(ii)(B)) and the annual documentation review in CIS safeguard 7.1. ### The template ```text # Patch Management Policy Owner: [Role, e.g. Head of IT]. Approved by: [Name, role]. Version: [1.0]. Effective: [date]. Next review: [date, no later than 12 months after approval]. ## 1. Purpose and scope 1.1 This policy sets how [Company name] finds, tests, installs and verifies security patches and updates, so that known vulnerabilities in its systems are fixed inside the windows in section 4. 1.2 It covers every operating system, firmware, application, library, container image and cloud service that [Company name] owns, operates or administers, including systems run by a third party where [Company name] controls the patch schedule. Exclusions: [list each, with reason and approver]. An exclusion not listed here is not valid. 1.3 Software that no longer receives vendor security updates is removed from service or isolated and recorded under Annex A. It is not kept in service by default. ## 2. Roles and responsibilities 2.1 Policy owner ([role]): owns this policy, approves the windows, reports to [executive sponsor]. 2.2 Patch coordinator ([role]): runs the monthly cycle, keeps the schedule and the evidence. 2.3 System owners ([role per system]): approve outage time and accept test results for their maintenance group. 2.4 Platform administrators ([role]): deploy, verify and roll back. 2.5 Executive sponsor ([role]): receives the monthly report and decides any window missed for more than [5] working days. 2.6 Third parties that administer a system must patch to these windows and report completion in writing. ## 3. Asset inventory 3.1 The inventory records, for every asset: owner; platform type (IT, OT, IoT, mobile, cloud, virtual machine, container); who administers it (internal, third party, shared); the tool that manages it; whether it is reachable from the internet; its maintenance group; any legal, contractual or outage limit on patching; and the date it was last patched. 3.2 An asset is added before it goes into production. Automated discovery runs at least [weekly]. 3.3 An asset found by discovery that has no owner is given one within [5] working days or isolated. ## 4. Severity and patch windows 4.1 Each vulnerability takes the severity the vendor publishes. If the vendor publishes none, the policy owner assigns one from the organization's risk analysis. A vulnerability listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog is class 1 whatever its vendor label. If two classes apply, the shorter window applies. 4.2 The window starts when the vendor releases the patch. If no patch exists, the window starts when one becomes available and the mitigation in Annex A applies meanwhile. 4.3 Windows: | Class | Window | Applies to | |---|---|---| | 1. Known exploited, internet-facing | 3 calendar days | Systems reachable from the internet | | 1. Known exploited, other | 14 calendar days | All other systems | | 2. Critical | 14 calendar days | All systems | | 3. High | 30 calendar days | All systems [set 14 if you hold Cyber Essentials] | | 4. Medium | 90 calendar days | All systems | | 5. Low | 180 calendar days | All systems | | Routine baseline | Every month, or more often | Operating system and application updates | 4.4 A window that cannot be met is escalated to the executive sponsor before it expires and recorded under Annex A. ## 5. Testing and staging 5.1 Every maintenance group has a canary set of [number or percent] assets that receives each patch first. 5.2 A patch moves from canary to the full group after [2] working days with no incident, or sooner if the patch is class 1. 5.3 A rollback method is written down before deployment. If none exists, say so in the change record and name the fallback. 5.4 Test evidence (what was tested, by whom, result, date) is kept with the change record. ## 6. Maintenance windows 6.1 Standard windows by group: [group, day, hours, time zone]. The schedule is published [5] working days ahead. 6.2 Installation is forced after [number] days from the start of the window, by direct execution or by restricting network access of the unpatched asset. 6.3 Reboots needed to finish an install happen inside the same window. An asset that cannot reboot is handled under Annex A. ## 7. Emergency patching 7.1 The policy owner (or deputy [role]) may declare an emergency for named assets when a vulnerability is class 1, when a vendor issues an emergency update, or when the policy owner judges that waiting for the standard window is unacceptable. 7.2 While an emergency is declared, the standard windows and change lead times are suspended for the named assets only. The declaration records who declared it, the time, the assets and the reason. 7.3 Canary installation may run for minutes to hours; full installation follows in the hours or days the emergency allows. 7.4 When the patch is installed and verified, the declaration is closed and the standard windows resume. ## 8. Reporting and metrics 8.1 Each month the patch coordinator reports to the executive sponsor: the share of assets patched inside their window, by class and by asset importance; the mean and median days to patch; open exceptions with age; assets with no owner. 8.2 Evidence for every reported figure is exportable from [system] for [retention period]. ## 9. Review and approval 9.1 The policy is reviewed at least every 12 months, and when a framework named in section 4 changes its timing. 9.2 Changes are approved by [role]. The approved version, date and approver are recorded on the cover. ## Annex A. Exceptions Exceptions follow the exceptions clause ([insert clause text]). ``` ### Adapting it Replace each bracket, then run three checks. First, list the frameworks that bind you and confirm no window in section 4.3 is longer than the shortest figure they set; if you hold Cyber Essentials, change class 3 to 14 days. Second, read the variant for your sector ([HIPAA](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/healthcare-hipaa/), [PCI DSS](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/payment-card-pci-dss/), [FedRAMP](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/federal-contractor-fedramp/)) and paste its sections over 4 and 8. Third, write the exceptions annex using the [exceptions template](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-exceptions-clause/) and the steps beneath it from the [procedure](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-management-procedure/). ### Questions **patch management policy example** The template above is a complete example: nine sections and an exceptions annex with a window table of 3, 14, 30, 90 and 180 days. Replace the square brackets with your roles, groups and windows. Sections 4 and 7 are the ones most organizations change. **patch management policy sample** Use the template block on this page as the sample. It is full text, not an outline, and every window in section 4.3 cites the clause it follows in the table above. Variants for seven situations replace specific sections. ### Sources - [CISA, BOD 26-04, Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk (10 June 2026), Required Action 6 and Table 1](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NCSC, Cyber Essentials Requirements for IT Infrastructure v3.3, Security Update Management](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/sites/default/files/2026-11/Cyber-Essentials-Requirements-for-IT-Infrastructure-v3-3.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Federal Register, HIPAA Security Rule to Strengthen the Cybersecurity of ePHI, 90 FR 898 (6 January 2025), proposed 164.308(a)(4)](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/06/2024-30983/hipaa-security-rule-to-strengthen-the-cybersecurity-of-electronic-protected-health-information), read 19 Nov 2026 - [FedRAMP, legacy Rev5 playbook, POA&M, Remediation Requirements](https://www.fedramp.gov/legacy/playbook/csp/authorization/poam/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [PCI Security Standards Council blog, Just Published: PCI DSS v4.0.1 (11 June 2024)](https://blog.pcisecuritystandards.org/just-published-pci-dss-v4-0-1), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CIS Controls v8 guide (August 2023), Control 7, safeguards 7.1 to 7.7](https://storage.pardot.com/799323/1693938137QgfIAdmE/CIS_Controls__v8__Critical_Security_Controls__2023_08.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [EU Delegated Regulation 2024/1774 (DORA RTS), Article 10(4)](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32024R1774), read 19 Nov 2026 - [EU Implementing Regulation 2024/2690, Annex, point 6.6](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L_202402690), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Planning (April 2022)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Patch Management Policy Template Set, 10 Documents](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/) - [Patch Window Table: Deadlines in 12 Frameworks](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/) - [Patch Management Policy Exceptions Clause Template](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-exceptions-clause/) - [Severity and Patch Windows: What Each Framework Sets](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/severity-and-patch-windows/) --- # Small Business Patch Management Policy Template Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/small-business/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Patch management policy for small business A company under 50 people can run a patch policy on one number: 14 days from release for any update the vendor calls critical or high, the rule in UK Cyber Essentials v3.3, effective 27 April 2026. This variant keeps that window, a monthly check, and a written record, in full text below. ### What changes from the general policy and why The general policy has five severity classes, rings and a coordinator role. A team without security staff cannot staff those, so this variant keeps three rows and one named person. Everything dropped is dropped for a reason that can be checked. - Medium and low windows (90 and 180 days) are gone. Without a vulnerability scanner nobody can sort medium from low, and CIS Controls v8 safeguards 7.3 and 7.4 ask for operating system and application updates monthly or more often anyway. - Classes 2 and 3 merge into one 14 day row, because [Cyber Essentials v3.3](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/sites/default/files/2026-11/Cyber-Essentials-Requirements-for-IT-Infrastructure-v3-3.pdf) puts critical and high updates in the same 14 day rule. The general policy's 30 days for high would fail a Cyber Essentials check. - The scope line names SaaS, IaaS and PaaS next to laptops and routers because the Cyber Essentials requirement lists exactly these categories, along with servers, desktops, tablets, mobile phones and firewalls. ### What Cyber Essentials requires, read exactly Updates must be installed within 14 days of release where the update fixes vulnerabilities the vendor describes as critical or high risk. The document says applying all updates within 14 days is recommended but not mandatory, and that a single update covering any critical or high issue must still go on in 14 days. It also requires software to be licensed and supported and removed when unsupported. Read 19 Nov 2026 from the NCSC PDF; the NCSC resources page confirms v3.3 as the current version, effective 27 April 2026. A date check shows how little time that leaves. Microsoft publishes its monthly security update on the second Tuesday of the month; the next one is 8 December 2026 ([Microsoft Learn](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/deployment/update/release-cycle)). Fourteen days from then is 22 December 2026, so a monthly check done on 9 December has a two week margin and a check done on 23 December has already failed it for anything released on the 8th. ### The template ```text ## Small business variant: paste over the same-numbered sections of the general policy ## 1. Purpose and scope 1.1 [Company name] keeps its computers, phones, network devices and cloud services up to date so that known security flaws are closed quickly. 1.2 Scope: laptops, desktops, servers, tablets, mobile phones, firewalls, routers, and every cloud service (IaaS, PaaS and SaaS) that staff use for company work, whether the company or a person owns the device. Personal devices that open company data are in scope. 1.3 Software that the maker no longer supports is removed. Where it cannot be removed, the IT lead records why and when it will go. ## 2. Roles and responsibilities 2.1 IT lead ([name], backup [name]): owns this policy and the monthly check. If an outside IT provider ([provider]) does the work, the IT lead is still accountable and keeps the provider's monthly written report. 2.2 Every employee: installs prompted updates within [3] days and restarts when asked. 2.3 Director ([name]): hears about any update that is more than 14 days late. ## 3. Asset inventory 3.1 One spreadsheet or tool lists every device and cloud service, its owner, whether it updates itself, and the date of the last check. 3.2 A new device is added on the day it is issued. ## 4. Severity and patch windows | Update type | Window | |---|---| | Fixes a flaw the maker calls critical or high | 14 days from release | | Listed as exploited in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog | 3 days if the system is reachable from the internet, otherwise 14 days | | Everything else | Next monthly cycle | 4.1 Automatic updates are switched on wherever the product allows it. The IT lead checks every month, on the Wednesday after the second Tuesday, that nothing is waiting. ## 5. Testing and staging 5.1 The IT lead's own device and one volunteer's device get updates first, then everyone else after [2] working days. Servers are updated outside working hours with a backup taken first. ## 6. Maintenance windows 6.1 Servers and network devices: [day, time]. Laptops: restarts allowed any weekday before [time]. ## 8. Reporting and metrics 8.1 Monthly note to the director: devices checked, devices late, reason, date fixed. ``` ### Records an assessor will ask for The variant produces three records without extra tooling: the device list (section 3.1), the monthly note (section 8.1) and, if an outside provider patches, that provider's monthly report. For a larger practice, move to the [general policy](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-management-policy-template/) once you add a dedicated security role, and read how the monthly rhythm works in [how often to patch](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/how-often-to-patch/). Where a laptop will not restart for weeks, the [systems that cannot reboot](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/systems-that-cannot-reboot/) page covers what to write instead. ### Sources - [NCSC, Cyber Essentials Requirements for IT Infrastructure v3.3, Security Update Management](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/sites/default/files/2026-11/Cyber-Essentials-Requirements-for-IT-Infrastructure-v3-3.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NCSC, Cyber Essentials resources page (v3.3 effective 27 April 2026)](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/cyberessentials/resources), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Microsoft Learn, Update release cycle for Windows clients](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/deployment/update/release-cycle), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CIS Controls v8 guide (August 2023), Control 7, safeguards 7.1 to 7.7](https://storage.pardot.com/799323/1693938137QgfIAdmE/CIS_Controls__v8__Critical_Security_Controls__2023_08.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CISA, Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog page](https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [General Patch Management Policy Template, Full Text](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-management-policy-template/) - [Patch Management Policy Template Set, 10 Documents](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/) - [How Often to Patch: Cadences From the Clauses Read](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/how-often-to-patch/) - [Severity and Patch Windows: What Each Framework Sets](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/severity-and-patch-windows/) --- # SaaS Company Patch Management Policy Template Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/saas-company/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Patch management policy for a SaaS company A SaaS company patches by rebuilding. This variant counts a container window as closed only when the rebuilt image runs in production and the old one does not, assigns managed-service patches to the provider or to you, and lists the evidence an auditor asks for. SOC 2 criteria text could not be read on 19 Nov 2026. ### What changes from the general policy NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 recommends running applications on platforms where patching is built in, with containers as its example, and using toolchains that already rebuild applications with updated components and test them before release. A SaaS policy written around that advice differs from the general one in four places: what counts as an asset, when a window closes, who patches managed services, and what evidence is exported. - **Asset.** An image digest and its package manifest replace a hostname. NIST's own inventory list includes the party who administers the asset, with shared responsibility as an explicit value. CISA describes an SBOM as a nested inventory, a list of ingredients that make up software components ([CISA](https://www.cisa.gov/sbom)). - **Window closure.** A merged fix is not a patched workload. Section 4.2 closes the clock when the old image has stopped running. - **Managed services.** NIST lists moving to a service where the provider patches as a way to transfer risk, not to remove the duty to know the state. Section 1.2 requires a record of what the provider covers. - **Components.** NIST SP 800-218 PW.4.4 asks organizations to verify that acquired commercial, open-source and other third-party components comply with the organization's own requirements through their life cycles. Section 4.3 puts that in the pipeline. The [third-party and open source guide](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/third-party-and-open-source-patching/) covers the practice. ### Live kernel patching: what to write and what not to If the variant allows live patching, state its limits. Red Hat says live kernel patches are for selected Important and Critical CVEs, are cumulative, are supported without extra cost for 6 months after the kernel errata release date, and exist for x86_64 and ppc64le only ([Red Hat](https://access.redhat.com/solutions/2206511), updated 1 September 2026). Canonical says Livepatch covers critical and high severity kernel vulnerabilities, between security maintenance windows, with coverage of 10 years under Ubuntu Pro ([Canonical](https://ubuntu.com/security/livepatch)). Both statements are the vendors' own. Section 6.2 therefore keeps the scheduled reboot or replacement as the real fix. ### Frameworks this variant touches | Source | Clause | Where the variant answers it | Read status | |---|---|---|---| | SOC 2 Trust Services Criteria | CC7.1, CC8.1 | Section 8.2 evidence export | Text could not be read on 19 Nov 2026 (AICPA download needs an account). No claim is made about what these criteria require | | NIS2 Implementing Regulation 2024/2690 | Point 6.6.1(a) to (d) | Sections 4 and 5, 4.3 | Read. Applies to cloud computing providers among others: patches applied within a reasonable time, tested before production, sources verified | | NIST SP 800-218 | PW.4.4, RV.1.1 | Section 4.3 | Read | | NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 | Sections 3.2, 3.5.1 | Sections 3.1, 5.1 | Read | Clauses read 19 Nov 2026. A reasonable-time rule carries no day count; the general policy's windows are the site's suggested defaults. ### The template ```text ## SaaS company variant: paste over the same-numbered sections of the general policy ## 1. Purpose and scope 1.1 This policy covers production and non-production workloads of [Company name]: host operating systems, container base images, application images, libraries and packages, build tooling, managed databases and queues, and employee endpoints. 1.2 For each managed service, the inventory records which patches the provider applies and which the company applies (the shared responsibility line). Provider-applied patches are monitored through [provider notices], not assumed. ## 3. Asset inventory 3.1 The inventory adds: image name and digest; base image and its source; package manifest or software bill of materials for each release; the pipeline that builds it; runtime location (cluster, region, account). 3.2 Inventory data is read from the cloud provider and the registry by API at least [daily]. ## 4. Severity and patch windows 4.1 Windows follow general policy section 4.3. 4.2 For a container or image, the window ends when a rebuilt image is running in production and the vulnerable image is no longer running, not when the rebuild is merged. 4.3 Third-party and open source components are patched by updating the dependency and rebuilding. The pipeline fails a release that carries a class 1 or class 2 finding unless an exception is recorded. ## 5. Testing and staging 5.1 Patched images go through the same automated tests as any release. They deploy to [canary percent] of production first, then expand if error rate and latency stay within [thresholds] for [period]. 5.2 Rollback is redeployment of the previous image digest. ## 6. Maintenance windows 6.1 Rolling replacement is the default and needs no customer-visible window. Hosts that cannot be replaced use the standard windows in general policy section 6. 6.2 Live kernel patching, where used, covers only the vulnerabilities its vendor supports. It does not replace the next scheduled reboot or replacement. ## 8. Reporting and metrics 8.1 Reports add: share of running workloads on an image younger than [30] days; oldest running image age; findings past window by team. 8.2 For each monthly report, export from [system]: the inventory snapshot, the list of changes with test evidence, and the exceptions list. These are the records given to an auditor. ``` ### Next steps Pair this text with the [general policy](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-management-policy-template/) sections 2, 7 and 9, and read [patching containers and images](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/containers-and-images/) for the steps behind clause 4.2. ### Sources - [NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Planning (April 2022)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NIST SP 800-218 v1.1, Secure Software Development Framework, PW.4.4 and RV.1.1](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-218.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CISA, Software Bill of Materials (SBOM)](https://www.cisa.gov/sbom), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Red Hat knowledgebase, kernel live patching (updated 1 September 2026)](https://access.redhat.com/solutions/2206511), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Canonical, Livepatch](https://ubuntu.com/security/livepatch), read 19 Nov 2026 - [EU Implementing Regulation 2024/2690, Annex, point 6.6](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L_202402690), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [General Patch Management Policy Template, Full Text](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-management-policy-template/) - [Container Image Patching: Rebuild, Do Not Patch](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/containers-and-images/) - [Third-Party and Open Source Patching in a Policy](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/third-party-and-open-source-patching/) - [Patch Management Policy Template Set, 10 Documents](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/) --- # Enterprise Patch Management Policy Template Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/enterprise/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Enterprise patch management policy Large estates need windows that depend on the asset group, not one number. This variant, modeled on NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 (April 2022), assigns every asset to one maintenance group, shortens windows for high importance groups to 7 and 14 days, and lets group owners delegate approval in writing. ### Why maintenance groups replace one policy-wide rule NIST defines a maintenance group as a set of assets with similar characteristics that generally have the same software maintenance needs for each risk response scenario (section 3.4). It then says organizations should define a maintenance plan for each group and each scenario, including timeframes for beginning and ending each action (section 3.5). The publication sets no day counts of its own. The numbers in the template's table are therefore this site's suggested defaults: the High importance column is set shorter than the general policy, and the other columns equal it. NIST also says maintenance groups should be defined to minimize assets treated as exceptions, and that assets with similar long-term exceptions might need a separate group with its own plan. Section 3.2 of the template adopts that as a rule: an asset that cannot meet its group's plan moves, it does not sit as an exception. ### Inventory without a configuration database NIST says the software inventory could be in a single enterprise asset inventory or split among multiple resources, that a realistic goal is a close-to-comprehensive inventory built on automation, and that updating inventories monthly or quarterly through a vulnerability scan is a model that should no longer be used. Authenticated scanning is needed if scans supply software inventory. Template section 3.1 therefore asks for a register of the sources of record instead of demanding a CMDB, and 3.3 limits unauthenticated scans to discovery. ### Rings and delegation The ring lengths come from NIST section 3.5.1, which describes a small first round of technically knowledgeable users lasting a few days, then a larger round of early adopters across the organization who try app updates for a few weeks. NIST adds that routine patches should be installable with some flexibility but forced after a grace period, either by direct execution or by blocking network access of unpatched assets. Delegation, the change advisory board carve-out and the sign-off expiry are the site's drafting; no source read sets them. Where the estate includes financial entities in the EU, DORA's RTS Article 10(4)(d) separately asks for set patch deadlines and escalation procedures when deadlines cannot be met; template section 4 and Annex A carry both ([source](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32024R1774)). ### The template ```text ## Enterprise variant: paste over the same-numbered sections of the general policy ## 2. Roles and responsibilities 2.1 Policy owner ([CISO]): owns this policy and the windows. Approves changes to maintenance plans. 2.2 Patch program lead ([role]): runs the cycle across all groups and reports monthly to the [risk committee]. 2.3 Group owners ([role per maintenance group]): own the maintenance plan for their group, approve outage time, and accept test results. Group owners may delegate day-to-day approval in writing to [role]; the delegation names the group, the limits, and an expiry date no later than [12] months. 2.4 Business unit heads: receive the group-level report and own late items in their units. 2.5 Change advisory board ([name]): reviews only changes that fall outside a maintenance plan. Plan-conforming patches are pre-approved. ## 3. Asset inventory 3.1 The inventory may be held in more than one system. The patch program lead keeps a register that names each source of record, the asset types it covers, and how often it syncs. 3.2 Each asset is assigned to exactly one maintenance group. Assets that cannot meet their group's plan move to a separate group with its own plan; they are not left as exceptions in the group. 3.3 Authenticated scanning or agent reporting is the source for installed software. Unauthenticated scans are used only for discovery. ## 4. Severity and patch windows 4.1 Group importance is High, Moderate or Low, set by the group owner and confirmed by the policy owner. 4.2 Windows (calendar days from vendor release): | Class | High importance group | Moderate importance group | Low importance group | |---|---|---|---| | 1. Known exploited, internet-facing | 3 | 3 | 3 | | 1. Known exploited, other | 7 | 14 | 14 | | 2. Critical | 7 | 14 | 14 | | 3. High | 14 | 30 | 30 | | 4. Medium | 60 | 90 | 90 | | 5. Low | 180 | 180 | 180 | ## 5. Testing and staging (rings) 5.1 Ring 0: [IT and security staff], first, for [3] working days. 5.2 Ring 1: [volunteer early adopters across business units], for up to [14] days for routine updates. 5.3 Ring 2 and later: remaining assets, in groups of [size]. 5.4 Class 1 updates skip Ring 1 and run Ring 0 for no more than [24] hours. ## 8. Reporting and metrics 8.1 Reports are cut by importance of asset and class of vulnerability, not as one overall percentage. Each cell shows the share patched by deadline, the mean days and the median days. 8.2 The CISO sees all cells; group owners see their group; the board sees the cells for High importance assets and class 1 and 2 vulnerabilities. ``` ### Where to go next The metrics table in clause 8.1 follows the matrix explained in [reporting and metrics](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/reporting-and-metrics/). For sign-off wording see [roles and responsibilities](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/roles-and-responsibilities/). Sections not shown above are as in the [general policy](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-management-policy-template/). ### Sources - [NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Planning (April 2022)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [EU Delegated Regulation 2024/1774 (DORA RTS), Article 10(4)](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32024R1774), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [General Patch Management Policy Template, Full Text](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-management-policy-template/) - [Patch Management Metrics: What the Policy Should Report](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/reporting-and-metrics/) - [Patch Management Roles and Responsibilities](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/roles-and-responsibilities/) - [Patch Management Policy Template Set, 10 Documents](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/) --- # HIPAA Patch Management Policy Template Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/healthcare-hipaa/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## HIPAA patch management policy The HIPAA Security Rule in force sets no patch deadline. The proposal published 6 January 2025 (90 FR 898) would require 15 calendar days for critical risk and 30 for high risk, with documented exceptions. No final rule was found on 19 Nov 2026, so this variant writes both, side by side. ### What the rule in force says The eCFR text of 45 CFR 164.308 (latest amendment 30 December 2016; eCFR current as of 17 November 2026) requires, at (a)(1)(ii)(B), security measures sufficient to reduce risks and vulnerabilities to a reasonable and appropriate level. Its risk analysis duty at (a)(1)(ii)(A) is an accurate and thorough assessment of the potential risks and vulnerabilities to the confidentiality, integrity and availability of ePHI. Protection from malicious software, (a)(5)(ii)(B), is addressable and reads procedures for guarding against, detecting and reporting malicious software. The text read does not use the word patch and sets no number of days. [Source](https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-45/subtitle-A/subchapter-C/part-164/subpart-C/section-164.308). A policy written today therefore answers to the risk analysis: the policy's windows are justified there. The template ties the windows to the analysis in clause 1.2. ### What the proposal would add | Proposed clause | Text read | Meaning for the policy | |---|---|---| | 164.308(a)(4)(ii)(C)(1) | Within 15 calendar days of identifying the need to patch, update, or upgrade ... to address a critical risk ... where a patch, update, or upgrade is available | Window for critical risk; clock starts at identification | | 164.308(a)(4)(ii)(C)(2) | Within 30 calendar days ... to address a high risk ... where a patch, update, or upgrade is available | Window for high risk | | 164.308(a)(4)(ii)(C)(3) | As determined by and documented in the ... policies and procedures ... for all other patches | No number; your own policy sets it | | 164.308(a)(4)(ii)(D) | (1) no patch is available to address a risk identified in the risk analysis; (2) the only available patch would adversely affect the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of ePHI | The two grounds for an exception | | 164.308(a)(4)(ii)(B) | Review and test written policies and procedures at least once every 12 months | Annual review and test | Proposed text from 90 FR 898, published 6 January 2025, read 19 Nov 2026 on federalregister.gov. Proposal only. The comment period closed on 7 March 2025 ([Federal Register API](https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/documents/2024-30983.json)). A search of the Federal Register API for documents published from 7 January 2025 to 19 November 2026 returned 23 hits, none of them a Security Rule final rule, so the proposal reads as not in force on this check. HHS pages returned HTTP 403 and the Unified Agenda was not read; confirm status before relying on this. ### The template ```text ## HIPAA variant: paste over the same-numbered sections of the general policy ## 1. Purpose and scope 1.1 This policy applies to every electronic information system of [Company name] that creates, receives, maintains or transmits electronic protected health information, and to every system that connects to one. [Company name] is a [covered entity / business associate]. 1.2 The policy is part of the security measures required by 45 CFR 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B), chosen on the basis of the risk analysis required by 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(A) dated [date]. ## 4. Severity and patch windows 4.1 Risk level (critical, high, other) is assigned by the policy owner from the current risk analysis and recorded for each vulnerability. 4.2 Windows, from the date [Company name] identifies the need to patch, where a patch is available: | Risk level | Window now | Window if the proposed federal rule is finalized as written | |---|---|---| | Critical | 14 calendar days (company standard) | 15 calendar days | | High | 30 calendar days (company standard) | 30 calendar days | | All other | As set in the general policy | As set in this policy | 4.3 Where no patch is available, the 15 and 30 days run from the date a patch becomes available, and Annex A applies meanwhile. 4.4 The company standard is stricter than or equal to every figure in the proposal, so adopting it now means no change when the rule is final. ## 9. Review and approval 9.1 This policy is reviewed and tested at least once every 12 months, and after any significant change to systems that hold ePHI. 9.2 Test means: [tabletop walk-through of one critical and one high case; evidence kept for each]. ## Annex A. Exceptions (HIPAA) A.1 An exception is valid only if (a) no patch is available, or (b) the only available patch would adversely affect the confidentiality, integrity or availability of ePHI. A.2 Each exception records the compensating controls applied, the risk analysis entry, the approver and the date for the next check. ``` ### Notes on the drafting Clause 4.2 puts company-standard windows (14 and 30) inside the proposal's 15 and 30 days, an arrangement that costs nothing to adopt early. The proposal also expects compensating controls for exceptions under its (E) and (F) paragraphs, which the [exceptions clause](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-exceptions-clause/) carries as a required field. Everything else in the [general policy](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-management-policy-template/) applies. Dates to watch are on the [dates to know](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/dates-to-know/) page and the HIPAA row of the [window table](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/hipaa-security-rule/). ### Sources - [eCFR, 45 CFR 164.308, administrative safeguards (current text)](https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-45/subtitle-A/subchapter-C/part-164/subpart-C/section-164.308), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Federal Register, HIPAA Security Rule to Strengthen the Cybersecurity of ePHI, 90 FR 898 (6 January 2025), proposed 164.308(a)(4)](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/06/2024-30983/hipaa-security-rule-to-strengthen-the-cybersecurity-of-electronic-protected-health-information), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Federal Register API, document 2024-30983 (publication and comment dates)](https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/documents/2024-30983.json), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [HIPAA Patch Rules: In Force Text and the 15/30 Day Proposal](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/hipaa-security-rule/) - [Patch Management Policy Exceptions Clause Template](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-exceptions-clause/) - [General Patch Management Policy Template, Full Text](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-management-policy-template/) - [Patch Management Compliance Dates: 7 Dec 2026 and Back](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/dates-to-know/) --- # PCI DSS Patch Management Policy Template Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/payment-card-pci-dss/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## PCI DSS patch management policy PCI SSC FAQ 1597 (May 2025) says Requirement 6.3.3 of PCI DSS v4.0.1 requires patches for critical vulnerabilities within one month of release. The standard's own text could not be read on 19 Nov 2026, so this variant cites the FAQ for that figure and adds a stricter 14 day company standard. ### How the one month figure was read Two PCI SSC sources were read: the blog post announcing v4.0.1 (11 June 2024) and FAQ 1597 (May 2025). FAQ 1597 says Requirement 6.3.3 requires patches for critical vulnerabilities within one month of release, and that all other patches follow time frames the entity sets from the risk levels it assigns under 6.3.1. The standard's own text returned HTTP 403 on 19 Nov 2026, so its wording is not quoted. Three dates from the blog post matter for scope. PCI DSS v4.0 was retired on 31 December 2024, which leaves v4.0.1 as the only active version. The effective date for the new requirements, 31 March 2025, was not moved by v4.0.1. And v4.0.1 added no new or deleted requirements, being a limited revision. ### What a policy should and should not claim - Do claim: critical vulnerabilities in scope are patched within one month of release at most. That is FAQ 1597's statement of Requirement 6.3.3. - Do not claim: wording from the standard itself, or a fixed number for non-critical vulnerabilities; FAQ 1597 leaves those to the entity's targeted risk analysis. - Do record the numbered requirement from your own licensed copy in clause 4.3; the bracket is there for that. - The company standard of 14 days is this site's default, aligned to UK Cyber Essentials v3.3 and sitting well inside 30. Because PCI rules apply to the in-scope environment only, clause 1.1 asks for a dated scope diagram. Out-of-scope systems follow the [general policy](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-management-policy-template/). ### The template ```text ## Payment card variant: paste over the same-numbered sections of the general policy ## 1. Purpose and scope 1.1 This policy applies to every system component in the cardholder data environment of [Company name], every system connected to it, and every system that can affect its security. The scope diagram dated [date] is kept by [role]. 1.2 Third parties that host or manage in-scope components are named in [register] and are bound by clause 4. ## 4. Severity and patch windows 4.1 Windows for in-scope components, from vendor release: | Class | Window | Basis | |---|---|---| | Critical vulnerabilities | 14 calendar days (company standard); never more than one month | PCI SSC FAQ 1597: Requirement 6.3.3, one month from release for critical vulnerabilities | | Known exploited | 3 days internet-facing, otherwise 14 days | Company standard (CISA BOD 26-04 tiers) | | High and other | 30, 90 and 180 days as in the general policy | Company standard; non-critical windows follow the entity's risk analysis (FAQ 1597) | 4.2 Where the QSA or the assessor reads the requirement differently, [role] amends this clause within [10] working days and records the reason. 4.3 In-scope components that cannot meet clause 4.1 are recorded under Annex A with the requirement reference [number from your copy of the standard]. ## 8. Reporting and metrics 8.1 The monthly report adds: in-scope components with a critical vulnerability past 14 days; oldest open critical age; scope changes. 8.2 Evidence of each patch (date installed, component, vulnerability) is kept for [period set by the assessor]. ``` ### Related reading The [PCI DSS patch window page](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/pci-dss/) lists what was and was not read, line by line. For proving the clause to an assessor see [proving patch compliance to an auditor](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/proving-patch-compliance-to-an-auditor/). Variants for other regimes are in the [template set](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/). ### Sources - [PCI Security Standards Council, FAQ 1597, assigning risk levels and resolving or addressing vulnerabilities (May 2025)](https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/faqs/1597), read 19 Nov 2026 - [PCI Security Standards Council blog, Just Published: PCI DSS v4.0.1 (11 June 2024)](https://blog.pcisecuritystandards.org/just-published-pci-dss-v4-0-1), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NCSC, Cyber Essentials Requirements for IT Infrastructure v3.3, Security Update Management](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/sites/default/files/2026-11/Cyber-Essentials-Requirements-for-IT-Infrastructure-v3-3.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CISA, BOD 26-04, Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk (10 June 2026), Required Action 6 and Table 1](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [PCI DSS v4.0.1 Patching: One Month for Critical Flaws](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/pci-dss/) - [Proving Patch Compliance to an Auditor: the Evidence](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/proving-patch-compliance-to-an-auditor/) - [General Patch Management Policy Template, Full Text](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-management-policy-template/) - [Patch Management Policy Template Set, 10 Documents](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/) --- # FedRAMP Patch Management Policy Template Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/federal-contractor-fedramp/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## FedRAMP patch management policy FedRAMP's Vulnerability Detection and Response rules become mandatory for initial and ongoing certification on 7 December 2026, with a grace period to 7 March 2027. Timeframes run from 12 hours to 192 days by class, and the older 30, 90 and 180 day text sits in the legacy playbook. ### Timeframes in the 2026 rules The Consolidated Rules for 2026 launched on 24 June 2026, with control mappings updated on 13 October 2026. Rule VDR-TFR-PVR says providers SHOULD partially mitigate, fully mitigate or remediate vulnerabilities to a lower potential agency impact within timeframes from evaluation. The table gives the maximum days read on the Rev5 page on 19 Nov 2026 for the four Potential Agency Impact levels. The page does not expand its column abbreviations; the labels below read them from the factors the rule names, internet reachability and likely exploitability. The 20x per-class tables were not compared line by line. | Class | Vulnerability condition | N5 | N4 | N3 | N2 | |---|---|---|---|---|---| | A and B | Likely exploitable, internet-reachable (LEV + IRV) | 4 | 8 | 32 | 96 | | A and B | Likely exploitable, not internet-reachable (LEV + NIRV) | 8 | 32 | 64 | 160 | | A and B | Not likely exploitable (NLEV) | 32 | 64 | 192 | 192 | | C | Likely exploitable, internet-reachable (LEV + IRV) | 2 | 4 | 16 | 48 | | C | Likely exploitable, not internet-reachable (LEV + NIRV) | 4 | 8 | 32 | 128 | | C | Not likely exploitable (NLEV) | 16 | 64 | 128 | 192 | | D | Likely exploitable, internet-reachable (LEV + IRV) | 12 hours | 2 | 8 | 24 | | D | Likely exploitable, not internet-reachable (LEV + NIRV) | 1 | 8 | 16 | 96 | | D | Not likely exploitable (NLEV) | 8 | 32 | 64 | 192 | Maximum days (class D N5 in hours) from evaluation, SHOULD wording. Source: FedRAMP Rev5 VDR rules page, read 19 Nov 2026. Class D is the only row that uses hours. Two further rules matter for drafting. VDR-TFR-KEV: providers SHOULD remediate Known Exploited Vulnerabilities according to the CISA catalog due dates, as required by BOD 26-04 or any successor guidance. VDR-TFR-RMN: providers SHOULD mitigate or remediate remaining vulnerabilities during routine operations as the provider determines necessary, which leaves timing to the provider. ### Dates and the older text The 20x page shows the status as Required, mandated by BOD 26-04: optional adoption from 4 July 2026, initial and ongoing certification from 7 December 2026, grace period ending 7 March 2027 ([20x rules](https://www.fedramp.gov/2026/providers/20x/rules/vulnerability-detection-and-response/)). Notice NTC-0014 of 16 June 2026 gives the same dates. BOD 26-04 itself, issued 10 June 2026, revoked BOD 19-02 and BOD 22-01. The legacy playbook, in the legacy section of the site, states that critical and high risks are remediated within 30 days of discovery, moderate within 90 and low within 180, and that high-risk items must be mitigated to a moderate level through compensating controls within 30 days. That text is attributed to this legacy page only; the Continuous Monitoring Strategy Guide was not opened by name, and the 2026 VDR page does not mention 30, 90 or 180 days. ### The template ```text ## FedRAMP variant: paste over the same-numbered sections of the general policy ## 1. Purpose and scope 1.1 This policy applies to the cloud service offering [name], FedRAMP [Rev5 / 20x] certification class [A / B / C / D], and to all supporting systems in its authorization boundary. 1.2 Legacy authorizations: until [date] the legacy remediation requirements apply to POA&M items; from the mandatory date the Vulnerability Detection and Response (VDR) rules apply. ## 4. Severity and patch windows 4.1 Timeframes are maximums measured from evaluation of the vulnerability, by the Potential Agency Impact level (N5, N4, N3, N2) and the vulnerability's internet reachability and likelihood of exploitation. They are copied from the FedRAMP rules page dated [read date] into Appendix 1 and re-read at each review. 4.2 Known Exploited Vulnerabilities are remediated by the due date shown for the entry in the CISA catalog, as required by BOD 26-04 or any successor guidance. 4.3 Other vulnerabilities are mitigated or remediated during routine operations as the provider determines necessary, within the company standard of the general policy (class 4: 90 days; class 5: 180 days). 4.4 Where the SHOULD wording of a rule is not followed, the provider records the reason and the alternative (Annex A). ## 8. Reporting and metrics 8.1 Reports show, for each class and impact level, the vulnerabilities evaluated, the timeframe applicable, the date mitigated or remediated, and any past timeframe. 8.2 Legacy: POA&M items show scheduled completion against 30 days (critical and high), 90 days (moderate), 180 days (low), from discovery. ``` ### Using it Keep Appendix 1 as a dated copy of the live rules page; the rules are SHOULD statements and may change. For the cross-framework picture see the [FedRAMP row of the patch window table](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/fedramp/) and the [BOD 26-04 page](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/cisa-bod-26-04/). The [general policy](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-management-policy-template/) supplies the remaining sections. ### Sources - [FedRAMP, Consolidated Rules for 2026, Rev5, Vulnerability Detection and Response](https://www.fedramp.gov/2026/providers/rev5/rules/vulnerability-detection-and-response/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [FedRAMP, Consolidated Rules for 2026, 20x, Vulnerability Detection and Response](https://www.fedramp.gov/2026/providers/20x/rules/vulnerability-detection-and-response/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [FedRAMP, legacy Rev5 playbook, POA&M, Remediation Requirements](https://www.fedramp.gov/legacy/playbook/csp/authorization/poam/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [FedRAMP, notice NTC-0014 (16 June 2026)](https://www.fedramp.gov/notices/0014/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CISA, BOD 26-04, Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk (10 June 2026), Required Action 6 and Table 1](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CISA, Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog page](https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [FedRAMP 2026 Patch Timeframes: 12 Hours to 192 Days](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/fedramp/) - [CISA BOD 26-04 Remediation Timelines, Row by Row](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/cisa-bod-26-04/) - [General Patch Management Policy Template, Full Text](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-management-policy-template/) - [Patch Management Compliance Dates: 7 Dec 2026 and Back](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/dates-to-know/) --- # MSP Patch Management Policy Template Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/managed-service-provider/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## MSP patch management policy An MSP's policy has to answer who may approve patching on a system the MSP does not own. This variant ties every action to the client's written authority, runs the window clock from vendor release even when approval is late, and reports per client. EU Regulation 2024/2690 names managed service providers. ### What differs when the estate belongs to someone else Three facts from public text shape the variant. First, NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 lists, among inventory characteristics, the party who administrates the asset (IT department, third party, end user, vendor, shared responsibility) and any contractual restrictions on patching, for example a regulated asset that can only be patched by its manufacturer after testing. An MSP inventory must carry both for every client. Second, NIST adds that mission or business restrictions can limit risk responses, giving the example of an asset that can only be rebooted during a monthly maintenance outage; client windows and blackout dates are that rule in practice. Third, the MSP is itself a regulated entity in some places. The EU Implementing Regulation 2024/2690 (adopted 17 October 2024, published in the Official Journal on 18 October 2024) covers, among other entity types, managed service providers and managed security service providers. Its point 6.6.1(a) requires security patches to be applied within a reasonable time after they become available, with testing before production, trusted sources, and added measures plus accepted residual risk where a patch is unavailable or not applied. Point 6.6.2 allows an entity to choose not to apply a patch where the disadvantages outweigh the benefits, provided it documents and substantiates the reasons. For an MSP that means a client's refusal must be recorded as the MSP's decision record, not left as a verbal note ([source](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L_202402690)). ### The clock problem When approval comes from a client, windows slip for reasons outside the MSP's hands. The variant does not stop the clock; it records the delay and reports it (clause 4.2). That keeps the evidence honest for both sides: the monthly client report separates days the MSP held a patch from days it waited for the client's approval, so a late item is attributable. | Evidence per client | Where in the template | Why it exists | |---|---|---| | Client schedule with windows and blackout dates | 1.1, 6.1 | NIST restriction on rebooting only in a maintenance outage | | Written approval or standing authority | 1.2, 2.2 | No patch without recorded authority | | Who administers each asset | 3.1 | NIST inventory characteristic: administering party | | Signed exception with end date | 4.1 | NIS2 point 6.6.2: documented, substantiated reasons | | Monthly report incl. approval delays | 8.1 | Shows where lateness came from | Evidence map. NIST and Regulation 2024/2690 read 19 Nov 2026. ### The template ```text ## MSP variant: paste over the same-numbered sections of the general policy ## 1. Purpose and scope 1.1 This policy governs how [MSP name] patches systems that belong to its clients under written agreements. It covers each client's endpoints, servers, network devices and cloud tenants listed in that client's schedule. 1.2 No system is patched, rebooted or excluded without the authority recorded in the client's agreement or a written instruction from the client contact named in the schedule. ## 2. Roles and responsibilities 2.1 Service delivery lead ([role]): owns this policy. 2.2 Client technical contact ([named in schedule]): approves the client's maintenance window and exceptions. 2.3 Technicians: patch only inside the windows in the client schedule. ## 3. Asset inventory 3.1 The inventory is kept per client and records who administers each asset (MSP, client, third party) and any contractual or regulatory limit on patching. ## 4. Severity and patch windows 4.1 Default windows are those of the general policy, section 4.3. A client may require shorter windows. A client may not lengthen them beyond the default without a signed exception that names the systems and the end date. 4.2 The window clock runs from vendor release, whoever approves. Delay waiting for client approval is recorded and reported to the client contact. ## 6. Maintenance windows 6.1 Each client has its own windows and blackout dates, held in the schedule. Windows are not shared across clients unless agreed. ## 8. Reporting and metrics 8.1 One report per client per month: assets in scope, share patched inside the window by class, mean and median days, exceptions with age, and delays awaiting client approval. 8.2 Reports are delivered by [date each month] and kept for [period] after the agreement ends. ``` ### Where it connects Use the [general policy](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-management-policy-template/) for sections not listed. Write the signed exceptions with the [exceptions clause](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-exceptions-clause/), and see [roles and responsibilities](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/roles-and-responsibilities/) for how to split duties when a client's staff share the work. ### Sources - [NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Planning (April 2022)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [EU Implementing Regulation 2024/2690, Annex, point 6.6](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L_202402690), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [General Patch Management Policy Template, Full Text](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-management-policy-template/) - [Patch Management Policy Exceptions Clause Template](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-exceptions-clause/) - [Patch Management Roles and Responsibilities](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/roles-and-responsibilities/) - [Patch Management Policy Template Set, 10 Documents](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/) --- # Patch Management Procedure Template, Nine Steps Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-management-procedure/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Patch management procedure A patch management procedure is the nine-step monthly routine that sits under the policy: it names who does each step and which record each leaves. On the November 2026 cycle, released on Patch Tuesday 10 November, the 14 day window closes on 24 November and the 30 day window on 10 December. ### What a procedure holds that a policy does not A policy states what must be true: windows, scope, roles. A procedure states what people do, in what order, and what proof results. NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 describes enterprise patch management as the process of identifying, prioritizing, acquiring, installing and verifying patches, and breaks a risk response into four actions: plan it (which may include acquiring, validating and testing the patch, and coordinating with change management), implement it, verify it, and monitor it continuously. The nine steps below expand those actions into the order a team can run. ### The November 2026 cycle worked through | Date | Event | Procedure step | |---|---|---| | Tue 10 Nov 2026 | Microsoft monthly security update released; clock starts for class 2 to 5 items from this release | Steps 2 and 3 | | Thu 12 Nov | Canary set installs; two working days of observation begin | Step 4 | | Fri 13 Nov | Class 1 internet-facing deadline (3 days) for any exploited item released 10 Nov | Steps 6 and 7 | | Tue 24 Nov | Class 2 critical deadline (14 days) | Steps 6 and 7 | | Thu 10 Dec | Class 3 high deadline (30 days); report due within 5 working days of the last deadline | Steps 7 and 8 | | Mon 8 Feb 2027 | Class 4 medium deadline (90 days) | Step 7 | Dates computed from the second-Tuesday rule on Microsoft Learn (release cycle page, read 19 Nov 2026) and the general policy's windows. Windows are the site's defaults. Today is 19 November 2026, so the November cycle is mid-flight: critical items released on 10 November are five days from deadline. Microsoft also publishes an optional non-security preview in the fourth week and out-of-band updates as needed, so step 2 checks vendor channels on more than one day. ### Rollback and stop conditions Step 6 requires stop conditions written before deployment. NIST's sample procurement questionnaire asks vendors whether they provide rollback capabilities for uninstalling patches and how often customers see significant issues; the answers decide how tight the stop conditions need to be. If the vendor offers no rollback, the procedure's fallback is restoration from a backup taken before the window, noted in the step 4 record. ### The template ```text # Patch Management Procedure Sits under: Patch Management Policy [version]. Owner: [Patch coordinator]. Cycle: monthly, starting on the second Tuesday. ## Step 1. Keep the inventory current Who: Patch coordinator with system owners. Do: Reconcile discovery output with the inventory; assign an owner to every unowned asset; confirm each asset's maintenance group. Record: Inventory snapshot dated [date]; list of assets added, removed, unowned. ## Step 2. Watch for releases Who: Patch coordinator. Do: Check vendor advisories for every product in the inventory on the release day and again two working days later. Check the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on each working day. Record: Release log (product, advisory, release date, vendor label). ## Step 3. Assess and prioritize Who: Patch coordinator; policy owner for disputes. Do: Match each release to affected assets; assign the policy class; set the deadline = release date + window. Record: Assessment sheet (advisory, assets affected, class, deadline). ## Step 4. Acquire and test Who: Platform administrators. Do: Download from the vendor's own channel; verify integrity; install on the canary set; observe for [2] working days (class 1: hours). Record: Canary result and tester, rollback method. ## Step 5. Approve and schedule Who: System owner. Do: Approve the deployment and the maintenance window, or state the reason for refusal; refusals go to the exceptions clause. Record: Approval (name, date), scheduled window. ## Step 6. Deploy Who: Platform administrators. Do: Install in the scheduled window in the order canary, then groups; force installation after the grace period; roll back if a stop condition is met: [list stop conditions]. Record: Deployment log per asset (installed, failed, pending, reboot required). ## Step 7. Verify Who: Platform administrators, checked by the patch coordinator. Do: Confirm the patch is installed and has taken effect (version, rescan or attestation); chase failed and pending assets. Record: Verification result per asset; list of assets still open at the deadline. ## Step 8. Report Who: Patch coordinator. Do: Send the monthly report defined in policy section 8 to the executive sponsor within [5] working days of the cycle's last deadline. Record: Report and the data export behind it. ## Step 9. Review the cycle Who: Patch coordinator, policy owner. Do: List misses and their causes; change a maintenance plan, ring or window if the same cause occurs twice. Record: Review notes and any change request to the policy. ``` ### Where each step is explained Each step has a longer page: [inventory](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/inventory/), [monitor for releases](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/monitor-for-releases/), [assess and prioritize](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/assess-and-prioritize/), [acquire and test](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/acquire-and-test/), [approve and schedule](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/approve-and-schedule/), [deploy](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/deploy/), [verify](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/verify/), [report](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/report/) and [review the cycle](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/review-the-cycle/). The windows used in step 3 come from the [general policy](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-management-policy-template/). ### Questions **what is a patch management procedure** A patch management procedure is the step-by-step routine that carries out a patch management policy: who finds releases, who tests, who approves, who deploys and what record each leaves. The template on this page has nine steps. It runs monthly, starting on the second Tuesday. **patch management procedure template** The nine-step template above is full text and can be pasted into your document system. Fill the brackets for roles, observation periods and stop conditions. Link it from section 9 of the policy. **patch management rollback process** Write the rollback method before deployment and record it at step 4. NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 asks vendors whether they provide rollback for uninstalling patches. Where they do not, restore from a backup taken before the window. ### Sources - [NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Planning (April 2022)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Microsoft Learn, Update release cycle for Windows clients](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/deployment/update/release-cycle), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [General Patch Management Policy Template, Full Text](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-management-policy-template/) - [Patch Management Process in 9 Steps (NIST SP 800-40r4)](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/) - [Step 7: How to Verify Patches Are Installed](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/verify/) - [Step 6: Patch Deployment Process and Rollback](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/deploy/) --- # Patch Management Policy Exceptions Clause Template Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-exceptions-clause/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Patch management policy exceptions clause An exceptions clause names the grounds, the fields a request must hold, who signs, how long it lasts and when it is re-checked. This template sets a 90 day maximum and a 30 day re-check as site defaults; the grounds follow the HIPAA proposal of 6 January 2025 and EU Regulation 2024/2690 point 6.6.2. ### Where each part of the clause comes from This page gives policy wording only. How an organization decides whether to accept a risk is a different subject and is not covered here. What a clause must contain is partly set by public text. | Part of the clause | Source read | Text or requirement | Status | |---|---|---|---| | Grounds (a) and (b) | HIPAA Security Rule proposal, 90 FR 898, proposed 164.308(a)(4)(ii)(D) | No patch available; or the only available patch would adversely affect the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of ePHI | Proposal, not in force on 19 Nov 2026 | | Ground (d) and written reasons | EU Implementing Regulation 2024/2690, point 6.6.2 | May choose not to apply patches when the disadvantages outweigh the cybersecurity benefits; must duly document and substantiate the reasons | In force; applies to the entity types in the regulation | | Measures applied meanwhile (field 4) | HIPAA proposal (E) and (F); NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 section 3.5.4 | Documented compensating controls; approved long-term mitigation methods for unpatchable assets | Proposal; NIST is guidance | | Escalation (A.10) | DORA RTS 2024/1774 Article 10(4)(d) | Set deadlines and escalation procedures in case those deadlines cannot be met | In force for financial entities | | Re-check (A.7) | NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 section 3.5.5 | All exceptions to maintenance plans should be reviewed regularly to determine if the maintenance plan can be implemented now | Guidance | | Maximum duration (A.6) | None found on 19 Nov 2026 in the sources read | No source read sets a maximum | Site default: 90 days | Sources read 19 Nov 2026. The 90 and 30 day figures are the site's suggested defaults. ### Why requests need an end date NIST says organizations should closely track and monitor all exceptions to maintenance plans, that having some is inevitable, and that assets with similar long-term exceptions might need a separate maintenance group with its own plan. An exception without an end date does neither: it is invisible and permanent. Field 5 of the clause forces a date and A.8 turns the expiry into a reported miss. The five grounds are deliberately narrow. 'We were busy' and 'the owner is on leave' are not grounds; they are reasons to escalate under A.10 or to delegate approval, as in the [enterprise variant](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/enterprise/). ### The template ```text ## Annex A. Patch exceptions A.1 Definition. An exception is an approved departure from a window in section 4 of this policy for named assets, for a stated period. A.2 Who may request. A system owner, group owner or the patch coordinator. A.3 Grounds. A request is accepted for consideration only on one of these grounds: (a) no patch is available; (b) the only available patch would adversely affect the confidentiality, integrity or availability of the system or its data; (c) the vendor no longer supports the software; (d) the disadvantages of applying the patch outweigh the security benefit and the reasons can be substantiated in writing; (e) a legal or contractual restriction prevents patching in the window. A.4 The request records: 1. The assets (inventory IDs), their owner and maintenance group. 2. The vulnerability or patch (identifier, vendor advisory, class, original deadline). 3. The ground under A.3 and the evidence for it. 4. The measures applied meanwhile, who operates them and how their working is checked. 5. The requested end date. 6. The plan to remove the exception, with a named owner. 7. The requester and the date. A.5 Signers. The group owner and the policy owner sign every exception. An exception on a class 1 or class 2 vulnerability also requires [executive sponsor]. A.6 Maximum duration. [90] calendar days. A longer period needs the executive sponsor's signature and a fresh request, not an extension. A.7 Re-check. The patch coordinator reviews every open exception at least every [30] days to determine whether the window can be met now, and records the result. A.8 Expiry. An exception ends on its end date. The asset then falls under the standard window; an expired exception is reported as a missed window in the next monthly report. A.9 Register. The patch coordinator keeps a register of open and closed exceptions with every field in A.4; the register is part of the monthly report. A.10 Escalation. A window that is going to be missed without an approved exception is escalated to the executive sponsor before it expires. ``` ### Using it Paste it as Annex A of the [general policy](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-management-policy-template/), or of any variant. A healthcare provider adds the HIPAA lines in the [HIPAA variant](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/healthcare-hipaa/). ### Sources - [Federal Register, HIPAA Security Rule to Strengthen the Cybersecurity of ePHI, 90 FR 898 (6 January 2025), proposed 164.308(a)(4)](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/06/2024-30983/hipaa-security-rule-to-strengthen-the-cybersecurity-of-electronic-protected-health-information), read 19 Nov 2026 - [EU Implementing Regulation 2024/2690, Annex, point 6.6](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L_202402690), read 19 Nov 2026 - [EU Delegated Regulation 2024/1774 (DORA RTS), Article 10(4)](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32024R1774), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Planning (April 2022)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [General Patch Management Policy Template, Full Text](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-management-policy-template/) - [HIPAA Patch Management Policy Template](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/healthcare-hipaa/) - [Patch Management Policy Template Set, 10 Documents](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/) --- # How the Patch Policy Templates Were Written Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/method/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Patch management policy template method The templates rest on 38 clause rows read from primary sources on 19 Nov 2026; three rows are empty because the text could not be read. Wording is the site's own drafting. Windows are traced to a clause or labeled a suggested default. The templates are licensed CC BY 4.0. ### What was read and how it is recorded Each row of the clause dataset holds the framework, version, clause number, the clause text quoted, the timing it sets, who it applies to, the source URL, the read date and a kind label. Kind is primary for standards and government text. A row is left empty when the text could not be read; nothing is filled from memory. | Source group | Rows | Notes | |---|---|---| | CIS Controls v8 (Aug 2023 guide) | 6 | Control 7 safeguards 7.1 to 7.7. v8.1 text sits behind a form and was not read | | HIPAA proposed rule (90 FR 898) and current 164.308 | 7 | Proposal read at federalregister.gov; HHS pages returned 403 | | FedRAMP 2026 rules, 20x page and legacy playbook | 7 | Rev5 and 20x VDR pages and notice NTC-0014 read in full | | NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 | 3 | Read from the NIST PDF | | PCI DSS v4.0.1 | 3 | One row from the council blog; 6.3.1 and 11.3 empty | | CISA BOD 26-04, 22-01, 19-02, KEV catalog | 4 | Table 1 of BOD 26-04 is an image, read by eye | | UK Cyber Essentials v3.3; EU 2024/2690; DORA RTS; NYDFS 500.5 | 5 | NYDFS read on Cornell LII, not dfs.ny.gov | | ISO/IEC 27001 Annex A 8.8; SOC 2 CC7.1 and CC8.1 | 3 | Empty: paywall and account wall | 38 rows in total; 5 empty (PCI 6.3.1, PCI 11.3, ISO 27001 A 8.8, SOC 2 CC7.1, SOC 2 CC8.1). Read 19 Nov 2026. No row was written for the Australian Essential Eight: the cyber.gov.au page and PDF did not load on 19 Nov 2026 by curl or WebFetch. ### What is source text and what is drafting - Source text: clause quotes, timings, dates and applicability, always with the link beside them. - Drafting: every sentence inside a template block, including role names, the placeholder structure and the choice of defaults. - Defaults: 3, 14, 30, 90 and 180 day windows; 90 day exception maximum; 30 day re-check. Each is labeled a suggested default unless a table row ties it to a clause. The [general policy](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-management-policy-template/) shows the tie for each. ### Adapting and re-licensing CC BY 4.0 lets you copy, change, sell and redistribute the templates if you credit the set and say what you changed. Cite: Patch Management Policy Template Set, version of 19 Nov 2026, CC BY 4.0. The clause dataset is offered as [CSV](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/clauses.csv) and [JSON](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/clauses.json) under the same license; each row keeps its source link, and the source text remains its issuer's. Before adopting a window, check it against the clause row, not against this page: three of the frameworks (HIPAA proposal, FedRAMP VDR rules, CISA BOD 26-04 Table 1) have changed or are due to change within the last twelve months. The [dates to know](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/dates-to-know/) page lists them, and the [template set index](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/) says which template changes. ### Sources - [PCI Security Standards Council blog, Just Published: PCI DSS v4.0.1 (11 June 2024)](https://blog.pcisecuritystandards.org/just-published-pci-dss-v4-0-1), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CIS Controls v8 guide (August 2023), Control 7, safeguards 7.1 to 7.7](https://storage.pardot.com/799323/1693938137QgfIAdmE/CIS_Controls__v8__Critical_Security_Controls__2023_08.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Federal Register, HIPAA Security Rule to Strengthen the Cybersecurity of ePHI, 90 FR 898 (6 January 2025), proposed 164.308(a)(4)](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/06/2024-30983/hipaa-security-rule-to-strengthen-the-cybersecurity-of-electronic-protected-health-information), read 19 Nov 2026 - [FedRAMP, Consolidated Rules for 2026, Rev5, Vulnerability Detection and Response](https://www.fedramp.gov/2026/providers/rev5/rules/vulnerability-detection-and-response/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CISA, BOD 26-04, Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk (10 June 2026), Required Action 6 and Table 1](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Planning (April 2022)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Patch Management Policy Template Set, 10 Documents](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/) - [General Patch Management Policy Template, Full Text](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-management-policy-template/) - [Patch Management Compliance Dates: 7 Dec 2026 and Back](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/dates-to-know/) - [Patch Window Table Method: Row Rules and Read Log](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/method/) --- # Patch Management Policy Sections: The Nine to Include Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Patch management policy sections A patch management policy needs nine sections: purpose and scope, roles, asset inventory, severity and patch windows, testing, maintenance windows, emergency patching, reporting and metrics, and review and approval. Each answers named clauses read on 19 Nov 2026, and exceptions sit in an annex. ### The nine sections and what each answers | # | Section | One line | Clauses it answers (read 19 Nov 2026) | |---|---|---|---| | 1 | Purpose and scope | What is covered, what is excluded, who approved the exclusion | Cyber Essentials v3.3 scope categories; NIS2 point 6.6.1; NIST SP 800-40r4 3.2 | | 2 | Roles and responsibilities | Who owns, runs, approves, installs and escalates | DORA RTS Art. 10(4)(d) escalation; NIST audiences for metrics | | 3 | Asset inventory requirement | What the inventory records and how fresh it stays | NIST 3.2; CIS Controls v8 safeguard 7.1 | | 4 | Severity and patch windows | Classes, deadlines and the clock start | Cyber Essentials 14 days; PCI one month (FAQ 1597); HIPAA proposal 15 and 30; FedRAMP 2026 and legacy; BOD 26-04 | | 5 | Testing and staging | Canary first, rollback ready, evidence kept | NIS2 6.6.1(b); NIST 3.5.1; DORA Art. 10(4) | | 6 | Maintenance windows | When installs happen and when they are forced | NIST 3.5.1; CIS 7.3 and 7.4 (monthly) | | 7 | Emergency patching clause | When windows are suspended and who decides | NIST 3.5.2; DORA Art. 10(4) | | 8 | Reporting and metrics | What is measured, for whom, how often | NIST 3.6; CIS 7.2 monthly review | | 9 | Review and approval | Annual review and the events that force one | HIPAA proposal 12 months; CIS 7.1 annual; BOD 26-04 Table 1 reassessment | Numbering matches the [general policy template](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-management-policy-template/). Exceptions are Annex A, written in the [exceptions clause](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-exceptions-clause/). ### Why this order Scope and roles come first because every later clause needs a subject and an owner. The inventory precedes the windows because a window can only be met for an asset the policy knows about; NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 puts inventory second in its planning steps, before it defines risk response scenarios and maintenance plans. Testing and maintenance windows follow the deadlines because they are the means of meeting them. Emergency patching comes after the routine rules since it is defined as the departure from them. Reporting and review close the loop: a policy with no measurement and no review date cannot show it was followed, and the proposed HIPAA rule would require the review and test at least once every 12 months. ### Which sections frameworks leave to you Several frameworks set no number and ask only for a documented process. EU Regulation 2024/2690 point 6.6.1(a) asks for patches within a reasonable time; DORA's RTS asks financial entities to set their own deadlines; NYDFS 500.5(c) asks for timely remediation prioritized by risk. For these, section 4 of your policy is the requirement, and an auditor will test you against what you wrote. The [patch window table](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/) lists the numbers that exist and says which frameworks set none. Do not put the decision on whether to accept a risk into the policy body. The policy carries an exceptions annex that records the departure; the grounds and fields are in the [exceptions template](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-exceptions-clause/). ### Sources - [NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Planning (April 2022)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NCSC, Cyber Essentials Requirements for IT Infrastructure v3.3, Security Update Management](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/sites/default/files/2026-11/Cyber-Essentials-Requirements-for-IT-Infrastructure-v3-3.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [EU Implementing Regulation 2024/2690, Annex, point 6.6](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L_202402690), read 19 Nov 2026 - [EU Delegated Regulation 2024/1774 (DORA RTS), Article 10(4)](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32024R1774), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CIS Controls v8 guide (August 2023), Control 7, safeguards 7.1 to 7.7](https://storage.pardot.com/799323/1693938137QgfIAdmE/CIS_Controls__v8__Critical_Security_Controls__2023_08.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Federal Register, HIPAA Security Rule to Strengthen the Cybersecurity of ePHI, 90 FR 898 (6 January 2025), proposed 164.308(a)(4)](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/06/2024-30983/hipaa-security-rule-to-strengthen-the-cybersecurity-of-electronic-protected-health-information), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Cornell LII, 23 NYCRR 500.5 (as amended, effective 1 November 2023)](https://www.law.cornell.edu/regulations/new-york/23-NYCRR-500.5), read 19 Nov 2026 - [PCI Security Standards Council blog, Just Published: PCI DSS v4.0.1 (11 June 2024)](https://blog.pcisecuritystandards.org/just-published-pci-dss-v4-0-1), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CISA, BOD 26-04, Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk (10 June 2026), Required Action 6 and Table 1](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [General Patch Management Policy Template, Full Text](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-management-policy-template/) - [Patch Window Table: Deadlines in 12 Frameworks](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/) - [Patch Management Policy Exceptions Clause Template](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-exceptions-clause/) - [Patch Management Policy Template Set, 10 Documents](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/) --- # Purpose and Scope of a Patch Management Policy Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/purpose-and-scope/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Patch management policy scope A patch policy's scope clause lists what is covered, what is excluded and who approved each exclusion. UK Cyber Essentials v3.3, effective 27 April 2026, names ten categories of in-scope items from servers to SaaS, while the proposed HIPAA rule says relevant electronic information systems. ### What the section must say - The purpose, in one sentence: fixes are installed inside stated windows. - What is covered, by class of asset, not by department: operating systems, firmware, applications, libraries, container images, cloud services. - Systems run by a third party where you control the patch schedule. - Exclusions, each with a reason and an approver; an unlisted exclusion is invalid. - What happens to software the vendor no longer supports. ### How frameworks define scope | Source | How scope is stated | Read 19 Nov 2026 | |---|---|---| | UK Cyber Essentials v3.3 | All in-scope software on servers, desktops, laptops, tablets, mobile phones, firewalls, routers, IaaS, PaaS and SaaS | Primary; NCSC PDF | | HIPAA Security Rule proposal, 90 FR 898 | Relevant electronic information systems of covered entities and business associates | Proposal | | EU Implementing Regulation 2024/2690 | DNS service providers, TLD registries, cloud computing and data centre providers, CDN, managed service and managed security service providers, online marketplaces and others | Primary | | NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 section 3.2 | Physical and virtual computing assets, including OT, IoT and container assets | Guidance | | CISA BOD 26-04 | Federal agency assets in any federal information system; excludes national security systems; contractors only if the contract says so | Primary; federal only | Scope wording as read; the first column names the source, not a requirement to follow all of them. ### Sample wording ```text 1.1 This policy covers every operating system, firmware, application, library, container image and cloud service that [Company name] owns, operates or administers, and every system run by a third party where [Company name] controls the patch schedule. 1.2 Exclusions are listed in Schedule 1 with the reason, the compensating measures and the approver. A system not listed in Schedule 1 is in scope. 1.3 Software that no longer receives security updates from its vendor is removed from service or isolated and recorded in Annex A within [30] days of the vendor's end-of-support date. ``` ### Common mistakes, with the specific that exposes each - **Leaving SaaS out.** Cyber Essentials v3.3 lists SaaS next to laptops and routers as in-scope software. A scope line that says 'devices' fails that test. - **Treating unsupported software as an exclusion.** The same document requires software to be licensed and supported and removed when unsupported; a scope exclusion is not removal. - **Copying a federal scope.** BOD 26-04 reaches contractors only if their contract says so. A contractor that quotes BOD 26-04 timelines as binding has misread its own scope; FedRAMP's rules are the contractual route, as the [FedRAMP template](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/federal-contractor-fedramp/) shows. - **Forgetting the inventory behind the scope.** Scope is only checkable against an [asset inventory](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/asset-inventory-requirement/). Continue to [roles and responsibilities](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/roles-and-responsibilities/), or see the whole list at [policy sections](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/). ### Sources - [NCSC, Cyber Essentials Requirements for IT Infrastructure v3.3, Security Update Management](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/sites/default/files/2026-11/Cyber-Essentials-Requirements-for-IT-Infrastructure-v3-3.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Federal Register, HIPAA Security Rule to Strengthen the Cybersecurity of ePHI, 90 FR 898 (6 January 2025), proposed 164.308(a)(4)](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/06/2024-30983/hipaa-security-rule-to-strengthen-the-cybersecurity-of-electronic-protected-health-information), read 19 Nov 2026 - [EU Implementing Regulation 2024/2690, Annex, point 6.6](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L_202402690), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Planning (April 2022)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CISA, BOD 26-04, Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk (10 June 2026), Required Action 6 and Table 1](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Patch Management Policy Sections: The Nine to Include](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/) - [Patch Management Roles and Responsibilities](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/roles-and-responsibilities/) - [Asset Inventory Requirement in a Patch Policy](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/asset-inventory-requirement/) - [FedRAMP Patch Management Policy Template](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/federal-contractor-fedramp/) --- # Patch Management Roles and Responsibilities Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/roles-and-responsibilities/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Patch management roles and responsibilities A roles clause names who owns the policy, runs the cycle, approves outage, installs, and decides an overdue window. NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 names seven audiences who need different patch metrics, from the board to system administrators, and DORA Article 10(4)(d) requires escalation when deadlines cannot be met. ### The six roles most policies need | Duty | Policy owner | Patch coordinator | System owner | Platform admin | Executive sponsor | |---|---|---|---|---|---| | Approve the windows | Decides | Advises | Consulted | - | Informed | | Run the monthly cycle | Informed | Decides | Consulted | Does | - | | Approve outage time | - | Informed | Decides | Does | - | | Install and verify | - | Checks | Informed | Does | - | | Declare an emergency | Decides | Does | Informed | Does | Informed | | Decide an overdue window | Advises | Reports | Advises | - | Decides | | Sign exceptions | Decides | Keeps register | Requests | - | Decides on class 1 and 2 | Duty table: the drafting is the site's own; the roles come from the [general policy](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-management-policy-template/) section 2. ### What public text says about roles NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 section 3.6 notes that the audiences for patching metrics include the chief executive and board of directors, the chief information officer, the chief information security officer, mission or business unit leadership, application developers, security and system administrators, and other cybersecurity and IT personnel, and that each needs a somewhat different set of metrics suited to their role. Its inventory section also lists, as a characteristic to track, the party who administrates each asset: the IT department, a third party, an end user, the vendor or manufacturer, or a shared responsibility model. A roles clause that does not account for all five values leaves some assets with no one obliged to patch them. DORA's RTS, Article 10(4)(d), asks financial entities for set deadlines for installing patches and updates and for escalation procedures in case those deadlines cannot be met. In the table, that is the 'decide an overdue window' row, which has to name a person, not a team. ### Sample wording ```text 2.1 The policy owner is [role]. The deputy is [role] and acts when the policy owner is absent for more than [2] working days. 2.2 The patch coordinator runs the monthly cycle and keeps the evidence. 2.3 System owners approve outage time within [2] working days of a request. Silence is not approval; if no answer comes, the patch coordinator escalates to the executive sponsor. 2.4 Where a third party administers a system, the contract names the patch windows, the report the third party sends and the person at [Company name] who receives it. ``` ### Common mistakes - **Naming people instead of roles.** Policies outlive staff; keep names in a register, roles in the policy. - **No deputy.** A single approver turns a 14 day window into a leave-calendar problem. - **Approval with no deadline.** NIST says that routine patching is often postponed and neglected, which gives attackers windows of opportunity; clause 2.3 above gives approval a clock. - **Nobody for the third party.** For an MSP, the question is reversed; see the [MSP template](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/managed-service-provider/). For the clause that follows, see [asset inventory](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/asset-inventory-requirement/); for the exception signers see the [exceptions clause](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-exceptions-clause/). ### Sources - [NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Planning (April 2022)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [EU Delegated Regulation 2024/1774 (DORA RTS), Article 10(4)](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32024R1774), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Patch Management Policy Sections: The Nine to Include](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/) - [Asset Inventory Requirement in a Patch Policy](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/asset-inventory-requirement/) - [MSP Patch Management Policy Template](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/managed-service-provider/) - [Patch Management Policy Exceptions Clause Template](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-exceptions-clause/) --- # Asset Inventory Requirement in a Patch Policy Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/asset-inventory-requirement/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Patch management asset inventory NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 says inventories updated monthly or quarterly by a vulnerability scan should no longer be the model, and asks for constant updates by automation. The inventory clause names the fields recorded for every asset, how often discovery runs, and who owns an asset found without one. ### What the section must say - The fields recorded for each asset. - How the inventory is kept current (automatic discovery, platform APIs, agent reporting), and how often. - Who owns an asset found without an owner, and by when. - That patching decisions use the per-asset record, not only the software version. NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 section 3.2 says organizations should establish and constantly maintain up-to-date software inventories for physical and virtual assets, including OT, IoT and container assets, in one inventory or several. A realistic goal is a close-to-comprehensive inventory built on automation. If scans supply software inventory, they need sufficient access, which means authenticated scanning, to detect changes. ### Fields NIST lists | Group | Field to record | Why it matters to a patch decision | |---|---|---| | Technical | Platform type (IT, OT, IoT, mobile, cloud, VM) | Selects the maintenance plan | | Technical | Who administers it (IT, third party, end user, vendor, shared responsibility) | Decides who can act | | Technical | How it is managed (endpoint tool, VM manager, container manager) | Decides how the patch is delivered | | Technical | Network connectivity and existing security controls | Sets exposure and available mitigations | | Technical | Primary users or interconnected services and their privileges | Sets blast radius | | Mission | Role and importance to the organization | Sets the window tier | | Mission | Laws, regulations or policies on how soon a vulnerability must be addressed | Sets the strictest window | | Mission | Contractual restrictions on patching | Sets who may patch | | Mission | Restrictions on risk responses, for example reboot only in a monthly maintenance outage | Sets the schedule | Characteristics listed in NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 section 3.2, read 19 Nov 2026. ### Sample wording ```text 3.1 [Company name] keeps an inventory of every asset in scope. For each asset it records: owner; platform type; administering party; management tool; internet exposure; maintenance group; legal, contractual or outage limits on patching; installed software and versions; date of last patch. 3.2 The inventory is updated by automated discovery at least [weekly] and by platform or agent reporting [daily] where available. A scan that cannot log in to the asset does not count as a software inventory. 3.3 An asset with no owner is assigned one within [5] working days or isolated from the network. 3.4 Software bills of materials supplied by vendors are attached to the asset record where they exist. ``` ### Common mistakes - **Quarterly refresh.** NIST says monthly or quarterly updating by scan was acceptable when assets were static and inside a fixed perimeter, and that this model should no longer be used. - **Version-only records.** NIST says risk response and prioritization should not be based solely on which software and versions are in use, because each asset has its own technical and mission context. - **No patch history.** NIST adds that a per-asset patching history may help incident responders in an investigation. - **SBOMs treated as the inventory.** CISA describes an SBOM as a nested inventory of software components, a list of ingredients; it describes software, not the assets that run it, and CISA lists 2026 updates to the SBOM minimum elements on its SBOM page (headline read, guidance not opened). Next: [severity and patch windows](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/severity-and-patch-windows/). The first step of the monthly cycle uses this inventory: [process step 1](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/inventory/). The fuller variant for estates with several inventory systems is the [enterprise template](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/enterprise/). ### Sources - [NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Planning (April 2022)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CISA, Software Bill of Materials (SBOM)](https://www.cisa.gov/sbom), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Patch Management Policy Sections: The Nine to Include](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/) - [Severity and Patch Windows: What Each Framework Sets](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/severity-and-patch-windows/) - [Step 1: Patch Management Asset Inventory](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/inventory/) - [Enterprise Patch Management Policy Template](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/enterprise/) --- # Severity and Patch Windows: What Each Framework Sets Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/severity-and-patch-windows/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Patch management SLA by severity Frameworks set patch deadlines from 12 hours to 192 days, and several set none: Cyber Essentials v3.3 says 14 days, the HIPAA proposal 15 and 30, PCI DSS one month for critical, CISA BOD 26-04 3, 14 or 60 days. A policy must pick one number per class and one clock start. ### Every number read, side by side | Source | Timing | Clock starts | Binds whom | |---|---|---|---| | CISA BOD 26-04 (10 Jun 2026), Table 1 | 3 days (with forensic triage for the highest-risk rows), 14 days, 60 days, or fix on system upgrade | Per directive | U.S. federal agencies; 16 rows; read from an image | | UK Cyber Essentials v3.3 | 14 days for critical or high | Release of the update | Applicants, in-scope systems | | HIPAA Security Rule proposal, 90 FR 898 | 15 days critical, 30 days high | Identifying the need to patch | Proposed; not in force | | PCI DSS v4.0.1 (PCI SSC FAQ 1597) | One month for critical | Release | Entities in scope; standard text not read | | FedRAMP legacy playbook | 30 days critical and high, 90 moderate, 180 low | Discovery | Legacy authorizations | | FedRAMP 2026 VDR rules | 12 hours to 192 days by class and impact level | Evaluation | Mandatory from 7 Dec 2026 | | CIS Controls v8, 7.3, 7.4, 7.7 | Monthly or more often | - | Recommended practice | | EU 2024/2690 point 6.6.1(a); DORA Art. 10(4)(d); NYDFS 500.5(c) | Reasonable time; self-set deadlines; timely and risk-prioritized | Availability of the patch (2024/2690) | No day count | | NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 | None; timeframes defined per maintenance plan | - | Guidance | Read 19 Nov 2026; each row has its own page in the [patch window table](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/). Two former federal rules are history. BOD 19-02 (29 April 2019) set 15 days for critical and 30 for high on internet-accessible systems; BOD 22-01 (3 November 2021) set 2 weeks for catalog entries with a 2021 or later CVE ID and 6 months for older ones. Both pages now read that the directive has been revoked and superseded by BOD 26-04. Any policy that still quotes two weeks for known exploited items is quoting a revoked directive. ### Sample wording ```text 4.1 Severity is the vendor's published severity. A vulnerability in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog is class 1 whatever the vendor label. Where two classes apply, the shorter window applies. 4.2 The window runs from the date the vendor releases the patch. Where no patch exists it runs from the date one becomes available. 4.3 Class 1: 3 days (internet-facing) or 14 days. Class 2 (critical): 14 days. Class 3 (high): 30 days. Class 4 (medium): 90 days. Class 5 (low): 180 days. 4.4 A window that will be missed is escalated before it expires. ``` ### Common mistakes - **Mixing clock starts.** A 14 day window from release and a 15 day window from identification can differ by weeks when an asset is found late. - **One number for everything.** Frameworks that set numbers set them per class; a flat 30 days fails Cyber Essentials and is too loose for known exploited items. - **Quoting a revoked directive.** See above: BOD 22-01 and BOD 19-02 were revoked on the issue of BOD 26-04 on 10 June 2026. - **Citing PCI DSS wording from memory.** The standard text could not be read on 19 Nov 2026; only the Council's FAQ 1597 and its v4.0.1 blog were. Windows for each framework are explained in the [general template's source table](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-management-policy-template/); for the next clause see [testing and staging](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/testing-and-staging/). ### Sources - [CISA, BOD 26-04, Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk (10 June 2026), Required Action 6 and Table 1](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CISA, BOD 22-01 (revoked), directive page](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-22-01-reducing-significant-risk-known-exploited-vulnerabilities), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CISA, BOD 19-02 (revoked, archived), directive page](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-19-02-vulnerability-remediation-requirements-internet-accessible-systems), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NCSC, Cyber Essentials Requirements for IT Infrastructure v3.3, Security Update Management](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/sites/default/files/2026-11/Cyber-Essentials-Requirements-for-IT-Infrastructure-v3-3.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Federal Register, HIPAA Security Rule to Strengthen the Cybersecurity of ePHI, 90 FR 898 (6 January 2025), proposed 164.308(a)(4)](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/06/2024-30983/hipaa-security-rule-to-strengthen-the-cybersecurity-of-electronic-protected-health-information), read 19 Nov 2026 - [PCI Security Standards Council blog, Just Published: PCI DSS v4.0.1 (11 June 2024)](https://blog.pcisecuritystandards.org/just-published-pci-dss-v4-0-1), read 19 Nov 2026 - [FedRAMP, legacy Rev5 playbook, POA&M, Remediation Requirements](https://www.fedramp.gov/legacy/playbook/csp/authorization/poam/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [FedRAMP, Consolidated Rules for 2026, Rev5, Vulnerability Detection and Response](https://www.fedramp.gov/2026/providers/rev5/rules/vulnerability-detection-and-response/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CIS Controls v8 guide (August 2023), Control 7, safeguards 7.1 to 7.7](https://storage.pardot.com/799323/1693938137QgfIAdmE/CIS_Controls__v8__Critical_Security_Controls__2023_08.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [EU Implementing Regulation 2024/2690, Annex, point 6.6](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L_202402690), read 19 Nov 2026 - [EU Delegated Regulation 2024/1774 (DORA RTS), Article 10(4)](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32024R1774), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Cornell LII, 23 NYCRR 500.5 (as amended, effective 1 November 2023)](https://www.law.cornell.edu/regulations/new-york/23-NYCRR-500.5), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Planning (April 2022)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Patch Window Table: Deadlines in 12 Frameworks](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/) - [Patch Management Policy Sections: The Nine to Include](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/) - [Patch Testing and Staging Policy Clause](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/testing-and-staging/) - [General Patch Management Policy Template, Full Text](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-management-policy-template/) --- # Patch Testing and Staging Policy Clause Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/testing-and-staging/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Patch testing policy A patch testing clause makes a small canary set install first, writes the rollback method down before deployment and keeps the evidence. NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 describes canary rounds lasting a few days, then a few weeks, and EU Regulation 2024/2690 point 6.6.1(b) requires testing before production. ### What the section must say - Which assets form the canary set and who chooses them. - How long the canary observes before the rollout widens, and what counts as an incident. - That a rollback method exists before deployment, or that the fallback is named. - What test evidence is kept, by whom. - How the clause changes when a vulnerability is class 1. NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 section 3.5.1 says a small subset of assets should get the patch first and act as canaries; if they show minimal impact the deployment widens, and if not a different response, such as a temporary mitigation, can be planned. For larger rollouts that affect users it describes multiple rounds: a first round with technically knowledgeable users for a few days, then a larger round of early adopters across the organization for a few weeks. It says that in effect this is how the patching gets tested. ### Where testing is required by text | Source | Requirement | Read status | |---|---|---| | EU Implementing Regulation 2024/2690, point 6.6.1(b) | Patches tested before they are put into production | Read | | DORA RTS 2024/1774, Article 10(4) | Procedures cover testing and deployment of patches, and emergency patching | Read | | NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, 3.5.2 | In an emergency a canary period may last a few minutes to a few hours | Read | | NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, procurement questionnaire | Ask vendors how they test patches before release and whether they provide rollback to uninstall them | Read | | PCI DSS; SOC 2 CC8.1 | Not read | Text unreadable on 19 Nov 2026 | Read 19 Nov 2026. ### Sample wording ```text 5.1 Each maintenance group has a canary set of [number or percent] assets chosen by the group owner to represent the group. 5.2 A patch installs on the canary set first. The rollout widens after [2] working days if there is no incident. An incident is [defined: failed boot, service outage, user-reported loss of function, security-tool alert]. 5.3 For class 1 patches the canary period is [hours]; the rollout may widen sooner on the policy owner's decision, recorded with the reason. 5.4 A rollback method is written before deployment. Where none exists, the fallback is [restore from backup taken before the window]. 5.5 For each patch the record holds: what was tested, by whom, result, date, and the decision to widen. ``` ### Common mistakes - **A lab that does not match production.** NIST's approach tests on real assets in the group; the canaries are real assets by design. - **No incident definition.** 'No problems' cannot be audited; clause 5.2 lists what counts. - **Skipping the canary in an emergency.** NIST still suggests a canary of a few minutes to a few hours even then, to confirm the patch is not corrupted and does not break the software. - **Rollback assumed.** Some patches cannot be uninstalled; record the fallback. Continue to [maintenance windows](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/maintenance-windows/). The same work as a monthly step is described in [acquire and test](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/acquire-and-test/), and the full procedure is the [patch management procedure template](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-management-procedure/). ### Sources - [NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Planning (April 2022)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [EU Implementing Regulation 2024/2690, Annex, point 6.6](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L_202402690), read 19 Nov 2026 - [EU Delegated Regulation 2024/1774 (DORA RTS), Article 10(4)](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32024R1774), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Patch Management Policy Sections: The Nine to Include](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/) - [Patch Maintenance Window Policy Clause](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/maintenance-windows/) - [Step 4: Patch Testing Process with Canary Rings](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/acquire-and-test/) - [Patch Management Procedure Template, Nine Steps](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-management-procedure/) --- # Patch Maintenance Window Policy Clause Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/maintenance-windows/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Patch maintenance window policy A maintenance window clause fixes when installs happen and when they are forced. Microsoft publishes its monthly security update on the second Tuesday: 8 December 2026, 12 January 2027, 9 February 2027. A quarterly window cannot meet a 14 day deadline, a monthly window usually can. ### What the section must say - The standard window for each maintenance group: day, hours, time zone. - How far ahead the schedule is published. - That installation is forced after a grace period, and how. - Where reboots happen, and what is done for assets that cannot reboot. - How the window relates to the vendor's release rhythm. NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 says routine patches should be installable with some flexibility, but installation should be forced after a grace period ends, either directly by triggering patch execution or indirectly by preventing network access for unpatched assets. Its inventory example of a mission restriction is an asset that can only be rebooted during a monthly maintenance outage. ### The vendor rhythm to plan around Microsoft Learn says the monthly security update is published on the second Tuesday of each month, typically at 10:00 AM Pacific Time; an optional non-security preview update comes in the fourth week; and out-of-band updates arrive as needed. Computed from that rule, the next release days are 8 December 2026, 12 January 2027 and 9 February 2027. | Window frequency | Longest wait for an update released just after a window | Meets 14 day rule? | Meets 30 day rule? | |---|---|---|---| | Weekly | 7 days | Yes | Yes | | Fortnightly | 14 days | Only if the window falls inside the 14 days | Yes | | Monthly | Up to about 31 days | No, for a patch released early in the cycle, unless a critical window is added | Marginal | | Quarterly | Up to about 92 days | No | No | Arithmetic of the interval against the Cyber Essentials 14 day rule and the one-month PCI rule and the 30 day HIPAA proposal. Not a source figure. The consequence is a rule written into the clause: the monthly window is the default, and class 1 to 3 items get an extra window so the deadline is met. ### Sample wording ```text 6.1 Standard windows: [group A: second Tuesday, 20:00 to 02:00 local]; [group B: Saturday following, 22:00 to 04:00]. The schedule for the next [3] months is published [5] working days before each window. 6.2 Class 1 to 3 patches that would miss their deadline before the next standard window are installed in an additional window agreed with the system owner within [2] working days. 6.3 If a patch is not installed by [14] days after the start of its window, installation is forced. 6.4 Reboots required to complete an install happen inside the same window. Assets that cannot be rebooted are recorded in Annex A with the compensating measures. ``` ### Common mistakes, and live patching - **Quarterly windows.** See the table: a 90 day gap cannot satisfy a 14 or 30 day deadline. - **Treating live patching as a window.** Red Hat says live kernel patches cover selected Important and Critical CVEs, are cumulative, are supported without extra cost for 6 months after the kernel errata release date, and exist for x86_64 and ppc64le only; Canonical says Livepatch covers critical and high kernel vulnerabilities between security maintenance windows. Both are vendor statements. Write the live patch as a stopgap, not a replacement for the reboot. - **No grace period.** NIST says patches must at some point be installed; clause 6.3 forces it. See the dedicated page on [systems that cannot reboot](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/systems-that-cannot-reboot/), the guide to [how often to patch](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/how-often-to-patch/), then the next clause, [reporting and metrics](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/reporting-and-metrics/). ### Sources - [Microsoft Learn, Update release cycle for Windows clients](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/deployment/update/release-cycle), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Planning (April 2022)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NCSC, Cyber Essentials Requirements for IT Infrastructure v3.3, Security Update Management](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/sites/default/files/2026-11/Cyber-Essentials-Requirements-for-IT-Infrastructure-v3-3.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Red Hat knowledgebase, kernel live patching (updated 1 September 2026)](https://access.redhat.com/solutions/2206511), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Canonical, Livepatch](https://ubuntu.com/security/livepatch), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Patch Management Policy Sections: The Nine to Include](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/) - [Patching Systems That Cannot Be Rebooted](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/systems-that-cannot-reboot/) - [Patch Management Metrics: What the Policy Should Report](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/reporting-and-metrics/) - [How Often to Patch: Cadences From the Clauses Read](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/how-often-to-patch/) --- # Patch Management Metrics: What the Policy Should Report Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/reporting-and-metrics/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Patch management metrics A reporting clause should ask for a matrix, not one percentage. NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 section 3.6 shows the share patched by deadline, mean days and median days for each pairing of asset importance and vulnerability importance, and calls a single organization-wide percentage not actionable. ### What the section must say - Who receives the report, how often, and by what date. - The figures: share patched by deadline, mean days, median days, split by asset importance and vulnerability class. - Open exceptions with age; assets with no owner. - Where the evidence behind each figure is stored and for how long. NIST's argument is concrete: if you were told 10 percent of assets were not being patched, what would that mean for risk? If they are the most important assets it may be a major problem; if the least important it may reflect sensible prioritization. A metric that counts all vulnerabilities and the percentage patched is, in NIST's words, not actionable. ### NIST's notional matrix, with its values | Vulnerability importance | Low asset importance | Moderate asset importance | High asset importance | |---|---|---|---| | Low | 64.7% by deadline; mean 80.4 days; median 75.2 | 72.4%; 34.7; 33.7 | 85.0%; 14.6; 8.1 | | Medium | 66.5%; 75.1; 70.7 | 68.7%; 33.2; 31.6 | 71.4%; 12.9; 10.5 | | High | 68.6%; 62.1; 58.0 | 78.8%; 26.8; 22.1 | 85.5%; 8.8; 8.1 | | Critical | 81.4%; 44.4; 41.3 | 92.3%; 21.2; 23.9 | 95.2%; 5.2; 5.1 | Table 1, Vulnerability Mitigation Time Summary Matrix, NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4. The values are NIST's notional example, not measurements of any organization. Each cell: share patched by deadline, mean days, median days. NIST also says each audience needs its own cut, for instance a Linux administrator's view of Linux patching or a business unit's comparison with others, and that the low-level data should be kept accurate because errors flow into the enterprise-level figures. It adds that collecting data by less accurate methods tends to underreport vulnerabilities and skew the higher-level metrics. ### Sample wording ```text 8.1 By the [5th] working day after each cycle, the patch coordinator sends the executive sponsor a report showing, for each pairing of asset importance (high, moderate, low) and vulnerability class (1 to 5): the share of assets patched by their deadline, the mean days to patch and the median days to patch. 8.2 The report lists open exceptions with their age, assets without an owner, and windows missed with the cause. 8.3 The board receives the high-importance column for classes 1 and 2 each [quarter]. Group owners receive their own group's cells. 8.4 Data for each figure is exportable from [system] and kept for [period]. ``` ### Common mistakes, and the review cadence in CIS - **One percentage.** See NIST's 10 percent example above. - **Mean without median.** A few very old items distort a mean; NIST's matrix shows both. - **No review of the strategy.** CIS Controls v8 safeguard 7.2 asks for a risk-based remediation strategy with monthly or more frequent reviews; the cadence is for the strategy, not for installing patches. Compliance rates for auditors are covered in [patch compliance rate](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/patch-compliance-rate/). The next clause is [review and approval](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/review-and-approval/); the report as a process step is [report](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/report/). ### Sources - [NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Planning (April 2022)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CIS Controls v8 guide (August 2023), Control 7, safeguards 7.1 to 7.7](https://storage.pardot.com/799323/1693938137QgfIAdmE/CIS_Controls__v8__Critical_Security_Controls__2023_08.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Patch Management Policy Sections: The Nine to Include](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/) - [Patch Compliance Rate: Formula, Denominators, Clocks](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/patch-compliance-rate/) - [Patch Management Policy Approval and Revision](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/review-and-approval/) - [Step 8: Patch Management Report Contents](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/report/) --- # Patch Management Policy Approval and Revision Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/review-and-approval/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Patch management policy review Review a patch policy at least every 12 months, the cadence in the HIPAA Security Rule proposal and in CIS safeguard 7.1, and sooner when a framework changes: CISA BOD 26-04 took effect 10 June 2026, FedRAMP's rules become mandatory on 7 December 2026. Approval names a role, a date and a version. ### What the section must say - The review interval, and the events that trigger an earlier review. - Who approves changes: a role, not a person. - Where the approved version, its date and its approver are recorded. - Who tests the policy, and how, if a framework requires testing. The HIPAA Security Rule proposal (90 FR 898, proposed 164.308(a)(4)(ii)(B)) would require reviewing and testing written patch policies and procedures at least once every 12 months. CIS Controls v8 safeguard 7.1 asks to review and update the vulnerability management documentation annually, or when significant enterprise changes occur. Safeguard 7.2 adds monthly or more frequent reviews of the remediation strategy. ### Events that force an earlier revision, with dates | Date | Event | Effect on a policy | |---|---|---| | 27 Apr 2026 | Cyber Essentials Requirements v3.3 effective | Keeps the 14 day rule for critical or high updates; check the scope list | | 10 Jun 2026 | CISA BOD 26-04 issued; revokes BOD 19-02 and BOD 22-01 | Remove any citation of 15, 30 day or 2 week and 6 month rules as current | | 24 Jun 2026 | FedRAMP Consolidated Rules for 2026 launched | Replace legacy references in FedRAMP-bound policies | | 7 Dec 2026 (upcoming) | FedRAMP VDR rules mandatory; grace period to 7 Mar 2027 | Revise before this date if you hold or seek certification | | 7 Dec 2026 (computed) | 180 days after BOD 26-04 issue, the end of its stated Phase III | Federal agencies only; Phase I was immediate, Phase II within 60 days | | Each fiscal year | CISA reassesses BOD 26-04 Table 1 | Re-read the Table if your windows copy it | Dates as read on 19 Nov 2026; the 7 Dec computation is arithmetic from the BOD page's phase wording, not a statement on the page. The fiscal-year reassessment is why a policy that copies a BOD table should cite the issue date and carry a re-read reminder; the [dates to know](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/dates-to-know/) page tracks the others. ### Sample wording ```text 9.1 This policy is reviewed and tested at least every 12 months, and within [30] days of any of these events: a change to the timing of a framework named in section 4; a significant change to the estate; a missed class 1 window. 9.2 [Role] approves changes. Each approved version records its number, date, approver and a list of changes. 9.3 The policy's test is [a tabletop of one class 1 and one class 2 case]. The record of the test is kept with the policy. ``` ### Common mistakes - **Review date left blank.** The cover line needs a date no later than 12 months ahead. - **Review without test.** The HIPAA proposal says review and test. - **No trigger for external change.** The table shows five dated changes in 2026 alone. Return to the [policy sections](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/), or see the table of what each framework sets in [severity and patch windows](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/severity-and-patch-windows/). ### Sources - [Federal Register, HIPAA Security Rule to Strengthen the Cybersecurity of ePHI, 90 FR 898 (6 January 2025), proposed 164.308(a)(4)](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/06/2024-30983/hipaa-security-rule-to-strengthen-the-cybersecurity-of-electronic-protected-health-information), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CIS Controls v8 guide (August 2023), Control 7, safeguards 7.1 to 7.7](https://storage.pardot.com/799323/1693938137QgfIAdmE/CIS_Controls__v8__Critical_Security_Controls__2023_08.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NCSC, Cyber Essentials Requirements for IT Infrastructure v3.3, Security Update Management](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/sites/default/files/2026-11/Cyber-Essentials-Requirements-for-IT-Infrastructure-v3-3.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CISA, BOD 26-04, Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk (10 June 2026), Required Action 6 and Table 1](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk), read 19 Nov 2026 - [FedRAMP, Consolidated Rules for 2026, Rev5, Vulnerability Detection and Response](https://www.fedramp.gov/2026/providers/rev5/rules/vulnerability-detection-and-response/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [FedRAMP, Consolidated Rules for 2026, 20x, Vulnerability Detection and Response](https://www.fedramp.gov/2026/providers/20x/rules/vulnerability-detection-and-response/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [FedRAMP, notice NTC-0014 (16 June 2026)](https://www.fedramp.gov/notices/0014/), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Patch Management Policy Sections: The Nine to Include](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/) - [Patch Management Compliance Dates: 7 Dec 2026 and Back](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/dates-to-know/) - [Severity and Patch Windows: What Each Framework Sets](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/severity-and-patch-windows/) - [FedRAMP Patch Management Policy Template](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/federal-contractor-fedramp/) --- # Emergency Patch Policy Clause for a Patch Policy Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/emergency-patch-clause/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Emergency patch policy An emergency clause says when normal patch windows are suspended, who decides and how it ends. CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog held 1,786 entries on 18 November 2026, 302 added in 2026, and Mandiant measured an average 5 days from disclosure to exploitation in 2023. ### What the section must say - The triggers that allow an emergency to be declared. - Who declares, and the deputy. - Exactly what is suspended (windows, lead times, approvals) and for which assets. - What is recorded at declaration and at closure. - How the emergency ends and the standard windows resume. This page covers the policy clause only. Running a response to a new disclosure is a different subject and is outside this site. ### What public text supports NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 defines emergency patching as the procedure to address patching emergencies in a crisis situation, such as a severe vulnerability or one being actively exploited, and recommends the same general approach as routine patching on a highly accelerated schedule: a canary period of a few minutes to a few hours, then patching in the following hours or days depending on urgency. It separately names emergency mitigation, used to temporarily mitigate vulnerabilities before a patch is available, and says organizations should plan to replace emergency mitigations with permanent fixes on enforced schedules. DORA's RTS Article 10(4) asks for emergency patching procedures. | Trigger candidate | Evidence a clause can cite | Read 19 Nov 2026 | |---|---|---| | Listed in the CISA KEV catalog | 1,786 entries, version 2026.11.18; 302 added in 2026 through 18 Nov (the site's count from the feed); 361 flagged as known ransomware campaign use | Primary, JSON feed | | Vendor emergency or out-of-band update | Microsoft lists out-of-band updates as resolving a recently identified issue or vulnerability, as needed | Vendor | | Speed of exploitation | Mandiant: average time to exploit 5 days for 2023 (32 days across 2021 and 2022), 138 vulnerabilities analyzed, 15 outliers excluded | Third-party | Counts are from the CISA feed and the Mandiant analysis published 15 October 2024; time-to-exploit figures are Mandiant's and cover that sample only. ### Sample wording ```text 7.1 The policy owner, or the deputy [role], may declare an emergency for named assets when (a) a vulnerability affecting them is listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, (b) the vendor issues an emergency or out-of-band update for software they run, or (c) the policy owner judges that waiting for the standard window is unacceptable. 7.2 A declaration records: who declared, date and time, the assets, the reason and the expected end. 7.3 During an emergency the standard windows and change lead times are suspended for the named assets only. All other assets keep their windows. 7.4 A canary installation precedes the rollout, lasting minutes to hours. Where no patch exists, the mitigation in Annex A applies and is replaced by the patch on a scheduled date. 7.5 The emergency closes when the patch is installed and verified on all named assets. The policy owner records the closure and the standard windows resume. ``` ### Common mistakes - **Global suspension.** A clause that suspends all windows invites skipping tests everywhere; scope it to named assets, as 7.3 does. - **No end.** NIST wants mitigations replaced by permanent fixes on enforced schedules; clause 7.4 and 7.5 do that. - **Declaring by committee.** One role and a deputy can act in minutes, not days. Link the clause to [severity and patch windows](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/severity-and-patch-windows/) for class 1, to [testing and staging](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/testing-and-staging/) for the canary, and to the [general policy](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-management-policy-template/) for the surrounding text. ### Sources - [NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Planning (April 2022)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [EU Delegated Regulation 2024/1774 (DORA RTS), Article 10(4)](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32024R1774), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CISA, KEV catalog JSON feed, version 2026.11.18](https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CISA, Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog page](https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Google Cloud / Mandiant, Time-to-exploit trends 2023 (15 October 2024)](https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/time-to-exploit-trends-2023), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Microsoft Learn, Update release cycle for Windows clients](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/deployment/update/release-cycle), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Patch Management Policy Sections: The Nine to Include](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/) - [Severity and Patch Windows: What Each Framework Sets](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/severity-and-patch-windows/) - [Patch Testing and Staging Policy Clause](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/testing-and-staging/) - [General Patch Management Policy Template, Full Text](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-management-policy-template/) --- # Patch Window Table: Deadlines in 12 Frameworks Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Patch management timelines by framework The Patch Window Table lists 37 rows from 12 frameworks and directives, read on 19 Nov 2026. The shortest deadline each framework states runs from 12 hours (FedRAMP Class D) and 3 days (CISA BOD 26-04) to 14 days (Cyber Essentials), 15 days (proposed HIPAA) and one month (PCI DSS). NIS2, DORA and NYDFS set no number. ### How to read the table Every row is one clause or one set of clauses, read from the issuer's own text or, where the text was not readable, from the issuer's own statement of it (PCI DSS rows come from the PCI Security Standards Council's FAQ). Timing falls into three kinds. A **deadline** is a count of days or hours from a stated start. A **cadence** is a recurring interval, such as the monthly cycle in [CIS Control 7](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/cis-control-7/). **No number set** means the text read contains no figure and the organization's own policy must supply one. Calendar days are used unless the row says otherwise; the clock start differs by framework and is the first thing to check before copying any number. Of the 37 rows, 35 carry clause text and 2 are marked Not read. Two directives are shown only as history because CISA revoked them on 10 Jun 2026. How each row was read is on the [method page](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/method/). ### The table | Framework | Version | Clause | What it requires | Timing | Applies to | Source | Read | |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| | PCI DSS | 4.0.1 | 6.3.3 | Install security patches and updates; critical vulnerabilities resolved within one month of release | 1 month (30 days) for critical | Entities in PCI DSS scope (scope text not read) | PCI SSC FAQ 1597 | 2026-11-19 | | PCI DSS | 4.0.1 | 6.3.3, other patches | All other applicable patches installed within time frames set by the entity's risk assessment | No number set; entity's targeted risk analysis | Entities in PCI DSS scope | PCI SSC FAQ 1597 | 2026-11-19 | | PCI DSS | 4.0.1 | 6.3.1, 11.3.1, 11.3.1.1 | Assign risk levels to vulnerabilities; resolve critical and high-risk; address lower levels per targeted risk analysis | No number set | Entities in PCI DSS scope | PCI SSC FAQ 1597 | 2026-11-19 | | CISA BOD 26-04 | Issued 10 Jun 2026 | Table 1, rows 1, 3, 9 | Remediate and perform forensic triage: in the KEV, total control, and publicly exposed or automatable | 3 days and forensic triage | Federal agency assets; contractors only if the contract says so | CISA BOD 26-04 | 2026-11-19 | | CISA BOD 26-04 | Issued 10 Jun 2026 | Table 1, rows 2, 5 | Remediate: row 2 exposed, in the KEV, automatable, partial control; row 5 exposed, not in the KEV, automatable, total control | 3 days | Federal agency assets | CISA BOD 26-04 | 2026-11-19 | | CISA BOD 26-04 | Issued 10 Jun 2026 | Table 1, rows 4, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12 | Remediate: row 4 exposed, in the KEV, not automatable, partial; row 6 exposed, not in the KEV, automatable, partial; row 7 exposed, not in the KEV, not automatable, total; rows 10 to 12 not exposed, in the KEV, any combination other than automatable with total control | 14 calendar days | Federal agency assets | CISA BOD 26-04 | 2026-11-19 | | CISA BOD 26-04 | Issued 10 Jun 2026 | Table 1, rows 8, 13, 14 | Remediate: exposed, not in the KEV, not automatable, partial; not exposed, not in the KEV, automatable | 60 calendar days | Federal agency assets | CISA BOD 26-04 | 2026-11-19 | | CISA BOD 26-04 | Issued 10 Jun 2026 | Table 1, rows 15, 16 | Remediate at next scheduled major upgrade or rebuild: not exposed, not in the KEV, not automatable | Fix on system upgrade | Federal agency assets | CISA BOD 26-04 | 2026-11-19 | | CISA BOD 22-01 (revoked 10 Jun 2026) | Issued 3 Nov 2021 | Required actions | Remediate KEV entries by the catalog due date | 2 weeks (CVE assigned 2021 or later); 6 months (older). History only | Federal civilian agencies (historical) | CISA BOD 22-01 | 2026-11-19 | | CISA BOD 19-02 (revoked 10 Jun 2026) | Issued 29 Apr 2019 | Required actions | Remediate critical and high findings on internet-accessible systems | 15 calendar days (critical); 30 (high). History only | Federal agency internet-accessible systems (historical) | CISA BOD 19-02 | 2026-11-19 | | NIST SP 800-40 | Rev. 4, April 2022 | 3.5 | Maintenance plan per group per scenario, with timeframes for beginning and ending each action | No number set | Organizations; guidance, not a mandate | NIST SP 800-40r4 | 2026-11-19 | | NIST SP 800-40 | Rev. 4, April 2022 | 3.5.2 | Emergency patching on an accelerated schedule | No number set (hours or days, by urgency) | Emergency patching scenario | NIST SP 800-40r4 | 2026-11-19 | | NIST SP 800-40 | Rev. 4, April 2022 | 3.5 (KEV note) | Reports BOD 22-01: remediate new KEV entries within two weeks | 2 weeks, as reported for BOD 22-01; not a NIST requirement | U.S. federal agencies (historical) | NIST SP 800-40r4 | 2026-11-19 | | CIS Controls | v8, Aug 2023 guide | 7.3, 7.4 | Automated operating system and application patch management | Monthly, or more frequent | Enterprise assets; IG1, IG2, IG3 | CIS Controls v8 guide | 2026-11-19 | | CIS Controls | v8, Aug 2023 guide | 7.7 | Remediate detected software vulnerabilities per the remediation process | Monthly, or more frequent | IG2, IG3 | CIS Controls v8 guide | 2026-11-19 | | CIS Controls | v8, Aug 2023 guide | 7.2 | Risk-based remediation strategy in a documented process | Monthly, or more frequent review of the strategy | IG1, IG2, IG3 | CIS Controls v8 guide | 2026-11-19 | | CIS Controls | v8, Aug 2023 guide | 7.1 | Documented vulnerability management process | Annual review of the documentation | IG1, IG2, IG3 | CIS Controls v8 guide | 2026-11-19 | | CIS Controls | v8, Aug 2023 guide | 7.5, 7.6 | Automated vulnerability scans: internal, then externally exposed assets | Quarterly (internal); monthly (external), or more frequent | IG2, IG3 | CIS Controls v8 guide | 2026-11-19 | | HIPAA Security Rule (in force) | 45 CFR 164.308, eCFR current | (a)(1)(ii)(A), (B) | Risk analysis; security measures that reduce risks to a reasonable and appropriate level | No number set | Covered entities and business associates | eCFR 45 CFR 164.308 | 2026-11-19 | | HIPAA Security Rule NPRM (proposed) | 90 FR 898, 6 Jan 2025 | Proposed (a)(4)(ii)(C)(1) | Patch, update or upgrade for a critical risk | 15 calendar days (proposed) | Relevant electronic information systems | 90 FR 898 | 2026-11-19 | | HIPAA Security Rule NPRM (proposed) | 90 FR 898, 6 Jan 2025 | Proposed (a)(4)(ii)(C)(2) | Patch, update or upgrade for a high risk | 30 calendar days (proposed) | Relevant electronic information systems | 90 FR 898 | 2026-11-19 | | HIPAA Security Rule NPRM (proposed) | 90 FR 898, 6 Jan 2025 | Proposed (a)(4)(ii)(C)(3), (B), (D) to (F) | Other patches per written policy; annual review and test; documented exceptions with compensating controls | No number for other patches; 12 months for review (proposed) | Covered entities and business associates | 90 FR 898 | 2026-11-19 | | FedRAMP Rev5 VDR | Launched 24 Jun 2026 | VDR-TFR-PVR, Class A and B | Partially or fully mitigate, or remediate to a lower impact, by Potential Agency Impact level | 4 to 192 days (maximums, SHOULD) | Rev5 certification holders | FedRAMP VDR rules | 2026-11-19 | | FedRAMP Rev5 VDR | Launched 24 Jun 2026 | VDR-TFR-PVR, Class C | Same, shorter table | 2 to 192 days (maximums, SHOULD) | Class C certification holders | FedRAMP VDR rules | 2026-11-19 | | FedRAMP Rev5 VDR | Launched 24 Jun 2026 | VDR-TFR-PVR, Class D | Same, shortest table | 12 hours to 192 days (maximums, SHOULD) | Class D certification holders | FedRAMP VDR rules | 2026-11-19 | | FedRAMP Rev5 VDR | Launched 24 Jun 2026 | VDR-TFR-KEV | Remediate KEVs by the CISA due date, even if fully mitigated | Per KEV entry; no number set by FedRAMP | FedRAMP certification holders | FedRAMP VDR rules | 2026-11-19 | | FedRAMP Rev5 VDR | Launched 24 Jun 2026 | VDR-TFR-RMN | Mitigate or remediate remaining vulnerabilities in routine operations | No number set | FedRAMP certification holders | FedRAMP VDR rules | 2026-11-19 | | FedRAMP legacy documentation | Legacy playbook | Remediation Requirements | Remediate by risk level from discovery | 30 days (critical, high); 90 (moderate); 180 (low) | Legacy Rev5 cloud service providers | FedRAMP legacy POA&M page | 2026-11-19 | | UK Cyber Essentials | v3.3, effective 27 Apr 2026 | Security Update Management | Update, including vulnerability fixes, where critical or high risk (CVSS v3 base 7 or above) or severity unknown | 14 days of release | In-scope servers, desktops, laptops, tablets, phones, firewalls, routers, IaaS, PaaS, SaaS | NCSC Cyber Essentials v3.3 | 2026-11-19 | | EU NIS2 Implementing Regulation 2024/2690 | Adopted 17 Oct 2024 | Annex 6.6.1(a) | Security patches applied after they become available | Reasonable time; no number set | DNS, TLD, cloud, data centre, CDN, managed service, managed security service, marketplace, search engine, social network and trust service providers | EUR-Lex 2024/2690 | 2026-11-19 | | EU NIS2 Implementing Regulation 2024/2690 | Adopted 17 Oct 2024 | Annex 6.6.2 | Derogation if disadvantages outweigh benefits, documented and substantiated | No number set | Same entity types | EUR-Lex 2024/2690 | 2026-11-19 | | EU NIS2 Implementing Regulation 2024/2690 | Adopted 17 Oct 2024 | Annex 6.10.2(c) | Address vulnerabilities critical to operations | Without undue delay | Same entity types | EUR-Lex 2024/2690 | 2026-11-19 | | EU DORA RTS 2024/1774 | Adopted 13 Mar 2024 | Article 10(4)(d) | Set deadlines for patch installation and escalation if missed | No number set; entity sets deadlines | Financial entities under Regulation 2022/2554 | EUR-Lex 2024/1774 | 2026-11-19 | | EU DORA RTS 2024/1774 | Adopted 13 Mar 2024 | Article 10(2)(b) | Automated vulnerability scanning of assets supporting critical or important functions | At least weekly | Financial entities under Regulation 2022/2554 | EUR-Lex 2024/1774 | 2026-11-19 | | NYDFS 23 NYCRR Part 500 | 500.5 as amended, eff. 1 Nov 2023 | 500.5(c) | Timely remediation, prioritized by risk to the covered entity | Timely; no number set | Covered entities under Part 500 | Cornell LII 23 NYCRR 500.5 | 2026-11-19 | | ISO/IEC 27001 | 2022 | Annex A 8.8 | Text not read on 19 Nov 2026 (HTTP 403) | Not read | Not read | ISO/IEC 27001 page | 2026-11-19 | | SOC 2 Trust Services Criteria | 2017, revised points of focus 2022 | CC7.1, CC8.1 | Text not read on 19 Nov 2026 (download needs an account) | Not read | Not read | AICPA criteria download | 2026-11-19 | Patch Window Table, 37 rows, read 19 Nov 2026. Timing is stated as the source states it; maximums and proposals are labeled. Rows marked history are revoked and not current rules. ### Deadlines in one list, shortest to longest The list below orders the stated deadlines by length only, for the highest-priority row of each framework that has one. It does not compare the frameworks. - **12 hours:** FedRAMP Class D, PAIN-5, column LEV + IRV (a maximum, SHOULD). [FedRAMP page](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/fedramp/). - **3 days:** CISA BOD 26-04, Table 1, rows 2 and 5, and with forensic triage in rows 1, 3 and 9. [BOD 26-04 page](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/cisa-bod-26-04/). - **14 days:** UK Cyber Essentials v3.3, from release, for critical or high-risk updates. [Cyber Essentials page](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/cyber-essentials/). - **15 days:** HIPAA Security Rule proposal, critical risk, from identifying the need to patch (not in force). [HIPAA page](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/hipaa-security-rule/). - **One month (30 days):** PCI DSS Requirement 6.3.3 for critical vulnerabilities, from release. [PCI DSS page](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/pci-dss/). - **Monthly cadence:** CIS Controls v8, safeguards 7.3, 7.4 and 7.7. ### Frameworks that leave the number to the policy [NIST SP 800-40](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/nist-sp-800-40/), [NIS2](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/nis2/), [DORA](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/dora/), the in-force HIPAA Security Rule and [NYDFS Part 500](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/nydfs-part-500/) all require a patch process and leave the number to the organization. Each adds something checkable instead: NIST asks for timeframes inside each maintenance plan, NIS2 asks for a test step and a documented derogation, DORA asks for escalation when a deadline is missed, and NYDFS asks that priority follow the risk each vulnerability poses. A policy built on these needs its own severity table; the [policy section on severity and patch windows](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/severity-and-patch-windows/) shows one. ### Not in the table - **ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A 8.8:** iso.org returned HTTP 403 on 19 Nov 2026 and the standard text is sold. Nothing is recorded about the content of the control. - **SOC 2 criteria CC7.1 and CC8.1:** the AICPA download is a script-rendered page that needs a free account. Nothing is recorded. - **Australian Essential Eight:** cyber.gov.au did not load (connection failed) on 19 Nov 2026. No row is written and no figure is recorded. - **CIS Controls v8.1:** the safeguard text sits behind a form, so the rows are v8 as published in the August 2023 guide. ### Files The same rows are published as [CSV](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/patch-window-table.csv) and [JSON](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/patch-window-table.json), with the fields listed on the method page. The dates behind these rows are on [dates to know](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/dates-to-know/). Reuse of the files follows the [terms of use](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/terms/). ### Sources - [CISA, BOD 26-04](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk), read 19 Nov 2026 - [PCI SSC, FAQ 1597](https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/faqs/1597), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NIST, SP 800-40 Rev. 4](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CIS, Controls v8 guide, Control 07](https://storage.pardot.com/799323/1693938137QgfIAdmE/CIS_Controls__v8__Critical_Security_Controls__2023_08.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Federal Register, 90 FR 898](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/06/2024-30983/hipaa-security-rule-to-strengthen-the-cybersecurity-of-electronic-protected-health-information), read 19 Nov 2026 - [FedRAMP, VDR rules (Rev5)](https://www.fedramp.gov/2026/providers/rev5/rules/vulnerability-detection-and-response/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NCSC, Cyber Essentials Requirements v3.3](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/sites/default/files/2026-11/Cyber-Essentials-Requirements-for-IT-Infrastructure-v3-3.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [EUR-Lex, Regulation 2024/2690](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L_202402690), read 19 Nov 2026 - [EUR-Lex, Delegated Regulation 2024/1774](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32024R1774), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Cornell LII, 23 NYCRR 500.5](https://www.law.cornell.edu/regulations/new-york/23-NYCRR-500.5), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Patch Window Table Method: Row Rules and Read Log](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/method/) - [CISA BOD 26-04 Remediation Timelines, Row by Row](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/cisa-bod-26-04/) - [Severity and Patch Windows: What Each Framework Sets](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/severity-and-patch-windows/) - [Patch Management Compliance Dates: 7 Dec 2026 and Back](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/dates-to-know/) - [General Patch Management Policy Template, Full Text](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-management-policy-template/) --- # CISA BOD 26-04 Remediation Timelines, Row by Row Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/cisa-bod-26-04/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## CISA BOD 26-04 remediation timelines CISA Binding Operational Directive 26-04, issued 10 Jun 2026, revoked BOD 19-02 and BOD 22-01 and replaced them with a 16-row table: 3 days (three rows add forensic triage), 14 days, 60 days, or fix on system upgrade. FedRAMP reads the binding timelines as starting 7 Dec 2026. Table 1 was read on 19 Nov 2026. ### What the directive replaced BOD 26-04 states that it "supersedes and hereby revokes BOD 19-02" (15 calendar days for critical and 30 for high findings on internet-accessible systems) and BOD 22-01 (two weeks for Known Exploited Vulnerabilities with a CVE ID assigned in 2021 or later, six months for older ones). Both pages now carry the word Revoked and are dated 10 Jun 2026 in CISA's directive list. The old figures survive only as history in the [Patch Window Table](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/). The directive "consolidates and clarifies vulnerability remediation guidelines for federal agencies." It does not use the severity labels of the two older directives. It uses four yes-or-no inputs instead, listed below. ### The four inputs and the clock - **Publicly exposed:** yes if the asset is "accessible to unauthenticated or untrusted entities via public networks, such as the internet, regardless of its physical or logical location." If any one of several methods finds it exposed, the value is Yes. - **In the KEV:** the CVE ID has an entry in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog; the criteria for inclusion are unchanged. - **Automatable by adversary:** defined as documented by CISA's Vulnrichment program (the page points to the CERTCC/SSVC project on GitHub). - **Technical impact:** total control means the exploit "gives the adversary total control over the behavior of the software, including if the exploit reliably reveals log-in credentials"; partial control is everything less, and a denial-of-service attack counts as limited control. Days are calendar days. The timeline begins when either CISA adds the vulnerability to the KEV Catalog or the agency identifies it on an asset and updates the CDM dashboard, "whichever event occurs first." The clock is not fixed: removing an asset from the internet changes Publicly Exposed from Yes to No and moves the required timeline back, while a new KEV listing shortens it. ### Table 1, all 16 rows | Row | Publicly exposed | In the KEV | Automatable by adversary | Technical impact | Timeline (calendar days) | |---|---|---|---|---|---| | 1 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Total control | 3 days and forensic triage | | 2 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Partial control | 3 days | | 3 | Yes | Yes | No | Total control | 3 days and forensic triage | | 4 | Yes | Yes | No | Partial control | 14 days | | 5 | Yes | No | Yes | Total control | 3 days | | 6 | Yes | No | Yes | Partial control | 14 days | | 7 | Yes | No | No | Total control | 14 days | | 8 | Yes | No | No | Partial control | 60 days | | 9 | No | Yes | Yes | Total control | 3 days and forensic triage | | 10 | No | Yes | Yes | Partial control | 14 days | | 11 | No | Yes | No | Total control | 14 days | | 12 | No | Yes | No | Partial control | 14 days | | 13 | No | No | Yes | Total control | 60 days | | 14 | No | No | Yes | Partial control | 60 days | | 15 | No | No | No | Total control | Fix on system upgrade | | 16 | No | No | No | Partial control | Fix on system upgrade | BOD 26-04, Appendix A, Table 1: Remediation Timelines. CISA publishes the table as an image; every row was read from the image and checked against CISA's text on 19 Nov 2026. CISA reassesses the table once per fiscal year. Counting the rows: three rows carry 3 days with forensic triage, two carry 3 days, six carry 14 days, three carry 60 days and two carry fix on system upgrade. Every asset that is in the KEV and publicly exposed has a 3 or 14 day limit; no row sets 60 days or later for a publicly exposed asset that is in the KEV. "Forensic triage" means the agency completes remediation or mitigation within the three days and also checks whether the asset is already compromised, following the Forensic Triage Guidance in the [implementation guide](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-implementation-guidance-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk). "Fix on system upgrade" means remediation at the next scheduled major upgrade or rebuild, unless conditions change. ### Phases and the date the table binds - **Phase I, effective immediately:** update vulnerability management policies; assign roles; set validation, enforcement, tracking and reporting; monitor the KEV Catalog; report KEV status through the CDM dashboard (agencies not fully automated report manually every two weeks); continue Cyber Hygiene scanning. - **Phase II, within 60 days of issuance:** update processes to support ongoing remediation based on the CVE database and the KEV Catalog. - **Phase III, within 180 days of issuance:** remediate each vulnerability "no later than the timelines set forth in Table 1" and tag every externally reachable asset with organization, environment, exposure and asset type. FedRAMP's public notice [NTC-0014](https://www.fedramp.gov/notices/0014/) puts dates on the phases: by 7 Aug 2026 agency policies must support ongoing remediation, and by 7 Dec 2026 agencies "must begin evaluating and remediating vulnerabilities following the timelines in BOD 26-04." That is why [FedRAMP's own deadline](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/fedramp/) is also 7 Dec 2026. ### What a policy must write to meet it 1. State the four inputs by name and say who sets each one for an asset (the page says CISA's Cyber Hygiene service, the CDM program or third-party scanners may supply publicly exposed). 2. Copy the 16-row table or reference it by version, and say what happens when CISA changes it at its yearly reassessment. 3. Say that days are calendar days and that the clock starts at KEV listing or first identification on an asset, whichever is earlier. 4. Define forensic triage for the 3-day rows by pointing to CISA's guidance, and name who performs it. 5. Define remediation the way the directive does: eliminated "through patching, decommissioning the system, or another action", consistent with DoD Instruction 8531.01, NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 and NIST SP 800-216. 6. Name the enforcement and tracking steps the directive requires of agency policy: validation, enforcement, internal tracking and reporting to CISA on request. A private-sector policy that borrows the four inputs still needs an owner for each one; the [severity and patch window policy section](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/severity-and-patch-windows/) shows where that fits. NIST's account of the older two-week rule is in [NIST SP 800-40](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/nist-sp-800-40/), and the dates are in [dates to know](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/dates-to-know/). ### Evidence the text names The directive asks for a copy of agency vulnerability management policies and procedures "if requested by CISA", automated reporting of KEV status through the CDM dashboard (or a manual report every two weeks), a machine-readable asset report to CISA every seven days for agencies not fully automated, and a quarterly attestation of publicly exposed IP addresses and domain names through the Cyber Hygiene scope change process. Scope matters before copying any number into a private-sector policy. The directive applies to agency assets in a federal information system and, unless the procurement contract says so, not to contractors. For cloud offerings with a FedRAMP certification, agencies work through the FedRAMP program office. ### Sources - [CISA, BOD 26-04, Required Actions, Appendix A and Table 1](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CISA, BOD 26-04 Table 1 image](https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2026-06/BOD_26-04_Table_1_Remediation_Timelines_0.png), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CISA, BOD 22-01 (revoked)](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-22-01-reducing-significant-risk-known-exploited-vulnerabilities), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CISA, BOD 19-02 (revoked)](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-19-02-vulnerability-remediation-requirements-internet-accessible-systems), read 19 Nov 2026 - [FedRAMP, Public Notice NTC-0014](https://www.fedramp.gov/notices/0014/), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Patch Window Table: Deadlines in 12 Frameworks](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/) - [FedRAMP 2026 Patch Timeframes: 12 Hours to 192 Days](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/fedramp/) - [NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4: What It Sets for Patch Timing](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/nist-sp-800-40/) - [Severity and Patch Windows: What Each Framework Sets](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/severity-and-patch-windows/) - [Patch Management Compliance Dates: 7 Dec 2026 and Back](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/dates-to-know/) --- # NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4: What It Sets for Patch Timing Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/nist-sp-800-40/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 patch management NIST SP 800-40 Revision 4 (April 2022) gives no fixed number of days for any patch. It asks each organization to sort assets into maintenance groups and write a maintenance plan, with its own timeframes, for four scenarios. It is guidance, not a mandate. Read in full on 19 Nov 2026. ### Why this publication sets no number The NIST publication page defines enterprise patch management as "the process of identifying, prioritizing, acquiring, installing, and verifying the installation of patches, updates, and upgrades throughout an organization." Section 3.5 then leaves the clock to the reader: a maintenance plan defines the actions for a scenario, "including the timeframes for beginning and ending each action." The only day count in the text is not NIST's. It reports that CISA's BOD 22-01 required federal agencies to fix new KEV entries within two weeks, a rule since replaced by [BOD 26-04](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/cisa-bod-26-04/). The document frames the trade-off a policy window has to settle. Deploying patches faster "reduces the window of opportunity for attackers but increases the risk of operational disruption because of the lack of testing"; testing first does the reverse. ### Four scenarios, each with its own plan | Scenario | What NIST says it is | What the plan should contain | |---|---|---| | 1. Routine patching | "the standard procedure for patches that are on a regular release cycle and have not been elevated to emergency status" | Phased deployment with canary assets; flexibility on when, then forced installation after a grace period | | 2. Emergency patching | "the procedure to address patching emergencies in a crisis situation" | The same approach on an accelerated schedule; canary period of a few minutes to a few hours; patching within hours or days | | 3. Emergency mitigation | "to temporarily mitigate vulnerabilities before a patch is available" | Quick mitigations such as deactivating functionality or isolating an asset; a schedule to replace them with the patch and remove the mitigation | | 4. Unpatchable assets | "implementation of isolation or other methods to mitigate the risk of systems that cannot be easily patched" | An approved set of long-term methods per group, reviewed in advance, and periodic re-evaluation of alternatives to patching | NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Sections 3.3 and 3.5.1 to 3.5.4. Quotations are verbatim; the third column summarizes the section. The document warns that routine patching "is often postponed and neglected" and that delay "makes emergency patching more difficult, time-consuming, and disruptive because of the need to first install previous patches that new patches depend upon." ### Maintenance groups instead of exception lists A maintenance group is "a set of assets with similar characteristics that generally have the same software maintenance needs for each risk response scenario." NIST's advice is to build groups rather than exceptions: "Instead of denoting certain assets or types of assets as 'exceptions,' there should be maintenance groups for them." Its examples give each group the software to patch, outage restrictions, existing mitigations and impact if compromised. | Example group in the text | Outage restriction | Impact if compromised | |---|---|---| | Mobile workforce laptops | Tolerant to downtime | Moderate | | On-premises datacenter | Scheduled outage windows for all non-emergency situations | High | | Legacy OT assets | Scheduled outage windows; software cannot be patched | High | | Containers with customer-facing applications in the public cloud | Highly tolerant to downtime | High | NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Section 3.4 (four of six examples shown). ### Exceptions, grace periods and metrics Some exceptions are inevitable, so NIST asks organizations to "closely track and monitor all exceptions to maintenance plans" and to review them "regularly to determine if the maintenance plan can be implemented now." Assets with similar long-term exceptions move into a group of their own. On routine patches the text says to "offer flexibility with how soon routine patches are to be installed, while also forcing installation after a grace period has ended," either by triggering installation or by cutting network access for unpatched assets. Section 3.6 rejects a single percentage. "Overly simplistic metrics, such as counting the number of vulnerabilities that the entire organization had and what percentage of them were patched, are not actionable." Its notional matrix reports, per cell of asset importance and vulnerability importance, the share patched by deadline plus mean and median days; the example's critical-vulnerability, high-importance cell reads 95.2 % by deadline with a 5.2 day mean. The numbers are illustrative, not a benchmark. ### What a policy must write - A list of maintenance groups and the criteria for membership, with a named group for assets that cannot be patched. - One plan per group per scenario, each with start and end timeframes (the days are the organization's choice). - The process that decides which plan applies and when to switch plans as understanding of risk changes. - A canary or phased-deployment rule and the length of the grace period before forced installation. - An exception review interval and the rule for moving long-term exceptions into their own group. - Metrics that weigh asset and vulnerability importance, not one overall percentage. The day counts that fill these plans belong in the [severity and patch window section](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/severity-and-patch-windows/). Scenario 4 is worked through in [patching systems that cannot be rebooted](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/systems-that-cannot-reboot/), and the exceptions step in [patch exceptions clause](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-exceptions-clause/). ### Evidence a reviewer can ask for The text names no auditor. What it makes checkable is the plan itself, the group membership list, the record of deadlines met per cell of the metrics matrix, and the dated exception reviews. For assets where patch history is tracked, the document notes the history "may be particularly helpful to incident responders during an investigation." ### Questions **patch management policy nist** NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 is the usual reference. It asks for maintenance groups and a maintenance plan per scenario, and it sets no fixed day count. Each plan carries the organization's own start and end timeframes, and exceptions are reviewed regularly. ### Sources - [NIST, SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Sections 3.3 to 3.6](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NIST CSRC, SP 800-40 Rev. 4 publication page](https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/40/r4/final), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Patch Window Table: Deadlines in 12 Frameworks](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/) - [CISA BOD 26-04 Remediation Timelines, Row by Row](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/cisa-bod-26-04/) - [Severity and Patch Windows: What Each Framework Sets](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/severity-and-patch-windows/) - [Patching Systems That Cannot Be Rebooted](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/systems-that-cannot-reboot/) - [Patch Management Policy Exceptions Clause Template](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-exceptions-clause/) --- # CIS Control 7: Monthly Patching Safeguards 7.1 to 7.7 Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/cis-control-7/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## CIS Control 7 patch management CIS Controls v8, Control 7 (Continuous Vulnerability Management), sets cadences rather than deadlines: monthly or more frequent for operating system and application patching and for remediation, quarterly for internal scans. It has no severity tiers. Safeguards 7.1 to 7.7 were quoted from the August 2023 guide on 19 Nov 2026. ### Cadence, not a clock Control 7 is the only framework in the [Patch Window Table](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/) that expresses patch timing as a recurring cadence with no severity input. Safeguards 7.3 and 7.4 tell an enterprise to perform operating system and application updates "through automated patch management on a monthly, or more frequent, basis." Nothing in the text says how long after a vendor release an update may wait, or that critical items run on a faster track. The control's stated aim is to "remediate, and minimize, the window of opportunity for attackers" and to "monitor public and private industry sources for new threat and vulnerability information." ### Safeguards 7.1 to 7.7 as published | Safeguard | Text (verbatim) | Cadence | Implementation groups | |---|---|---|---| | 7.1 Establish and Maintain a Vulnerability Management Process | "Establish and maintain a documented vulnerability management process for enterprise assets." | Documentation reviewed annually or on significant change | IG1, IG2, IG3 | | 7.2 Establish and Maintain a Remediation Process | "Establish and maintain a risk-based remediation strategy documented in a remediation process, with monthly, or more frequent, reviews." | Monthly or more frequent review of the strategy | IG1, IG2, IG3 | | 7.3 Perform Automated Operating System Patch Management | "Perform operating system updates on enterprise assets through automated patch management on a monthly, or more frequent, basis." | Monthly or more frequent | IG1, IG2, IG3 | | 7.4 Perform Automated Application Patch Management | "Perform application updates on enterprise assets through automated patch management on a monthly, or more frequent, basis." | Monthly or more frequent | IG1, IG2, IG3 | | 7.5 Perform Automated Vulnerability Scans of Internal Enterprise Assets | "Perform automated vulnerability scans of internal enterprise assets on a quarterly, or more frequent, basis." | Quarterly or more frequent (scans) | IG2, IG3 | | 7.6 Perform Automated Vulnerability Scans of Externally-Exposed Enterprise Assets | "Perform scans on a monthly, or more frequent, basis." | Monthly or more frequent (scans) | IG2, IG3 | | 7.7 Remediate Detected Vulnerabilities | "Remediate detected vulnerabilities in software through processes and tooling on a monthly, or more frequent, basis, based on the remediation process." | Monthly or more frequent | IG2, IG3 | CIS Controls v8, Control 07 safeguards, from the August 2023 guide PDF. Implementation groups as marked in the safeguard index. The v8.1 wording was not read on 19 Nov 2026. Two details change how a policy should read the table. Safeguard 7.2's monthly cadence is for reviewing the remediation strategy, not for installing patches. And 7.5 and 7.6 are scanning cadences, so they belong in a vulnerability-scanning clause, not in the patch window. ### What is missing from the page The CIS Controls v8.1 safeguard text could not be read on 19 Nov 2026: the v8.1 download sits behind a form and the control 7 page on cisecurity.org shows only the overview. Every figure here is therefore v8 as published in August 2023. A policy that cites v8.1 should check the 7.3, 7.4 and 7.7 wording before copying it. ### What a policy must write to meet it - A documented vulnerability management process, reviewed at least yearly and after significant change (7.1). - A written remediation strategy that is risk-based and reviewed monthly or more often (7.2). - A monthly or faster automated cycle for operating system updates and for application updates, stated separately (7.3, 7.4). - For IG2 and IG3 enterprises, a monthly or faster remediation cadence tied to the remediation process (7.7) and scan cadences of quarterly internal and monthly external (7.5, 7.6). Because Control 7 has no severity tiers, a policy that adopts it still needs a separate rule for urgent items. The [policy section on severity and patch windows](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/severity-and-patch-windows/) shows how a severity table sits above a baseline cadence, and [NIST SP 800-40](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/nist-sp-800-40/) is the planning guide for the faster tracks. ### Evidence the text implies The safeguards ask for documents and records, not named artifacts: the vulnerability management process with its review date, the remediation process with monthly review dates, and automated patch management output showing the cycle ran. The guide names no assessor, so what a given assessor accepts is outside this page. ### Sources - [CIS, Critical Security Controls v8 guide (August 2023), Control 07 safeguards 7.1 to 7.7](https://storage.pardot.com/799323/1693938137QgfIAdmE/CIS_Controls__v8__Critical_Security_Controls__2023_08.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Patch Window Table: Deadlines in 12 Frameworks](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/) - [NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4: What It Sets for Patch Timing](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/nist-sp-800-40/) - [Severity and Patch Windows: What Each Framework Sets](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/severity-and-patch-windows/) - [Patch Management Metrics: What the Policy Should Report](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/reporting-and-metrics/) --- # PCI DSS v4.0.1 Patching: One Month for Critical Flaws Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/pci-dss/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## PCI DSS patching requirements PCI SSC FAQ 1597 says Requirement 6.3.3 of PCI DSS v4.0.1 requires patches for critical vulnerabilities within one month of release; all other patches follow time frames the entity sets from its own risk assessment. The standard's PDF returned HTTP 403 on 19 Nov 2026, so this page quotes the Council's FAQs and blog. ### What could and could not be read The standard itself (docs-prv.pcisecuritystandards.org) returned HTTP 403 on 19 Nov 2026, and the document library download sits behind an agreement form, so no clause text is quoted from the PDF. Two statements of the PCI Security Standards Council were read instead: FAQ 1597, titled "What are the expectations for entities when assigning risk rankings to vulnerabilities and resolving or addressing those vulnerabilities?" (dated May 2025), and the Council's blog post of 11 Jun 2024 announcing v4.0.1. Each is quoted below and labeled. The requirement numbers 6.3.1, 6.3.3, 11.3.1 and 11.3.1.1 come from FAQ 1597. Their exact wording, scope notes and testing procedures remain unread. ### The timing rule in the Council's words - **Critical vulnerabilities:** Requirement 6.3.3 "specifies time frames for installing security patches/updates", and "those for critical vulnerabilities must be resolved within one month of release." (FAQ 1597) - **Everything else:** "all other applicable security patches/updates must be installed within appropriate time frames determined by the entity's assessment of the risk to their environment," aligned with the risk levels assigned under 6.3.1, "for example, resolving high-risk vulnerabilities more quickly than lower-ranked vulnerabilities." (FAQ 1597) - **The v4.0.1 change:** the 11 Jun 2024 blog says Requirement 6 "reverted to PCI DSS v3.2.1 language that installing patches/updates within 30 days applies only for 'critical vulnerabilities.'" It adds that v4.0.1 has no new or deleted requirements. ### Assigning levels, resolving and addressing FAQ 1597 splits the work into two steps. Requirement 6.3.1 has the entity assign risk levels "based on impact to the entity" and identify at a minimum the high-risk or critical vulnerabilities; it "does not require that an entity accepts risk rankings assigned by external sources." Requirements 11.3.1 and 11.3.1.1 then ask that critical and high-risk vulnerabilities be resolved and lower-level ones addressed "in accordance with the entity's risk as defined and documented in a targeted risk analysis (TRA)." | Council term | Council definition (FAQ 1597) | |---|---| | Resolved | "the entity solves or fixes the vulnerability" | | Addressed | "the entity determines whether to resolve the vulnerability or to mitigate the risk by addressing the vulnerability in another way (e.g., with a compensating control or by disabling a vulnerable service)" | PCI SSC FAQ 1597, footnotes to the resolve and address steps, read 19 Nov 2026. ### Missing the window cannot be fixed afterwards FAQ 1572 (June 2025) asks whether a compensating control can cover a requirement with a defined frequency when the activity was not performed in time. The answer is No: there is "no way for them to perform the control retroactively or backdate a later occurrence of the control to an earlier period." The Council's examples include "not installing a critical security patch within 30 days of release." An assessor can still find the requirement In Place if the entity has implemented corrective actions and the assessor has assurance that the entity has a repeatable and documented process, that the miss was due to an exceptional circumstance ("poor security practices and recurring failures are not 'exceptional circumstances'"), that the cause was addressed, and that steps to prevent recurrence are in the process. Otherwise "Not in Place" is a possible finding. ### What a policy must write to meet it 1. Define critical for the entity's environment and say it comes from the entity's own risk assessment process, not from a scanner label alone. 2. State that critical patches are installed within one month (30 days) of release, and that the month starts at the vendor's release. 3. State that every other patch has a time frame tied to the risk level, with a faster window for high-risk items, and cite the targeted risk analysis that supports each window. 4. State what is done for lower-level items: resolve, or address by another documented route. 5. Describe the corrective-action record kept whenever a window is missed, covering the points FAQ 1572 lists. ### Evidence an assessor looks for From the two FAQs: the risk-level method and its output (6.3.1), the targeted risk analysis behind non-critical time frames, patch install dates compared with vendor release dates for critical items, and, for any miss, the documented corrective actions and the repeatable process the assessor must be assured of. Which artifacts a particular assessor requests for a Report on Compliance or Self-Assessment Questionnaire is not stated in the sources read. The [payment card policy template](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/payment-card-pci-dss/) uses the one-month rule, and the [Patch Window Table](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/) and [severity and patch window section](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/severity-and-patch-windows/) show how it sits beside other frameworks. ### Sources - [PCI SSC, FAQ 1597, assigning risk levels and resolving or addressing vulnerabilities (May 2025)](https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/faqs/1597), read 19 Nov 2026 - [PCI SSC, FAQ 1572, compensating controls and missed frequencies (June 2025)](https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/faqs/1572), read 19 Nov 2026 - [PCI SSC blog, Just Published: PCI DSS v4.0.1 (11 Jun 2024)](https://blog.pcisecuritystandards.org/just-published-pci-dss-v4-0-1), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Patch Window Table: Deadlines in 12 Frameworks](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/) - [PCI DSS Patch Management Policy Template](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/payment-card-pci-dss/) - [Severity and Patch Windows: What Each Framework Sets](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/severity-and-patch-windows/) - [Patch Management Compliance Dates: 7 Dec 2026 and Back](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/dates-to-know/) --- # HIPAA Patch Rules: In Force Text and the 15/30 Day Proposal Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/hipaa-security-rule/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## HIPAA patch management requirements The HIPAA Security Rule now in force sets no patch deadline. The proposed rule published 6 Jan 2025 (90 FR 898) would require patching within 15 calendar days for critical risk and 30 for high risk. A Federal Register search on 19 Nov 2026 found no final rule, so the proposal is not in force. ### What is in force The eCFR text of 45 CFR 164.308, whose latest amendment is dated 30 Dec 2016, does not use the word patch in the text read. Two clauses carry the weight. The risk analysis clause, 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(A), calls for "an accurate and thorough assessment of the potential risks and vulnerabilities to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of electronic protected health information." The risk management clause, 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B), calls for "security measures sufficient to reduce risks and vulnerabilities to a reasonable and appropriate level." Malware protection, 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(B), is an addressable specification reading "Procedures for guarding against, detecting, and reporting malicious software." Neither clause names a number of days, so a covered entity's own written window, justified by its risk analysis, is what an investigator would read. ### What the proposal would add The notice of proposed rulemaking, published 6 Jan 2025 as 90 FR 898 (document 2024-30983, comments closed 7 Mar 2025), proposes a new patch management standard at 164.308(a)(4). It would require written policies and procedures "for identifying, prioritizing, acquiring, installing, evaluating, and verifying the timely installation of patches, updates, and upgrades," reviewed and tested at least once every 12 months. | Proposed paragraph | Window | Condition | |---|---|---| | 164.308(a)(4)(ii)(C)(1) | 15 calendar days | Critical risk, counted from identifying the need to patch; where no patch is available, from when one becomes available | | 164.308(a)(4)(ii)(C)(2) | 30 calendar days | High risk, same counting rule | | 164.308(a)(4)(ii)(C)(3) | As documented in the entity's own policy | All other patches, updates and upgrades | | 164.308(a)(4)(ii)(B) | 12 months | Review and test of the written policies and procedures | HIPAA Security Rule NPRM, 90 FR 898, proposed text read from the Federal Register full text on 19 Nov 2026. Proposal only. The proposal bases the windows on the entity's own risk analysis, its vulnerability scans, monitoring of authoritative sources and penetration tests, "within a reasonable and appropriate period of time." The clock therefore starts at the entity's identification, not at vendor release, which differs from [UK Cyber Essentials](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/cyber-essentials/)' 14 days from release. ### The proposed exceptions Two exceptions would apply, each only if documented: no patch, update or upgrade is available to address a risk found in the risk analysis, or the only available one "would adversely affect the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of electronic protected health information." Where an exception applies, the entity "must document in real-time" the exception and implement reasonable and appropriate compensating controls until a patch that does not cause that harm becomes available. The clause text is policy content only here; how to decide whether to accept a risk sits outside this site. Note: Status check: a Federal Register API search of documents published from 7 Jan 2025 to 19 Nov 2026 returned 23 hits, none a final Security Rule. The HHS fact sheet returned HTTP 403 and the Unified Agenda entry was not read, so "not final" rests on that search alone. ### What a policy must write - Today: a written patch window per risk level that follows from the risk analysis, with the analysis dated and tied to the window. No number is dictated. - If preparing for the proposal: a 15 day window for critical risk and 30 days for high risk, counted from identifying the need to patch, and a documented rule for everything below. - An annual review and test of the patch policy, with the test result recorded. - A written exception step with real-time documentation, a named reason from the two permitted, and the compensating controls in place until the patch can be applied. ### Evidence Under the proposal, the entity would have to produce the written policies, the record of the 12 month review and test, and for each exception the real-time documentation and the compensating controls. The health-care template at [HIPAA patch management policy](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/healthcare-hipaa/) carries the in-force wording and flags the proposed numbers separately. Row-level timing is in the [Patch Window Table](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/), and the proposal's dates are in [dates to know](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/dates-to-know/). ### Sources - [eCFR, 45 CFR 164.308 (current)](https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-45/subtitle-A/subchapter-C/part-164/subpart-C/section-164.308), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Federal Register, HIPAA Security Rule to Strengthen the Cybersecurity of ePHI, 90 FR 898](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/06/2024-30983/hipaa-security-rule-to-strengthen-the-cybersecurity-of-electronic-protected-health-information), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Federal Register API, document 2024-30983 (dates)](https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/documents/2024-30983.json), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Federal Register API, status search 7 Jan 2025 to 19 Nov 2026](https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/documents.json), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Patch Window Table: Deadlines in 12 Frameworks](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/) - [HIPAA Patch Management Policy Template](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/healthcare-hipaa/) - [Cyber Essentials 14 Day Patching Rule (v3.3, April 2026)](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/cyber-essentials/) - [Emergency Patch Policy Clause for a Patch Policy](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/emergency-patch-clause/) - [Patch Management Compliance Dates: 7 Dec 2026 and Back](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/dates-to-know/) --- # FedRAMP 2026 Patch Timeframes: 12 Hours to 192 Days Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/fedramp/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## FedRAMP patching requirements FedRAMP's Consolidated Rules for 2026 set maximum timeframes from 12 hours to 192 days by certification Class, impact level and exploitability, and follow CISA's KEV due dates. Initial and ongoing certification must meet them from 7 Dec 2026, with a grace period to 7 Mar 2027. Read 19 Nov 2026. ### Status and dates The FedRAMP rules for Vulnerability Detection and Response (VDR) launched on 24 Jun 2026 and are marked "Required (Mandated by CISA BOD 26-04)." The page lists optional adoption from 4 Jul 2026, initial and ongoing certification from 7 Dec 2026, and a grace period ending 7 Mar 2027. FedRAMP's public notice [NTC-0014](https://www.fedramp.gov/notices/0014/) explains the move: mandatory adoption had been planned for 1 Jun 2027 with a grace period to 1 Jan 2028, and BOD 26-04 "makes it clear" that CISA will not wait. The notice also says the legacy monthly vulnerability scanning process "is insufficient." During the grace period, offerings not yet following the rules "may maintain their FedRAMP Certification under a corrective action plan (which will include notice to all agencies)," and after 7 Mar 2027 certification "will be revoked for all cloud service offerings not following these rules." The notice also reminds providers that the timeframes are "maximum timeframes" and that providers "should mitigate and/or remediate vulnerabilities much faster." Control mappings were last updated on 13 Oct 2026, when the page records adding SI-2(3) to the timeframe rule; the earlier 1 Jul 2026 entry notes no change to the requirement. ### The timeframe rule Rule VDR-TFR-PVR says providers "SHOULD partially mitigate vulnerabilities, fully mitigate vulnerabilities, or remediate vulnerabilities to a lower potential agency impact within the timeframes from evaluation shown below," factoring in the Potential Agency Impact "N-rating" (PAIN), internet reachability and likely exploitability. The days are maxima. The Class A and Class B tables are identical. | PAIN level and column | Class A and B | Class C | Class D | |---|---|---|---| | PAIN-5, LEV + IRV | 4 days | 2 days | 12 hours | | PAIN-5, LEV + NIRV | 8 days | 4 days | 1 day | | PAIN-5, NLEV | 32 days | 16 days | 8 days | | PAIN-4, LEV + IRV | 8 days | 4 days | 2 days | | PAIN-4, LEV + NIRV | 32 days | 8 days | 8 days | | PAIN-4, NLEV | 64 days | 64 days | 32 days | | PAIN-3, LEV + IRV | 32 days | 16 days | 8 days | | PAIN-3, LEV + NIRV | 64 days | 32 days | 16 days | | PAIN-3, NLEV | 192 days | 128 days | 64 days | | PAIN-2, LEV + IRV | 96 days | 48 days | 24 days | | PAIN-2, LEV + NIRV | 160 days | 128 days | 96 days | | PAIN-2, NLEV | 192 days | 192 days | 192 days | FedRAMP Consolidated Rules for 2026, Rev5 path, VDR-TFR-PVR, timeframes from evaluation. Column labels are as printed on the page (LEV + IRV, LEV + NIRV, NLEV); the page text read does not expand them, so they are not expanded here. Read 19 Nov 2026. Class D is the only table that uses hours: 12 hours for PAIN-5 where the column is LEV + IRV. The longest figure anywhere, 192 days, appears in all three tables. ### KEVs and everything else - **VDR-TFR-KEV:** providers "SHOULD remediate Known Exploited Vulnerabilities according to the due dates in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog (even if the vulnerability has been fully mitigated)" as BOD 26-04 or successor guidance requires. FedRAMP sets no separate number; the [BOD 26-04 table](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/cisa-bod-26-04/) governs. - **VDR-TFR-RMN:** providers "SHOULD mitigate or remediate remaining vulnerabilities during routine operations as determined necessary by the provider." No number. - **VDR-CSO-AKE:** providers "SHOULD NOT deploy or otherwise activate new machine-based information resources with Known Exploited Vulnerabilities." ### The older figures FedRAMP's legacy playbook page on plans of action and milestones still reads: "FedRAMP requires Critical and High risks to be remediated within 30 days of discovery, Moderate risks within 90 days of discovery, and Low risks within 180 days of discovery." That text sits in the legacy documentation, not in the 2026 rules, and the 2026 VDR page does not mention 30, 90 or 180 days. The continuous monitoring strategy guide itself was not opened by name, so those three figures are attributed to the legacy page only. ### What a policy must write 1. Name the certification Class the cloud offering holds and copy the matching column of the timeframe table. 2. Define how Potential Agency Impact, internet reachability and likely exploitability are assigned to each finding, since the table cannot be applied without them. 3. Say that KEV-listed vulnerabilities follow the CISA due date and that a full mitigation does not end the remediation duty. 4. Say what is done for remaining vulnerabilities and who decides it is necessary. 5. State that failures in detection and response are themselves treated as vulnerabilities (rule VDR-CSO-FAV). ### Evidence The VDR page frames the rules as continuous and automated: providers should "use automated services to improve and streamline vulnerability detection and response," and the page states the rules give flexibility in implementation "while ensuring agencies receive the information needed to support ongoing authorization decisions." The evidence is therefore the provider's evaluation records and timestamps compared with the table. FedRAMP's sibling Vulnerability Evaluation and Reporting rules, mandatory on the same date, cover how the evaluation and reporting are done and were not compared line by line here. A contractor-facing policy is in the [FedRAMP template](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/federal-contractor-fedramp/); every date is in [dates to know](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/dates-to-know/); row-level timing is in the [Patch Window Table](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/). ### Sources - [FedRAMP, Consolidated Rules for 2026, Rev5, Vulnerability Detection and Response](https://www.fedramp.gov/2026/providers/rev5/rules/vulnerability-detection-and-response/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [FedRAMP, 20x path, Vulnerability Detection and Response (status dates)](https://www.fedramp.gov/2026/providers/20x/rules/vulnerability-detection-and-response/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [FedRAMP, Public Notice NTC-0014](https://www.fedramp.gov/notices/0014/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [FedRAMP, legacy playbook, POA&M remediation requirements](https://www.fedramp.gov/legacy/playbook/csp/authorization/poam/), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Patch Window Table: Deadlines in 12 Frameworks](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/) - [CISA BOD 26-04 Remediation Timelines, Row by Row](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/cisa-bod-26-04/) - [FedRAMP Patch Management Policy Template](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/federal-contractor-fedramp/) - [Patch Management Compliance Dates: 7 Dec 2026 and Back](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/dates-to-know/) --- # Cyber Essentials 14 Day Patching Rule (v3.3, April 2026) Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/cyber-essentials/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Cyber Essentials 14 day patching UK Cyber Essentials Requirements for IT Infrastructure v3.3 (April 2026, effective 27 Apr 2026) requires updates that fix vulnerabilities described as critical or high risk, or with a "CVSS v3 base score of 7 or above", to be installed within 14 days of release. Applying every update in 14 days is advised, not required. ### The clause Under Security Update Management, the requirements apply to servers, desktop computers, laptops, tablets, mobile phones, firewalls, routers, IaaS, PaaS and SaaS. All software on in-scope devices must "be licensed and supported," be removed when it becomes unsupported (or removed from scope by a defined subset that blocks all traffic to and from the internet), have automatic updates enabled where possible, and "be updated, including vulnerability fixes, within 14 days of release" where any of three conditions holds. 1. The update fixes vulnerabilities described by the vendor as critical or high risk. 2. The update addresses vulnerabilities with a "CVSS v3 base score of 7 or above". 3. There are no details from the vendor on the level of vulnerabilities the update fixes. ### What the guidance adds - **Not mandatory, but advised:** "For optimum security we strongly recommend (but it's not mandatory) that all released updates are applied within 14 days of release." - **Why 14:** "14 days is considered a reasonable period to be able to implement this requirement. Any longer would constitute a serious security risk while a shorter period may not be practical." - **Bundled updates:** if a vendor ships multiple issues of differing severity as one update, and it covers any critical or high-risk issue, "then it must be installed within 14 days." - **Different vendor wording:** where a vendor uses other severity terms, "critical" or "high risk" means a "CVSS v3 base score of 7 or above", or identified as such by the vendor. ### What changed around it Version 3.3 became the current version on 27 Apr 2026, per the NCSC resources page, and the document's own list of changes does not touch the 14 day rule. The changes include a definition of cloud services, a statement that cloud services cannot be excluded from scope, and the introduction of the Software Security Code of Practice. Reports of question-set changes tied to the same date could not be confirmed from the documents readable on 19 Nov 2026 and are left out. The clock differs from other frameworks in the table. Cyber Essentials counts from vendor release; the [HIPAA proposal](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/hipaa-security-rule/) counts from the entity's identification of the need to patch; the [BOD 26-04](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/cisa-bod-26-04/) clock starts at KEV listing or first identification on an asset. ### What a policy must write - A 14 day window from vendor release for critical or high-risk updates, stated in days and measured from release. - The severity test copied from the scheme: vendor wording of critical or high risk, CVSS v3 base 7 or above, or no vendor detail at all (which must be treated as in scope). - A rule for bundled updates that says one critical item in the bundle triggers the 14 days for the whole update. - A supported-software rule: licensed, with a vendor-published end date for fixes, and removed or isolated from the internet once unsupported. - Automatic updates enabled where possible, with the exceptions listed. ### Evidence The document tells applicants that they "might also be required to supply evidence before your Certification Body can award certification." It defines licensed and supported software as software with a vendor commitment to "regular vulnerability fixes" and a published future date when they stop. The checkable records are therefore install dates against release dates for critical and high items, the list of in-scope devices, and each product's vendor support end date. The questions a certification body asks beyond that are not in the document. A small-organization policy built on the 14 day rule is in the [small business template](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/small-business/); the other numbers sit in the [Patch Window Table](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/), and the [severity and patch window section](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/severity-and-patch-windows/) shows how to write them. ### Sources - [NCSC, Cyber Essentials: Requirements for IT Infrastructure v3.3, Security Update Management (April 2026)](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/sites/default/files/2026-11/Cyber-Essentials-Requirements-for-IT-Infrastructure-v3-3.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NCSC, Cyber Essentials resources (version and effective date)](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/cyberessentials/resources), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Patch Window Table: Deadlines in 12 Frameworks](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/) - [HIPAA Patch Rules: In Force Text and the 15/30 Day Proposal](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/hipaa-security-rule/) - [Small Business Patch Management Policy Template](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/small-business/) - [Severity and Patch Windows: What Each Framework Sets](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/severity-and-patch-windows/) --- # NIS2 Patch Management: Point 6.6 of Regulation 2024/2690 Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/nis2/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## NIS2 patch management Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2690, point 6.6, requires security patches to be applied "within a reasonable time after they become available", tested first and taken from trusted sources, with a documented derogation when harm outweighs benefit. It sets no day count. Adopted 17 Oct 2024; read 19 Nov 2026. ### Whom the text covers Regulation 2024/2690 was adopted on 17 Oct 2024 and published in the Official Journal on 18 Oct 2024, under Article 21(5) of the NIS 2 Directive. Its Annex applies to DNS service providers, TLD name registries, cloud computing service providers, data centre service providers, content delivery network providers, managed service providers, managed security service providers, providers of online marketplaces, online search engines and social networking platforms, and trust service providers. Other NIS2 entities are governed by their national transposition, which this page does not read. ### Point 6.6, clause by clause Point 6.6.1 asks entities to "specify and apply procedures, coherent with the change management procedures" and with vulnerability, risk and other management procedures, "for ensuring that": | Clause | Verbatim text | What it fixes | |---|---|---| | 6.6.1(a) | "security patches are applied within a reasonable time after they become available" | Timing: reasonable time, counted from availability; no day count | | 6.6.1(b) | "security patches are tested before being applied in production systems" | A test step before production | | 6.6.1(c) | "security patches come from trusted sources and are checked for integrity" | Provenance and integrity check | | 6.6.1(d) | "additional measures are implemented and residual risks are accepted in cases where a patch is not available or not applied pursuant to point 6.6.2" | Fallback when no patch or a derogation applies | Regulation (EU) 2024/2690, Annex, point 6.6.1, read on EUR-Lex on 19 Nov 2026. Point 6.6.2 allows a derogation: entities "may choose not to apply security patches when the disadvantages of applying the security patches outweigh the cybersecurity benefits," and "shall duly document and substantiate the reasons for any such decision." ### Related points that bear on a patch window - **6.4.2 and 6.4.3, change management:** changes to software and hardware in operation must be documented and, based on the risk assessment, "tested and assessed in view of the potential impact before being implemented." If an emergency prevents the regular procedure, the entity documents the result and why the procedure could not be followed. - **6.10.2(c), vulnerability handling:** entities shall "address, without undue delay, vulnerabilities identified by the relevant entities as critical to their operations." This is the only timing wording in the Annex tighter than "reasonable time", and it attaches to vulnerabilities critical to operations rather than to patches. - **6.10.3:** when justified by impact the entity creates and implements a mitigation plan; otherwise it documents and substantiates why the vulnerability "does not require remediation." ### Recital 16 behind it Recital 16 explains the intent: "to avoid significant disruption and harm caused by the exploitation of unpatched vulnerabilities," entities should apply patch procedures aligned with their change, vulnerability and risk management, and take measures "proportionate to their resources to ensure that security patches do not introduce additional vulnerabilities or instabilities." Where an update makes a service inaccessible by plan, entities "are encouraged to duly inform customers in advance." That sentence is encouragement, not a requirement. ### What a policy must write 1. A patch procedure that cross-refers to the change, vulnerability and risk procedures by name. 2. A stated time standard. The text says reasonable time, so the policy supplies the number; [DORA](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/dora/) takes the same approach and [Cyber Essentials](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/cyber-essentials/) fixes 14 days for critical or high items. 3. A test step before production and a source-and-integrity check for every patch. 4. A derogation rule that requires a written reason weighing disadvantages against benefit, and the additional measures that apply while the patch is not applied. 5. A separate target for vulnerabilities critical to operations, worded as without undue delay. ### Evidence The Annex names records, not an inspector's checklist: the documented procedures, the documented and substantiated reason for every derogation, the change records showing tests and impact assessment, and the residual risk acceptance in 6.6.1(d). How a national authority audits these is set nationally and was not read. The derogation record is the same object a policy's exceptions step produces; see [patch exceptions clause](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-exceptions-clause/), and the other frameworks side by side in the [Patch Window Table](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/). ### Sources - [EUR-Lex, Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2690, Annex points 6.4, 6.6 and 6.10 and recital 16](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L_202402690), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Patch Window Table: Deadlines in 12 Frameworks](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/) - [DORA Patch Management: Article 10 of RTS 2024/1774](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/dora/) - [Cyber Essentials 14 Day Patching Rule (v3.3, April 2026)](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/cyber-essentials/) - [Patch Management Policy Exceptions Clause Template](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-exceptions-clause/) - [Emergency Patch Policy Clause for a Patch Policy](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/emergency-patch-clause/) --- # DORA Patch Management: Article 10 of RTS 2024/1774 Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/dora/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## DORA patch management Under DORA's technical standard, Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1774 Article 10, financial entities must "set deadlines for the installation of software and hardware patches" with escalation when missed, and scan assets supporting critical or important functions at least weekly. No day count is fixed. DORA applies from 17 Jan 2025. ### Dates and legal basis DORA, Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, was signed on 14 Dec 2022 and "shall apply from 17 January 2025." The regulatory technical standard that carries the patch detail, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1774, was adopted on 13 Mar 2024 and published in the Official Journal on 25 Jun 2024. Article 10 of the standard is titled Vulnerability and patch management and sits inside the ICT security policies required by Article 9(2) of DORA. ### Article 10(3) and 10(4): the patch procedure Paragraph 3 says financial entities "shall develop, document and implement patch management procedures." Paragraph 4 lists what those procedures shall do: | Article 10(4) | Verbatim text | |---|---| | (a) | "to the extent possible identify and evaluate available software and hardware patches and updates using automated tools" | | (b) | "identify emergency procedures for the patching and updating of ICT assets" | | (c) | "test and deploy the software and hardware patches and the updates" referred to in Article 8(2) | | (d) | "set deadlines for the installation of software and hardware patches and updates and escalation procedures in case those deadlines cannot be met" | Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1774, Article 10(4), read on EUR-Lex on 19 Nov 2026. The deadline is the entity's own, but the clause makes an escalation path part of the policy. A policy that sets a window and has no step for when it is missed does not meet (d). ### Article 10(2): the vulnerability side - **(b) scanning:** automated scans and assessments at a frequency "commensurate to the classification" of the asset and its risk profile, and "on at least a weekly basis" for ICT assets supporting critical or important functions. - **(f) prioritizing:** "prioritise the deployment of patches and other mitigation measures", considering "the criticality of the vulnerability, the classification" of the asset and its risk profile. - **(g) and (h):** monitor and verify the remediation of vulnerabilities, and record every detected vulnerability and its resolution. - **(c) and (d) third parties:** verify that ICT third-party providers handle vulnerabilities and report at least the critical ones in a timely manner, and track the use of third-party and open-source libraries, monitoring their versions and possible updates. ### Recital 12 on testing Recital 12 of the standard says patch management "should be a crucial part of those ICT security policies and procedures that, through testing and deployment in a controlled environment, are to resolve identified vulnerabilities and to prevent disruptions from the installation of patches." So the testing step is part of the duty, not an option that a tight deadline can remove. ### What a policy must write 1. A patch procedure document that exists as its own procedure, not a line in a general security policy. 2. Deadlines per asset class or severity set by the entity, with the rule for choosing each (criticality, asset classification, risk profile). 3. An escalation procedure with owners and a time trigger for missed deadlines. 4. An emergency patching procedure, stated separately from the routine one. 5. Automated identification of patches where possible, and the reason when it is not. 6. A weekly scan commitment for assets supporting critical or important functions, and a record of detected vulnerabilities and their resolution. ### Evidence The standard describes documents and records: the documented procedure, the deadlines, the escalation log, the weekly scan results, and the remediation tracking in (g) and (h). The competent authority's own supervisory expectations were not read. A separate emergency step is worked through in the [emergency patch clause](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/emergency-patch-clause/); the other frameworks sit side by side in the [Patch Window Table](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/). For the shared logic of reasonable time, see [NIS2](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/nis2/); for a fixed bar, see [Cyber Essentials](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/cyber-essentials/). ### Sources - [EUR-Lex, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1774, Article 10 and recital 12](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32024R1774), read 19 Nov 2026 - [EUR-Lex, Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 (DORA), application date](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32022R2554), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Patch Window Table: Deadlines in 12 Frameworks](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/) - [NIS2 Patch Management: Point 6.6 of Regulation 2024/2690](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/nis2/) - [Cyber Essentials 14 Day Patching Rule (v3.3, April 2026)](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/cyber-essentials/) - [Emergency Patch Policy Clause for a Patch Policy](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/emergency-patch-clause/) - [Patch Management Metrics: What the Policy Should Report](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/reporting-and-metrics/) --- # NYDFS Part 500.5: Timely Remediation, No Day Count Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/nydfs-part-500/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## NYDFS patch management NYDFS 23 NYCRR 500.5(c) requires covered entities to "timely remediate vulnerabilities, giving priority to vulnerabilities based on the risk they pose." No number of days is set. Section 500.5 was amended effective 1 Nov 2023 and also requires written vulnerability management policies. Read on the Cornell LII copy, 19 Nov 2026. ### The section as published Section 500.5, titled Vulnerability management, begins by requiring each covered entity, "in accordance with its risk assessment," to "develop and implement written policies and procedures for vulnerability management that are designed to assess and maintain the effectiveness of its cybersecurity program." Those policies must be designed to ensure that the entity does three things. | Paragraph | Verbatim text | Timing wording | |---|---|---| | 500.5(a)(1) | penetration testing "from both inside and outside the information systems' boundaries by a qualified internal or external party at least annually" | At least annually | | 500.5(a)(2) | "automated scans of information systems, and a manual review of systems not covered by such scans" | "at a frequency determined by the risk assessment, and promptly after any material system changes" | | 500.5(b) | "are promptly informed of new security vulnerabilities by having a monitoring process in place" | Promptly | | 500.5(c) | "timely remediate vulnerabilities, giving priority to vulnerabilities based on the risk they pose to the covered entity" | Timely, risk-prioritized | 23 NYCRR 500.5, Adopted 1 Mar 2017 (eff. 3/1/2017), Amended 1 Nov 2023 (eff. 11/1/2023), per the register notes on the Cornell LII copy. Four time words appear (annually, promptly, timely and a frequency set by the risk assessment) and none is a number except the yearly penetration test. The department's own site, dfs.ny.gov, was reached but the Part 500 text was not read there, so this page relies on the Cornell Legal Information Institute copy. ### What changed in 2023 The register notes show the section was adopted effective 1 Mar 2017 and amended effective 1 Nov 2023. The text as read is the amended one. Which words the 2023 amendment changed was not compared against the 2017 text and is not stated here. ### What a policy must write - A written vulnerability management policy and procedure that cites the entity's risk assessment as its basis. - A definition of timely for remediation, in days per risk tier, since the regulation leaves it open. The tiers must trace to the risk each vulnerability poses to the entity, because 500.5(c) orders priority by risk. - A scan frequency chosen from the risk assessment, a manual review for systems the scans do not cover, and a rule to scan promptly after material system changes. - A monitoring process that tells the entity of new vulnerabilities, with the sources named. - An annual penetration test by a qualified party, inside and outside the boundary. ### Evidence The paragraph structure shows what can be checked: the written policy, the risk assessment that sets scan frequency, scan and manual review records, evidence of the monitoring process, the penetration test report and dates, and remediation records showing risk-based ordering. Any inspection practice of the department beyond the text was not read. For a regulator that names a number, compare [HIPAA's proposed 15 and 30 days](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/hipaa-security-rule/); for one that also leaves the number to the entity but requires escalation, see [DORA](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/dora/); and see the full [Patch Window Table](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/). ### Sources - [Cornell LII, 23 NYCRR 500.5 Vulnerability management](https://www.law.cornell.edu/regulations/new-york/23-NYCRR-500.5), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Patch Window Table: Deadlines in 12 Frameworks](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/) - [HIPAA Patch Rules: In Force Text and the 15/30 Day Proposal](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/hipaa-security-rule/) - [DORA Patch Management: Article 10 of RTS 2024/1774](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/dora/) - [Severity and Patch Windows: What Each Framework Sets](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/severity-and-patch-windows/) --- # Patch Window Table Method: Row Rules and Read Log Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/method/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Patch window table method Each row of the Patch Window Table was read from an issuer's own text on 19 Nov 2026, with the clause, the quote or paraphrase, the source URL and the read date recorded. Where a source could not be opened, the row says Not read. CISA's BOD 26-04 revoked BOD 19-02 and BOD 22-01 on 10 Jun 2026. ### Row rules - One row per clause or per set of clauses with the same timing. A framework with several tiers gets several rows. - Text comes from the issuer: the directive page, the regulation on EUR-Lex, the eCFR, the Federal Register, the Council's FAQ. Secondary summaries are used only when the issuer's text could not be opened, and the row names the issuer's own statement. - Timing is copied as the source states it. A proposal is labeled proposed. A maximum is labeled maximum. A revoked rule is labeled history. - **No number set** means the text read contains no figure for the clause. The row is not a statement that the framework has no timing anywhere; it is a statement about the text that was read. - **Not read** means the source could not be opened. Nothing about the content is recorded and no number is filled in from other sources. ### Read log, 19 Nov 2026 | Source | Result | Effect on the table | |---|---|---| | PCI DSS v4.0.1 PDF (docs-prv.pcisecuritystandards.org) | HTTP 403; the document library download needs an agreement form | Rows use PCI SSC FAQ 1597 and the 11 Jun 2024 blog; clause wording is unread | | ISO/IEC 27001:2022 (iso.org) | HTTP 403 on every page tried; standard text is sold | Row marked Not read | | SOC 2 Trust Services Criteria (aicpa-cima.com) | Page loads as a script app; the download needs an account | Row marked Not read | | Australian Essential Eight (cyber.gov.au) | Connection failed, no HTTP status returned | No row written | | CIS Controls v8.1 | Download behind a form | Rows use the v8 guide of August 2023 | | HHS HIPAA Security Rule fact sheet (hhs.gov) | HTTP 403 | Rows use the Federal Register text and API | | CISA BOD 26-04 page and Table 1 image | Page text read; the table is an image on the page, and the image file was opened and read row by row | 16 rows verified against the page's definitions | | FedRAMP notice NTC-0014 and the VDR rules page | Both page texts read | Dates and tables as printed | | Cornell LII for 23 NYCRR 500.5 | Read; dfs.ny.gov Part 500 text not read | Row cites Cornell LII | Results observed on 19 Nov 2026. A later read may differ; see the corrections page. ### BOD 26-04 and the two directives it revoked CISA issued BOD 19-02 on 29 Apr 2019 (15 calendar days for critical, 30 for high findings on internet-accessible systems) and BOD 22-01 on 3 Nov 2021 (two weeks for KEV entries with a CVE ID assigned in 2021 or later, six months for older ones). BOD 26-04, dated 10 Jun 2026, "supersedes and hereby revokes" both, and the pages for the two old directives now carry the word Revoked. They appear in the table as history so that a policy citing them can see what replaced them. The first reading of Table 1 had been taken from the image by eye. On 19 Nov 2026 the image file was opened again and all 16 rows were read against the page's definitions of publicly exposed, in the KEV, automatable and technical impact; the counts on the [BOD 26-04 page](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/cisa-bod-26-04/) come from that check. The directive's Phase III, in which Table 1 binds, is read by FedRAMP's notice as 7 Dec 2026. ### Files and fields The table is published as [CSV](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/patch-window-table.csv) and [JSON](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/patch-window-table.json). Fields, in order: - framework, version, clause_id, clause_text (verbatim, quote marks removed) - timing_set, applies_to, severity_basis - source_url, read_date (always an ISO date) - notes (what could not be read or confirmed) and kind (primary for standards, regulations and government text) ### Updates Rows keep the date they were read. A changed rule is added as a new row with the new date and the old row is labeled history, as with BOD 22-01. Errors are logged on the [corrections page](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/corrections/). The wider site method is on the [site method page](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/method/), and the table itself is at the [Patch Window Table](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/). ### Sources - [CISA, BOD 26-04](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CISA, BOD 26-04 Table 1 image](https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2026-06/BOD_26-04_Table_1_Remediation_Timelines_0.png), read 19 Nov 2026 - [FedRAMP, Public Notice NTC-0014](https://www.fedramp.gov/notices/0014/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [ISO, ISO/IEC 27001 (HTTP 403 on read)](https://www.iso.org/standard/27001), read 19 Nov 2026 - [PCI SSC, FAQ 1597](https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/faqs/1597), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Patch Window Table: Deadlines in 12 Frameworks](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/) - [CISA BOD 26-04 Remediation Timelines, Row by Row](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/cisa-bod-26-04/) - [Corrections Log and Open Source Gaps, Edition 1](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/corrections/) - [How the Patch Window Table Is Built and Read](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/method/) - [Patch Management Compliance Dates: 7 Dec 2026 and Back](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/dates-to-know/) --- # Patch Management Compliance Dates: 7 Dec 2026 and Back Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/dates-to-know/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Patch management compliance dates The next hard date for a patch policy is 7 Dec 2026: FedRAMP's vulnerability rules become mandatory and federal agencies begin remediating on CISA BOD 26-04 timelines, with a FedRAMP grace period to 7 Mar 2027. The HIPAA 15 and 30 day proposal is still not final as of 19 Nov 2026. ### Ahead, from the latest date to the nearest Two of the four upcoming dates come from FedRAMP's decision to align with CISA's BOD 26-04. FedRAMP's notice [NTC-0014](https://www.fedramp.gov/notices/0014/) moved mandatory adoption from 1 Jun 2027 to 7 Dec 2026. The two Patch Tuesday dates are computed from Microsoft's published rule (second Tuesday of each month), not announced dates. | Date | Item | What it means for a patch policy | Source | |---|---|---|---| | 7 Mar 2027 | FedRAMP grace period ends | Offerings not yet following the rules may keep certification under a corrective action plan, with notice to all agencies, until this date; after it, FedRAMP says certification will be revoked for offerings not following them. | FedRAMP VDR rules | | 12 Jan 2027 | Next Patch Tuesday after December (computed) | Microsoft publishes its monthly security update on the second Tuesday; the date is computed from that rule. | Microsoft release cycle | | 8 Dec 2026 | Patch Tuesday, December (computed) | The first Microsoft monthly security update after FedRAMP's 7 Dec start; a policy window counted from release starts here for Windows items. | Microsoft release cycle | | 7 Dec 2026 | FedRAMP VDR and VER rules mandatory; BOD 26-04 Table 1 timelines begin for agencies (per FedRAMP's notice) | Initial and ongoing FedRAMP certification must meet the VDR timeframes; agencies must begin remediating on Table 1 timelines. | FedRAMP NTC-0014 | Upcoming dates as read on 19 Nov 2026. Patch Tuesday dates are computed from the rule on Microsoft Learn. ### Status checked today | Date | Item | What it means for a patch policy | Source | |---|---|---|---| | 19 Nov 2026 | HIPAA proposed rule checked: no final rule found | A Federal Register API search of 7 Jan 2025 to 19 Nov 2026 found 23 documents and no final Security Rule. The 15 and 30 day windows remain proposals. | Federal Register API | Status check on 19 Nov 2026; HHS pages returned HTTP 403 and the Unified Agenda was not read. A proposal that has gone 22 months without a final rule can still change. A policy that adopts the 15 and 30 day windows early should label them as voluntary. The clause text is on the [HIPAA page](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/hipaa-security-rule/). ### Since 2025, newest first | Date | Item | What it means for a patch policy | Source | |---|---|---|---| | 13 Oct 2026 | FedRAMP VDR control mappings updated | Added SI-2(3) to the timeframe rule's control mappings. | FedRAMP VDR rules | | 4 Jul 2026 | FedRAMP optional adoption of the VDR rules allowed | Providers could follow the new timeframes before they became mandatory. | FedRAMP VDR rules | | 24 Jun 2026 | FedRAMP Consolidated Rules for 2026 launched | Class-based timeframe tables from hours to 192 days and a KEV-following rule published. | FedRAMP VDR rules | | 16 Jun 2026 | FedRAMP notice NTC-0014 published | Moved mandatory adoption from 1 Jun 2027 to 7 Dec 2026 to align with BOD 26-04. | FedRAMP NTC-0014 | | 10 Jun 2026 | CISA BOD 26-04 issued; BOD 19-02 and BOD 22-01 revoked | Replaced fixed 15/30 day and 2 week/6 month rules with a 16-row table of 3, 14 and 60 days or fix on upgrade. | CISA BOD 26-04 | | 27 Apr 2026 | UK Cyber Essentials Requirements v3.3 effective | Current version; keeps the 14 day rule for critical or high-risk updates. | NCSC resources | | 31 Mar 2025 | PCI DSS v4 new requirements effective | The v4.0.1 revision did not move this date. Which new requirements are patch-related was not read. | PCI SSC blog | | 7 Mar 2025 | HIPAA Security Rule NPRM comment period closed | Last day for comments on the 15 and 30 day proposal. | Federal Register API | | 17 Jan 2025 | DORA applies | Financial entities must follow the ICT risk rules, including the RTS patch management article. | EUR-Lex DORA | | 6 Jan 2025 | HIPAA Security Rule NPRM published (90 FR 898) | Proposes written patch management with 15 calendar days for critical risk and 30 for high risk, and documented exceptions. | Federal Register | Dated items from 2025 to 2026, read 19 Nov 2026 from the issuers' pages. ### Earlier history, newest first | Date | Item | What it means for a patch policy | Source | |---|---|---|---| | 31 Dec 2024 | PCI DSS v4.0 retired | After this date v4.0.1 is the only active version supported by PCI SSC. | PCI SSC blog | | 17 Oct 2024 | NIS2 Implementing Regulation 2024/2690 adopted (published 18 Oct 2024) | Point 6.6 requires patches within a reasonable time with a documented derogation; no fixed days. | EUR-Lex 2024/2690 | | 11 Jun 2024 | PCI DSS v4.0.1 published | Requirement 6 language on 30 days reverted to apply only to critical vulnerabilities. | PCI SSC blog | | 13 Mar 2024 | DORA RTS 2024/1774 adopted (published 25 Jun 2024) | Article 10 requires patch procedures with self-set deadlines and escalation. | EUR-Lex 2024/1774 | | 1 Nov 2023 | NYDFS Part 500 second amendment effective for 500.5 | Section 500.5 reads timely remediation prioritized by risk; no day count. | Cornell LII | | 14 Dec 2022 | DORA (Regulation 2022/2554) signed | Sets application from 17 Jan 2025; patch detail comes from the RTS. | EUR-Lex DORA | | Apr 2022 | NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 published | Guide to enterprise patch management planning; sets no fixed day count. Supersedes Rev. 3 of 22 Jul 2013 per NIST's page. | NIST SP 800-40r4 | | Mar 2022 | PCI DSS v4.0 published | The version that later added future-dated requirements. | PCI SSC blog | | 3 Nov 2021 | CISA BOD 22-01 issued and the KEV Catalog established | Created the KEV duty: 2 weeks for CVEs assigned 2021 or later, 6 months for older ones. | CISA BOD 22-01 | | 29 Apr 2019 | CISA BOD 19-02 issued | Set 15 day (critical) and 30 day (high) remediation for federal internet-accessible systems. | CISA BOD 19-02 | | 30 Dec 2016 | Latest amendment to 45 CFR 164.308 in the current eCFR | The in-force HIPAA administrative safeguards text carries no patch deadline; eCFR up to date as of 17 Nov 2026. | eCFR versioner | Dated items from 2016 to 2024. Month-only dates are as published. Not dated here because the source could not be read on 19 Nov 2026: the publication dates of ISO/IEC 27001:2022 and CIS Controls v8.1, the Essential Eight update dates, and which PCI DSS v4 requirements are among those effective 31 Mar 2025. Rows that use these frameworks are in the [Patch Window Table](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/) and the read log is on the [method page](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/method/). ### How to use the list Match each item to a clause in the policy. A date that changes a number (BOD 26-04, FedRAMP, the HIPAA proposal) belongs in the [severity and patch window section](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/severity-and-patch-windows/). A date that changes a version (PCI DSS v4.0 retired, Cyber Essentials v3.3) belongs in the policy's reference list, with the version and the read date, so that the next reader sees which edition the numbers came from. ### Sources - [FedRAMP, Public Notice NTC-0014 (16 Jun 2026)](https://www.fedramp.gov/notices/0014/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [FedRAMP, VDR rules changelog and status dates](https://www.fedramp.gov/2026/providers/rev5/rules/vulnerability-detection-and-response/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CISA, BOD 26-04](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk), read 19 Nov 2026 - [PCI SSC blog, PCI DSS v4.0.1](https://blog.pcisecuritystandards.org/just-published-pci-dss-v4-0-1), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Federal Register API, document 2024-30983](https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/documents/2024-30983.json), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NCSC, Cyber Essentials resources](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/cyberessentials/resources), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Microsoft Learn, Windows update release cycle](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/deployment/update/release-cycle), read 19 Nov 2026 - [eCFR versioner API, 45 CFR 164.308](https://www.ecfr.gov/api/versioner/v1/versions/title-45.json?part=164§ion=164.308), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Patch Window Table: Deadlines in 12 Frameworks](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/) - [FedRAMP 2026 Patch Timeframes: 12 Hours to 192 Days](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/fedramp/) - [CISA BOD 26-04 Remediation Timelines, Row by Row](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/cisa-bod-26-04/) - [HIPAA Patch Rules: In Force Text and the 15/30 Day Proposal](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/hipaa-security-rule/) - [Severity and Patch Windows: What Each Framework Sets](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/severity-and-patch-windows/) --- # Patch Management Glossary: 32 Terms, Sourced Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/glossary/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Patch management terms 32 patch management terms, from Binding operational directive to Unpatchable asset, each with a plain definition and a sourced example drawn from NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, CISA BOD 26-04, FedRAMP, PCI SSC FAQ 1597, Cyber Essentials v3.3 and Microsoft, read on 19 Nov 2026. ### Binding operational directive (BOD) A directive CISA issues to federal agencies that sets required actions, deadlines for them and actions CISA itself will take. **Example:** BOD 26-04, dated 10 Jun 2026, "supersedes and hereby revokes" BOD 19-02 and BOD 22-01 and sets Phase I, II and III actions ([CISA](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk)). See [CISA BOD 26-04](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/cisa-bod-26-04/). ### Calendar days Days counted on the calendar, weekends and holidays included, as opposed to business days. **Example:** BOD 26-04 states "Days are calendar days" ([CISA](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk)); the HIPAA proposal writes "15 calendar days" ([90 FR 898](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/06/2024-30983/hipaa-security-rule-to-strengthen-the-cybersecurity-of-electronic-protected-health-information)). ### Canary assets A small subset of the assets to be patched that receives a patch first, so that problems show up before the rollout expands. **Example:** NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 says these assets "act as canaries" and that, in an emergency, the canary period "could last a few minutes to a few hours" ([NIST](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf)). ### Clock start The event from which a patch deadline is counted. Frameworks differ, so the same number of days can mean different calendar dates. **Example:** Cyber Essentials counts "within 14 days of release"; the HIPAA proposal counts from "identifying the need to patch"; BOD 26-04 counts from KEV listing or agency identification, "whichever event occurs first" ([NCSC](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/sites/default/files/2026-11/Cyber-Essentials-Requirements-for-IT-Infrastructure-v3-3.pdf), [CISA](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk)). ### Critical or high-risk update (Cyber Essentials) In the scheme, an update that fixes vulnerabilities the vendor calls critical or high risk, or that have a "CVSS v3 base score of 7 or above"; it must be installed within 14 days of release. **Example:** The scheme adds that a single vendor update covering several issues "must be installed within 14 days" if it covers any critical or high-risk issue ([NCSC v3.3](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/sites/default/files/2026-11/Cyber-Essentials-Requirements-for-IT-Infrastructure-v3-3.pdf)). See [Cyber Essentials](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/cyber-essentials/). ### Derogation A permitted departure from a rule, here the choice not to apply a security patch, which must be documented. **Example:** NIS2 point 6.6.2 lets entities "choose not to apply security patches when the disadvantages of applying the security patches outweigh the cybersecurity benefits" and requires them to "duly document and substantiate" the reasons ([EUR-Lex](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L_202402690)). See [NIS2](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/nis2/). ### Exception (to a maintenance plan) A case where an asset does not follow its group's patch plan. A policy's exceptions clause records who may grant one, for how long and with what safeguards. **Example:** NIST asks that all exceptions "be reviewed regularly to determine if the maintenance plan can be implemented now" ([NIST](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf)); the HIPAA proposal allows two documented exceptions ([90 FR 898](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/06/2024-30983/hipaa-security-rule-to-strengthen-the-cybersecurity-of-electronic-protected-health-information)). See the [exceptions clause](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-exceptions-clause/). ### Fix on system upgrade A BOD 26-04 timeline value meaning the vulnerability is remediated at the next scheduled major upgrade or rebuild of the asset. **Example:** Rows 15 and 16 of Table 1 (not publicly exposed, not in the KEV, not automatable) carry this value ([CISA](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk)). ### Forensic triage A check, required alongside the 3-day deadline in three rows of BOD 26-04 Table 1, of whether the asset is already compromised. **Example:** BOD 26-04 requires the agency to complete remediation or mitigation within three days "and carry out a forensic triage of the asset" ([CISA](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk)). ### Grace period A set time during which a rule applies but enforcement or consequences are deferred, or the time a patch policy allows before installation is forced. **Example:** FedRAMP's grace period for its vulnerability rules ends 7 Mar 2027 ([NTC-0014](https://www.fedramp.gov/notices/0014/)); NIST advises "forcing installation after a grace period has ended" for routine patches ([NIST](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf)). ### In the KEV A BOD 26-04 decision point that is Yes when the CVE ID has an entry in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog. **Example:** On 19 Nov 2026 the catalog's JSON feed reported 1,786 entries, catalog version 2026.11.18 ([CISA feed](https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json)). NIST notes that other organizations "may voluntarily choose to use the catalog to help prioritize their patching efforts" ([NIST](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf)). ### Licensed and supported software In Cyber Essentials, software the organization has a legal right to use and that a vendor has committed to support with regular vulnerability fixes, with a published date when that stops. **Example:** Software that becomes unsupported must be removed from devices or kept out of scope behind a defined subset that blocks traffic to and from the internet ([NCSC v3.3](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/sites/default/files/2026-11/Cyber-Essentials-Requirements-for-IT-Infrastructure-v3-3.pdf)). ### Live patching Applying a security fix to running code, usually the Linux kernel, without a reboot. **Example:** Canonical Livepatch patches "critical and high severity Linux kernel vulnerabilities" while the system runs ([Ubuntu](https://ubuntu.com/security/livepatch)); Red Hat's live kernel patches are for selected Important and Critical CVEs and are supported at no extra cost for 6 months after the errata date ([Red Hat](https://access.redhat.com/solutions/2206511)); the kernel documentation notes "Only functions that can be traced could be patched" ([kernel.org](https://docs.kernel.org/livepatch/livepatch.html)). See [systems that cannot be rebooted](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/systems-that-cannot-reboot/). ### Maintenance group A set of assets with similar characteristics that generally have the same software maintenance needs for each risk response scenario. **Example:** NIST's examples include mobile workforce laptops (tolerant to downtime), an on-premises datacenter (scheduled outage windows) and legacy OT assets whose software cannot be patched ([NIST](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf)). ### Maintenance plan The actions to take when a scenario occurs for a maintenance group, "including the timeframes for beginning and ending each action." **Example:** NIST asks for one plan per group per scenario, so four scenarios and three groups mean up to twelve plans ([NIST](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf)). See [NIST SP 800-40](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/nist-sp-800-40/). ### Maintenance window A scheduled period in which a system may be taken out of service for work such as patching. NIST calls the periods scheduled outage windows. **Example:** In NIST's example the on-premises datacenter "must adhere to scheduled outage windows for all non-emergency situations" ([NIST](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf)). See [maintenance windows in a policy](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/maintenance-windows/). ### Optional non-security preview update A Microsoft cumulative update released in the fourth week of the month, typically used for early validation of the monthly security update. **Example:** Microsoft lists it beside the monthly security update on the second Tuesday and the as-needed out-of-band update ([Microsoft Learn](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/deployment/update/release-cycle)). ### Patch compliance rate The share of in-scope assets or vulnerabilities patched by their deadline. NIST warns that a single organization-wide percentage is not actionable. **Example:** NIST's notional matrix shows 95.2 % patched by deadline for critical vulnerabilities on high-importance assets against 81.4 % on low-importance assets; the figures are illustrative ([NIST](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf)). ### Patch SLA The written time commitment in a patch policy: how long after release or identification a patch must be installed, by severity or asset class. **Example:** FedRAMP Class D allows 12 hours at its tightest cell and 192 days at its loosest; Cyber Essentials allows 14 days ([FedRAMP](https://www.fedramp.gov/2026/providers/rev5/rules/vulnerability-detection-and-response/), [NCSC](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/sites/default/files/2026-11/Cyber-Essentials-Requirements-for-IT-Infrastructure-v3-3.pdf)). See the [Patch Window Table](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/). ### Patch Tuesday Microsoft's name for its monthly security update release, on the second Tuesday of each month. **Example:** Microsoft publishes it "typically at 10:00 AM Pacific Time"; the next two dates computed from the rule are 8 Dec 2026 and 12 Jan 2027 ([Microsoft Learn](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/deployment/update/release-cycle)). ### Potential Agency Impact (PAIN) FedRAMP's measure of how much a vulnerability could affect agencies, written as an "N-rating" from PAIN-5 (shortest timeframes in the tables) to PAIN-2, which sets the timeframe together with internet reachability and likely exploitability. **Example:** In Class A and B, PAIN-5 gives 4 days and PAIN-2 gives up to 192 days depending on column ([FedRAMP](https://www.fedramp.gov/2026/providers/rev5/rules/vulnerability-detection-and-response/)). See [FedRAMP](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/fedramp/). ### Publicly exposed In BOD 26-04, an asset accessible to unauthenticated or untrusted entities via public networks, regardless of its physical or logical location. **Example:** If one method finds a system publicly exposed, the value is set to Yes, and removing it from the internet moves the timeline back ([CISA](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk)). ### Remediate (BOD 26-04 sense) To eliminate the vulnerability "through patching, decommissioning the system, or another action." **Example:** CISA says its use is intentionally consistent with DoD Instruction 8531.01, NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 and NIST SP 800-216 ([CISA](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk)). ### Resolved and addressed (PCI SSC) The Council's two verbs for vulnerabilities: resolved means the entity solves or fixes it; addressed means the entity decides whether to resolve it or reduce the risk another way. **Example:** FAQ 1597 applies resolved to critical and high-risk vulnerabilities and addressed to lower-risk ones, per the entity's targeted risk analysis ([PCI SSC](https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/faqs/1597)). See [PCI DSS](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/pci-dss/). ### Risk response NIST's four choices for a vulnerable asset: accept, mitigate, transfer or avoid. Patching sits under mitigate. **Example:** NIST describes mitigate as "Reduce the risk by eliminating the vulnerabilities" and avoid as "Ensure that the risk does not occur by eliminating the attack surface" ([NIST](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf)). ### Security update Microsoft's term for "a widely released fix for a product-specific, security-related vulnerability." **Example:** Microsoft separates it from an update, which "addresses a noncritical, non-security-related bug" ([Microsoft Learn](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/deployment/standard-terminology-software-updates)). ### Service pack and update rollup Microsoft's terms for tested, cumulative sets of fixes packaged together; an update rollup is "a tested, cumulative set of hotfixes, security updates, critical updates, and updates." **Example:** A service pack is "a tested, cumulative set of all hotfixes, security updates, critical updates, and updates" ([Microsoft Learn](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/deployment/standard-terminology-software-updates)). ### Software bill of materials (SBOM) "A nested inventory, a list of ingredients that make up software components," in CISA's words. **Example:** NIST notes some vendors provide machine-consumable data on software composition, such as an SBOM, to help keep inventories current ([CISA](https://www.cisa.gov/sbom), [NIST](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf)). ### Targeted risk analysis (TRA) In PCI DSS, the documented analysis that supports a time frame the entity sets for a requirement. **Example:** FAQ 1597 says lower-risk vulnerabilities are addressed "in accordance with the entity's risk as defined and documented in a targeted risk analysis" ([PCI SSC](https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/faqs/1597)). ### Technical impact In BOD 26-04, how much control an exploit gives an adversary: total control or partial control. **Example:** Total control includes the case where the exploit "reliably reveals log-in credentials"; a denial-of-service attack is limited control ([CISA](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk)). ### Third-party component Commercial, open-source or other software the organization acquires and builds into or runs beside its own, which a policy must keep patched. **Example:** NIST SSDF task PW.4.4 asks organizations to verify that such components comply with the organization's requirements "throughout their life cycles" ([NIST SP 800-218](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-218.pdf)). See [third-party patching](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/third-party-and-open-source-patching/). ### Unpatchable asset An asset that cannot be easily patched because the vendor provides no patch (end of life) or because it must run uninterrupted. **Example:** NIST's scenario 4 uses "isolation or other methods to mitigate the risk" and plans to reevaluate the alternatives periodically ([NIST](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf)). ### Sources - [NIST, SP 800-40 Rev. 4](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CISA, BOD 26-04](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CISA, KEV catalog JSON feed](https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CISA, Software Bill of Materials](https://www.cisa.gov/sbom), read 19 Nov 2026 - [FedRAMP, VDR rules](https://www.fedramp.gov/2026/providers/rev5/rules/vulnerability-detection-and-response/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [FedRAMP, NTC-0014](https://www.fedramp.gov/notices/0014/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [PCI SSC, FAQ 1597](https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/faqs/1597), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NCSC, Cyber Essentials v3.3](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/sites/default/files/2026-11/Cyber-Essentials-Requirements-for-IT-Infrastructure-v3-3.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [EUR-Lex, Regulation 2024/2690](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L_202402690), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Federal Register, 90 FR 898](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/06/2024-30983/hipaa-security-rule-to-strengthen-the-cybersecurity-of-electronic-protected-health-information), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Microsoft Learn, Windows update release cycle](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/deployment/update/release-cycle), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Microsoft Learn, standard terminology for software updates](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/deployment/standard-terminology-software-updates), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Canonical, Livepatch](https://ubuntu.com/security/livepatch), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Red Hat, kernel live patching](https://access.redhat.com/solutions/2206511), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Linux kernel documentation, livepatch](https://docs.kernel.org/livepatch/livepatch.html), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NIST, SP 800-218 (SSDF) v1.1](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-218.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Patch Window Table: Deadlines in 12 Frameworks](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/) - [Patch Management Compliance Dates: 7 Dec 2026 and Back](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/dates-to-know/) - [Patch Management Tools Directory: Two Kinds, Same Fields](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/tools/) - [Severity and Patch Windows: What Each Framework Sets](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/severity-and-patch-windows/) --- # Patch Management Tools Directory: Two Kinds, Same Fields Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/tools/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Patch management tools The directory covers 31 tools in two kinds, read on 19 Nov 2026: 16 that deploy patches and 15 platforms that decide what to patch first and prepare the fix. Each kind is alphabetical, every tool has the same ten fields, prices are published or by quote, and vendor claims are labeled as the vendor's. ### Two kinds, kept apart NIST defines enterprise patch management as the process of "identifying, prioritizing, acquiring, installing, and verifying the installation of patches, updates, and upgrades." The 31 tools below split along that line. **Deploys patches** (16 tools) install updates on endpoints or servers. **Prioritizes and prepares the fix** (15 tools) decide what to patch first and prepare the change, such as a pull request, a rule change or a plan, and most hand the rollout to another tool. Three of them, noted in their fields, also have a patch deployment module of their own. Each kind is alphabetical by tool name. No tool is graded or compared with another, and the order carries no meaning. Every tool has the same ten fields; a field reads none found on 2026-11-19 when the pages read did not state it. Statements about what a product does are the vendor's own and labeled so, and prices are copied as published or marked by quote. The Limited field records only what the pages read did not state; it is not an assessment of any vendor's figures. The list is not exhaustive: Opus Security was not classified because opus.security did not resolve on 2026-11-19. For the patch timing a tool must support, start from the [Patch Window Table](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/); the policy sections on [maintenance windows](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/maintenance-windows/) and [testing and staging](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/testing-and-staging/) say what approval and rings a policy needs. ### Deploys patches: Action1 | Field | Action1, as published | |---|---| | Official page | https://www.action1.com/ | | What it patches | Windows (workstations and servers), macOS, and Linux (Debian, Ubuntu, Red Hat, SUSE) operating systems, plus supported third-party applications from a vendor-curated catalog called PatchAssurance; the vendor does not give a title count on the patch management page. | | How it deploys | Cloud-native; the vendor states no patch servers, appliances, VPN or additional infrastructure are required. Data hosting regions: USA, UK, Europe, Australia. | | Approval and rings | Policies, update rings, success thresholds, approvals, exceptions, maintenance windows, reboot controls and automatic retries, as the vendor states. | | Compliance reporting | Tracks successful, failed and pending deployments, missing updates, required reboots and unresolved vulnerabilities; customizable reports can be scheduled and audit evidence exported, as the vendor states. | | Price, published or by quote | Free for the first 200 endpoints (no feature limits, per the vendor); more than 200 endpoints by quote. Source: https://www.action1.com/pricing/ | | Rolls patches out itself | Yes, this is what the tool is listed for, as the vendor describes it. | | Does well (vendor's description) | Vendor describes a single cloud console that patches Windows, macOS, Linux and supported third-party apps with ring-based staged rollouts. | | Limited | Price above 200 endpoints: none found on 2026-11-19 (quote form only). Third-party title count: none found on 2026-11-19 on the patch management page. | | Sources and read dates | action1.com/patch-management (read 2026-11-19); action1.com/pricing (read 2026-11-19) | Action1 (deploys patches). Vendor statements are the vendor's. None found means none found on the pages read on 2026-11-19. ### Deploys patches: Automox | Field | Automox, as published | |---|---| | Official page | https://www.automox.com/ | | What it patches | Windows, macOS and Linux operating systems plus third-party applications; the vendor pages state different title counts (580 on the patching page, 633 on the software page, 633+ on the pricing page). | | How it deploys | Cloud-native console with a lightweight agent on each endpoint; the vendor states no VPN and no on-prem infrastructure. | | Approval and rings | Policies applied to groups or tagged devices; the homepage describes rollout rings, maintenance windows, schedules, reboot enforcement and one approval path for the catalog, as stated by the vendor. | | Compliance reporting | 20 prebuilt reports; exports as PDF, CSV or XLSX with scheduled delivery; real-time compliance status, per the vendor. | | Price, published or by quote | Patch OS plan: $1 per endpoint per month with annual commitment (Windows, macOS, Linux OS patching). Third-party patching tiers (Automate Essentials, Enterprise): custom pricing. Source: https://www.automox.com/pricing | | Rolls patches out itself | Yes, this is what the tool is listed for, as the vendor describes it. | | Does well (vendor's description) | Vendor describes one console and one policy model across Windows, macOS and Linux, with third-party titles in the same catalog. | | Limited | Third-party patching is not in the $1 Patch OS plan; it is listed under Automate Essentials at custom pricing. Prices for those tiers: none found on 2026-11-19. | | Sources and read dates | automox.com (read 2026-11-19); automox.com/platform/patching (read 2026-11-19); automox.com/platform/patching/cross-os-patch-management (read 2026-11-19); automox.com/platform/reporting (read 2026-11-19); automox.com/pricing (read 2026-11-19) | Automox (deploys patches). Vendor statements are the vendor's. None found means none found on the pages read on 2026-11-19. ### Deploys patches: Canonical Landscape | Field | Canonical Landscape, as published | |---|---| | Official page | https://ubuntu.com/landscape | | What it patches | Ubuntu systems: desktops, servers, cloud instances and IoT devices, per the vendor documentation. No Windows or macOS coverage stated on the pages read. | | How it deploys | Client-server: Landscape Client agent on each machine reports to a Landscape server; server can be self-hosted or used as Canonical-managed or SaaS service; works on-premise, cloud, hybrid and air-gapped. | | Approval and rings | Documentation lists package, upgrade, reboot and repository profiles and repository mirroring; Ubuntu Pro page mentions staggered updates. Approval workflow details: none found on 2026-11-19 on the pages read. | | Compliance reporting | Vendor states it can check compliance and generate reports from one interface; docs list package reporting. | | Price, published or by quote | Included in an Ubuntu Pro subscription; Landscape SaaS maintained by Canonical is a subscription add-on at $3,099 per Landscape virtual machine per year; managed Landscape on bare metal $9,470 per Landscape physical machine per year. Ubuntu Pro itself: $25 per machine per year (Workstation, as listed). Source: https://ubuntu.com/pricing/pro | | Rolls patches out itself | Yes, this is what the tool is listed for, as the vendor describes it. | | Does well (vendor's description) | Vendor describes central inventory, updates, security patching and compliance checks for Ubuntu estates, including air-gapped ones. | | Limited | Scope is Ubuntu systems on the pages read; other operating systems: none found on 2026-11-19. Approval workflow wording: none found on 2026-11-19. | | Sources and read dates | documentation.ubuntu.com/landscape (read 2026-11-19); ubuntu.com/pricing/pro (read 2026-11-19); ubuntu.com/pro (read 2026-11-19) | Canonical Landscape (deploys patches). Vendor statements are the vendor's. None found means none found on the pages read on 2026-11-19. ### Deploys patches: Datto RMM | Field | Datto RMM, as published | |---|---| | Official page | https://www.datto.com/products/rmm/ | | What it patches | Windows (policy-based), macOS and Linux (reusable components) and supported third-party applications, per Kaseya's Datto RMM page. | | How it deploys | Cloud platform with a lightweight agent installed on managed endpoints. | | Approval and rings | Policies and scheduled jobs to devices, sites, filters or groups; approval workflow: none found on 2026-11-19. | | Compliance reporting | Dashboards; specific patch report types: none found on 2026-11-19. | | Price, published or by quote | by quote ("Request Pricing" on the vendor page) | | Rolls patches out itself | Yes, this is what the tool is listed for, as the vendor describes it. | | Does well (vendor's description) | The vendor describes automating Windows patching through policies and centralizing updates for supported third-party applications. | | Limited | Windows is the platform with policy-based patching; macOS and Linux updates are handled with reusable components per the vendor page. | | Sources and read dates | datto.com/products/rmm (read 2026-11-19); kaseya.com/products/rmm-software (read 2026-11-19) | Datto RMM (deploys patches). Vendor statements are the vendor's. None found means none found on the pages read on 2026-11-19. ### Deploys patches: HCL BigFix | Field | HCL BigFix, as published | |---|---| | Official page | https://www.hcl-software.com/bigfix | | What it patches | Per BigFix 10 Patch documentation: Windows, AIX, Red Hat Enterprise Linux, CentOS, Amazon Linux, SUSE, Ubuntu, Oracle Linux, Solaris, HP-UX, Mac OS X, Debian, VMware ESXi, Raspbian, Rocky Linux, and virtual environments; Windows application update patches and Microsoft Click-to-Run products are also documented. Third-party app catalog size: none found on 2026-11-19. | | How it deploys | On-premise BigFix Enterprise and Patch modules are listed, and a BigFix SaaS Remediate offering is listed in the documentation; the BigFix agent evaluates each endpoint (stated in the Windows patch guide). | | Approval and rings | Console operators select the Action and apply patches based on settings in the Fixlet work area and the Take Action dialog, per the documentation. Rings and approval workflow wording: none found on 2026-11-19 on the pages read. | | Compliance reporting | Documentation says dashboards, wizards and reports aid in managing updates; a separate BigFix Compliance module is listed. | | Price, published or by quote | none found on 2026-11-19 (marketing site hcl-software.com returned a bot challenge; the documentation site lists no prices) | | Rolls patches out itself | Yes, this is what the tool is listed for, as the vendor describes it. | | Does well (vendor's description) | Documentation describes one console with near real-time visibility and enforcement for patching across many server and desktop operating systems. | | Limited | Marketing pages were not readable on 2026-11-19, so pricing and third-party catalog details: none found on 2026-11-19. | | Sources and read dates | help.hcl-software.com/bigfix (read 2026-11-19); help.hcl-software.com/bigfix/10.0/patch (read 2026-11-19); help.hcl-software.com/bigfix/10.0/patch/Patch/Patch_Windows/c_introduction.html (read 2026-11-19) | HCL BigFix (deploys patches). Vendor statements are the vendor's. None found means none found on the pages read on 2026-11-19. ### Deploys patches: Ivanti Neurons for Patch Management | Field | Ivanti Neurons for Patch Management, as published | |---|---| | Official page | https://www.ivanti.com/products/ivanti-neurons-for-patch-management | | What it patches | Windows, macOS, Linux and third-party applications; patch catalog of 800+ software titles, per the vendor. | | How it deploys | Cloud-based, cloud-native solution per the vendor; integrates with other Ivanti products named on the page (Ivanti UEM, Ivanti ITSM, Risk-Based Vulnerability Management, Application Security Posture Management). Agent wording: none found on 2026-11-19 on this page. | | Approval and rings | Ring deployment for phased rollouts with a user sentiment survey per ring, deploy by risk, and continuous patch remediation, as the vendor states. Approval wording: none found on 2026-11-19. | | Compliance reporting | Ready-to-use exposure-based compliance reporting that calculates exposure time per update, with detailed and summary views of devices, patches, exposures, vulnerabilities and deployment history, per the vendor. | | Price, published or by quote | by quote: platform fee plus device-based licenses; no number published. Source: https://www.ivanti.com/products/ivanti-neurons-for-patch-management | | Rolls patches out itself | Yes, this is what the tool is listed for, as the vendor describes it. | | Does well (vendor's description) | Vendor describes prioritization by "risk rating" and exploit data, with ring deployment and exposure-time reporting in a cloud product. | | Limited | Published price: none found on 2026-11-19; the page directs to the sales team. | | Sources and read dates | ivanti.com/products/ivanti-neurons-for-patch-management (read 2026-11-19) | Ivanti Neurons for Patch Management (deploys patches). Vendor statements are the vendor's. None found means none found on the pages read on 2026-11-19. ### Deploys patches: Jamf Pro patch management | Field | Jamf Pro patch management, as published | |---|---| | Official page | https://www.jamf.com/products/jamf-pro/ | | What it patches | Apple devices (Mac, iPhone, iPad, Apple TV) and third-party apps via App Installers and patch software titles, per the vendor pages and blogs; no Windows or Linux stated. | | How it deploys | MDM-based: Jamf Pro manages Apple devices using native Apple features; hosting model (cloud or on-prem): none found on 2026-11-19 on the pages read. | | Approval and rings | Patch policies can be separate for IT-only, user acceptance and wide groups (vendor blog); updates scoped with Smart Groups and custom user notifications (vendor blog, date not shown on page text read). | | Compliance reporting | A patch report shows software title versions; a Jamf Pro dashboard shows patch management statuses, per the vendor. | | Price, published or by quote | Jamf for Mac $12.50 per macOS device per month billed annually, 25-device minimum; Jamf for Mobile $5.75 per mobile device per month billed annually, 25-device minimum; Jamf Now starting at $4 per device per month. Patch is not priced separately on the page. Source: https://www.jamf.com/pricing/ | | Rolls patches out itself | Yes, this is what the tool is listed for, as the vendor describes it. | | Does well (vendor's description) | Vendor describes patching Apple devices using native Apple features without user interaction, and patch policies for staged groups. | | Limited | Apple platforms only on the pages read; other platforms: none found on 2026-11-19. Documentation site (learn.jamf.com) loads by script and could not be read. | | Sources and read dates | jamf.com/blog/streamline-patch-management (read 2026-11-19); jamf.com/blog/whats-new-in-patch (read 2026-11-19); jamf.com/pricing (read 2026-11-19); jamf.com/products/jamf-pro (read 2026-11-19); jamf.com/products/jamf-pro/patch-management (read 2026-11-19) | Jamf Pro patch management (deploys patches). Vendor statements are the vendor's. None found means none found on the pages read on 2026-11-19. ### Deploys patches: JumpCloud | Field | JumpCloud, as published | |---|---| | Official page | https://jumpcloud.com/platform/patch-management | | What it patches | Windows, macOS, Ubuntu Linux, Chrome browsers and applications; for Apple devices the vendor says it uses Declarative Device Management for native OS patching of macOS, iOS and iPadOS. | | How it deploys | Cloud-based unified endpoint management and directory platform; agent details: none found on 2026-11-19 on the patch page. | | Approval and rings | Scheduled, automated patching with out-of-the-box policies or custom policies; a Windows KB dashboard to monitor and install specific updates, per the vendor. Rings: none found on 2026-11-19. | | Compliance reporting | Vendor states visibility and control over OS, browser and app patches, including an OS Patch Management Policy Report support article. | | Price, published or by quote | Patch Management a la carte add-on: $3.00 (annual) or $4.00 (monthly) in the price table whose heading reads Price/User/Month; source https://jumpcloud.com/pricing | | Rolls patches out itself | Yes, this is what the tool is listed for, as the vendor describes it. | | Does well (vendor's description) | Vendor describes patching of Windows, macOS, Ubuntu, browsers and apps inside the same console used for directory and device management. | | Limited | Linux patching is stated for Ubuntu only on the patch page; other distributions: none found on 2026-11-19. | | Sources and read dates | jumpcloud.com/platform/patch-management (read 2026-11-19); jumpcloud.com/pricing (read 2026-11-19) | JumpCloud (deploys patches). Vendor statements are the vendor's. None found means none found on the pages read on 2026-11-19. ### Deploys patches: Kaseya VSA | Field | Kaseya VSA, as published | |---|---| | Official page | https://www.kaseya.com/products/kaseya-vsa/ | | What it patches | Operating systems and third-party software, per the VSA page. | | How it deploys | VSA 10 is the current generation; the page names agent-based management (hosting model not read). | | Approval and rings | Patch policies, deployment schedules and reboot communication; Kaseya RMM patch page mentions approvals, scheduling and blackout periods. | | Compliance reporting | Reporting on patch status; patch reports highlight vulnerabilities and non-compliant endpoints. | | Price, published or by quote | by quote (price requests via Kaseya request pages; no number published) | | Rolls patches out itself | Yes, this is what the tool is listed for, as the vendor describes it. | | Does well (vendor's description) | The vendor describes defining patch policies for operating systems and third-party software with reporting. | | Limited | none found on 2026-11-19 (no documented limit on the pages read) | | Sources and read dates | kaseya.com/products/kaseya-vsa (read 2026-11-19); kaseya.com/products/rmm-software/patch-management (read 2026-11-19) | Kaseya VSA (deploys patches). Vendor statements are the vendor's. None found means none found on the pages read on 2026-11-19. ### Deploys patches: ManageEngine Patch Manager Plus | Field | ManageEngine Patch Manager Plus, as published | |---|---| | Official page | https://www.manageengine.com/patch-management/ | | What it patches | Windows, macOS, Linux and 1100+ third-party applications as the vendor states; Enterprise edition adds drivers, BIOS and antivirus updates. | | How it deploys | Lightweight agents; vendor lists cloud and on-premises options and states remote systems can be patched without a VPN. | | Approval and rings | Automated patch testing and approval (Enterprise edition); decline or roll back patches; patch outside deployment window (Professional). | | Compliance reporting | Customizable patch reporting (Professional); integrated analytics and reporting for patch compliance. | | Price, published or by quote | Professional: less than $1 per endpoint per month; Enterprise: starts at $1 per endpoint per month (https://www.manageengine.com/patch-management/) | | Rolls patches out itself | Yes, this is what the tool is listed for, as the vendor describes it. | | Does well (vendor's description) | The vendor describes automated patching across Windows, macOS, Linux and third-party applications from a single console. | | Limited | Automated patch testing and approval is listed only under the Enterprise edition; the page names no endpoint cap (none found on 2026-11-19). | | Sources and read dates | manageengine.com/patch-management (read 2026-11-19) | ManageEngine Patch Manager Plus (deploys patches). Vendor statements are the vendor's. None found means none found on the pages read on 2026-11-19. ### Deploys patches: Microsoft Intune with Windows Autopatch | Field | Microsoft Intune with Windows Autopatch, as published | |---|---| | Official page | https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/overview/windows-autopatch-overview | | What it patches | Windows, Microsoft 365 Apps for enterprise, Microsoft Edge and Microsoft Teams updates (Autopatch); Intune update rings apply to Windows updates. Other third-party apps: none found on the pages read on 2026-11-19. | | How it deploys | Cloud service managed through the Microsoft Intune admin center; devices register with the service. | | Approval and rings | Update rings (deferrals, deadlines, restarts) and Autopatch groups with sequential deployment rings; multi-phase feature update release policies; approvals for specific drivers and firmware. | | Compliance reporting | Intune reports, Windows quality and feature update reports, device alerts and a Hotpatch quality update report. | | Price, published or by quote | Intune Plan 1 listed at $8.00/user/month (standalone) at https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/business/microsoft-intune-pricing; Autopatch features are included with Business Premium, A3+, E3+ and F3 licenses per https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/overview/windows-autopatch-overview | | Rolls patches out itself | Yes, this is what the tool is listed for, as the vendor describes it. | | Does well (vendor's description) | Microsoft describes Autopatch as a cloud service that automates Windows, Microsoft 365 Apps, Edge and Teams updates. | | Limited | Microsoft states admins typically should not assign custom update rings to Autopatch-managed devices; the support-request feature is for E3+ and F3 licenses only. | | Sources and read dates | learn.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/intune/fundamentals/licenses (read 2026-11-19); learn.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/intune/protect/windows-10-update-rings (read 2026-11-19); learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/overview/windows-autopatch-overview (read 2026-11-19); microsoft.com/en-us/security/business/microsoft-intune-pricing (read 2026-11-19) | Microsoft Intune with Windows Autopatch (deploys patches). Vendor statements are the vendor's. None found means none found on the pages read on 2026-11-19. ### Deploys patches: NinjaOne Patch Management | Field | NinjaOne Patch Management, as published | |---|---| | Official page | https://www.ninjaone.com/patch-management/ | | What it patches | Windows, macOS, Linux and 8,800+ applications as one section states (another section states 6,000+). | | How it deploys | Cloud-native, agent-driven; vendor states no VPN or on-prem infrastructure is needed. | | Approval and rings | Automated approvals, global approvals and custom patch scan and deployment schedules; rings: none found on 2026-11-19. | | Compliance reporting | Reports on patch compliance status and failed deployments; a Patch Activity Log shows who approved or rejected patches. | | Price, published or by quote | by quote (per-device pricing, no number published on the page read on 2026-11-19) | | Rolls patches out itself | Yes, this is what the tool is listed for, as the vendor describes it. | | Does well (vendor's description) | The vendor describes automated prioritizing and deploying of patches across operating systems and applications. | | Limited | The page gives two different application counts (8,800+ and 6,000+); patch caching depends on license level per the page. | | Sources and read dates | ninjaone.com/patch-management (read 2026-11-19) | NinjaOne Patch Management (deploys patches). Vendor statements are the vendor's. None found means none found on the pages read on 2026-11-19. ### Deploys patches: PDQ Connect and PDQ Deploy | Field | PDQ Connect and PDQ Deploy, as published | |---|---| | Official page | https://www.pdq.com/pdq-connect/ | | What it patches | Windows updates and third-party software; Windows and macOS devices (Connect); Windows devices (Deploy). | | How it deploys | PDQ Connect: cloud-based with a lightweight agent on each device. PDQ Deploy: on-premises Windows, for domain or VPN-connected networks. | | Approval and rings | Schedules and event-based triggers; approval workflow: none found on 2026-11-19. | | Compliance reporting | Software inventory with installed versions and asset tracking; specific report types: none found on 2026-11-19. | | Price, published or by quote | PDQ Connect: Basic $12, Plus $18, Premium $28 per device per year, 100 device minimum (https://www.pdq.com/pricing/). PDQ Deploy: starts at $1,950 per admin per year, includes PDQ Inventory (https://www.pdq.com/pdq-deploy/). | | Rolls patches out itself | Yes, this is what the tool is listed for, as the vendor describes it. | | Does well (vendor's description) | The vendor describes patching Windows updates and third-party applications from a single platform. | | Limited | The vendor ties Deploy to domain or VPN-connected networks; Connect devices need an internet connection and the agent. | | Sources and read dates | pdq.com/pdq-connect (read 2026-11-19); pdq.com/pdq-deploy (read 2026-11-19); pdq.com/pricing (read 2026-11-19) | PDQ Connect and PDQ Deploy (deploys patches). Vendor statements are the vendor's. None found means none found on the pages read on 2026-11-19. ### Deploys patches: Red Hat Satellite | Field | Red Hat Satellite, as published | |---|---| | Official page | https://www.redhat.com/en/technologies/management/satellite | | What it patches | Red Hat Enterprise Linux environments; other OS and third-party apps: none found on the page read on 2026-11-19. | | How it deploys | Self-hosted management product; vendor mentions offline and air-gapped readiness and keeping data in-house. | | Approval and rings | Curate repositories and patches for Dev, QA, and Production environments; deploy specific patches. | | Compliance reporting | Vulnerability prioritization of CVEs and configuration advisories; vendor notes enhanced reporting in Satellite 6.19. | | Price, published or by quote | none found on 2026-11-19 (Red Hat subscription; no number on the page read) | | Rolls patches out itself | Yes, this is what the tool is listed for, as the vendor describes it. | | Does well (vendor's description) | The vendor describes provisioning, patching and management of Red Hat Enterprise Linux environments. | | Limited | The page read describes Red Hat Enterprise Linux environments only; Red Hat documentation pages returned access denied on 2026-11-19 (see unread). | | Sources and read dates | redhat.com/en/technologies/management/satellite (read 2026-11-19) | Red Hat Satellite (deploys patches). Vendor statements are the vendor's. None found means none found on the pages read on 2026-11-19. ### Deploys patches: Tanium Patch and Tanium Deploy | Field | Tanium Patch and Tanium Deploy, as published | |---|---| | Official page | https://www.tanium.com/products/tanium-patch/ | | What it patches | Windows, Linux and Mac devices per the Patch page; Deploy covers third-party software installs, updates and removals. | | How it deploys | Single client; vendor states no secondary relay, database or distribution servers. Cloud or on-premises hosting not clearly stated on the pages read. | | Approval and rings | Rule sets and maintenance windows to deliver groups of patches at specified times; rings and approval workflow: none found on 2026-11-19. | | Compliance reporting | Real-time patch success rates, per-machine patch history and reboot status. | | Price, published or by quote | none found on 2026-11-19 | | Rolls patches out itself | Yes, this is what the tool is listed for, as the vendor describes it. | | Does well (vendor's description) | The vendor describes carrying out patching tasks and monitoring patch status across Windows, Linux and Mac devices. | | Limited | The Tanium help site returned no product content to the fetch tool on 2026-11-19, so docs-level limits were not read. | | Sources and read dates | tanium.com/products/tanium-deploy (read 2026-11-19); tanium.com/products/tanium-patch (read 2026-11-19) | Tanium Patch and Tanium Deploy (deploys patches). Vendor statements are the vendor's. None found means none found on the pages read on 2026-11-19. ### Deploys patches: WSUS (Windows Server Update Services) | Field | WSUS (Windows Server Update Services), as published | |---|---| | Official page | https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-server-update-services/get-started/windows-server-update-services-wsus | | What it patches | Microsoft product updates distributed through Microsoft Update to computers on a network; third-party apps: none found on the pages read on 2026-11-19. | | How it deploys | On-premises Windows Server role with a management console. | | Approval and rings | Administrators manage distribution of updates through the WSUS management console; detailed approval and group steps not read on 2026-11-19. | | Compliance reporting | none found on the pages read on 2026-11-19 | | Price, published or by quote | none found on 2026-11-19 (no separate price on the Microsoft Learn pages read) | | Rolls patches out itself | Yes, this is what the tool is listed for, as the vendor describes it. | | Does well (vendor's description) | Microsoft describes WSUS as a way to fully manage distribution of updates released through Microsoft Update to computers on your network. | | Limited | Microsoft states WSUS is deprecated and adds no new features; its removed-features page (dated 16 Nov 2026) lists the WSUS role as removed in Windows Server 2028, which Microsoft marks as preview, with plans that can change before release. | | Sources and read dates | learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-server-update-services/get-started/windows-server-update-services-wsus (read 2026-11-19); learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/get-started/removed-deprecated-features-windows-server-2025 (read 2026-11-19) | WSUS (Windows Server Update Services) (deploys patches). Vendor statements are the vendor's. None found means none found on the pages read on 2026-11-19. ### Prioritizes and prepares the fix: Astelia | Field | Astelia, as published | |---|---| | Official page | https://www.astelia.io/ | | What it patches | Operating system and software patches it drives through the customer's own patch management tool, plus firewall and IPS rule changes; no pull requests for application code found. | | How it deploys | Agents propose the fastest fix and carry it out through the existing stack (patch tool, firewall, IPS) with a person in the loop. | | Approval and rings | Drafted tickets and firewall rules wait in an approval queue for a human click; role-based access control, audit and execution logs listed. | | Compliance reporting | none found on 2026-11-19 (audit and execution logs only) | | Price, published or by quote | none found on 2026-11-19 | | Rolls patches out itself | Not on the pages read: vendor page says the workflow drives the patch through the patch management tool already in use. | | Does well (vendor's description) | Proposes a patch or a network mitigation and holds the action in a human approval queue. | | Limited | Fixes are patches through other patch tools and network mitigations; none found on 2026-11-19: tested code pull requests. | | Sources and read dates | astelia.io/ai-info-page (read 2026-11-10, reconfirmed 2026-11-19); astelia.io/careers (read 2026-11-10); astelia.io/post/closing-the-exposure-loop (read 2026-11-10, reconfirmed 2026-11-19); astelia.io/use-cases/deploy-astelia-agents (read 2026-11-10, reconfirmed 2026-11-19); astelia.io/use-cases/streamline-remediation (read 2026-11-10, reconfirmed 2026-11-19) | Astelia (prioritizes and prepares the fix). Vendor statements are the vendor's. None found means none found on the pages read on 2026-11-19. ### Prioritizes and prepares the fix: Averlon | Field | Averlon, as published | |---|---| | Official page | https://www.averlon.ai/ | | What it patches | Container images, Terraform and Pulumi infrastructure code, and Kubernetes Helm charts, as proposed pull requests; compensating controls where patching is not the route. | | How it deploys | GitHub Actions open ready-to-merge pull requests and assign a ticket to the owner; the change reaches production through the customer's normal merge and release path. | | Approval and rings | A human developer reviews each generated fix (about 15 minutes per fix in the vendor's example); proposed changes are evaluated in CI. | | Compliance reporting | none found on 2026-11-19 | | Price, published or by quote | none found on 2026-11-19 | | Rolls patches out itself | Not on the pages read: fixes are delivered as pull requests; none found on 2026-11-19: a feature that installs OS patches on hosts. | | Does well (vendor's description) | Generates pull requests for container image, IaC and Helm chart issues that a developer reviews before merge. | | Limited | Pages read name no pricing, headcount or customer count (none found on 2026-11-19). | | Sources and read dates | averlon.ai (read 2026-11-10, reconfirmed 2026-11-19); averlon.ai/about (read 2026-11-10); averlon.ai/blog/automating-remediation-application-infrastructure-security-issues (read 2026-11-10, reconfirmed 2026-11-19); averlon.ai/platform (read 2026-11-10, reconfirmed 2026-11-19); averlon.ai/why-averlon (read 2026-11-10, reconfirmed 2026-11-19) | Averlon (prioritizes and prepares the fix). Vendor statements are the vendor's. None found means none found on the pages read on 2026-11-19. ### Prioritizes and prepares the fix: Backline | Field | Backline, as published | |---|---| | Official page | https://backline.ai/ | | What it patches | Open source dependency (SCA) fixes, container image CVEs and infrastructure-as-code misconfigurations. | | How it deploys | Opens a pull request with a remediation plan linked to the originating findings. | | Approval and rings | Existing unit tests and dependency checks run before a fix is proposed; fixes ship as standard pull requests, so rollback uses Git and engineers control merges. | | Compliance reporting | none found on 2026-11-19 | | Price, published or by quote | none found on 2026-11-19 | | Rolls patches out itself | Not on the pages read: fixes ship as pull requests. | | Does well (vendor's description) | Runs existing unit tests and dependency checks before it proposes a pull request. | | Limited | Where no safe upgrade path exists it flags the issue and hands it to engineers with an explanation. | | Sources and read dates | backline.ai (read 2026-11-10, reconfirmed 2026-11-19); backline.ai/company (read 2026-11-10); backline.ai/product (read 2026-11-10, reconfirmed 2026-11-19) | Backline (prioritizes and prepares the fix). Vendor statements are the vendor's. None found means none found on the pages read on 2026-11-19. ### Prioritizes and prepares the fix: Cogent Security | Field | Cogent Security, as published | |---|---| | Official page | https://www.cogent.com/ | | What it patches | Newly disclosed vulnerabilities through generated fixes, and patches or configuration changes executed through existing tools (assisted to autonomous). | | How it deploys | Finds the fix, assesses impact and executes through the customer's existing tools; agents track status and verify completion. | | Approval and rings | Autonomy is staged from recommendations and review upward; granular approval workflows; high-impact changes need human approval and an audit trail. | | Compliance reporting | Audit trail for high-impact changes; none found on 2026-11-19: a named compliance framework report. | | Price, published or by quote | none found on 2026-11-19 | | Rolls patches out itself | Not on the pages read: vendor says it executes through existing tools; none found on 2026-11-19: its own patch-distribution agent. | | Does well (vendor's description) | Lets customers choose where agents act alone and where they pause for sign-off. | | Limited | None found on 2026-11-19: a price, or its own patch-distribution agent. | | Sources and read dates | siliconangle.com/2026/11/03/exclusive-cogent-securitys-vr-1-1-model-outscores-claude-code-and-codex-on-vulnerability-repair (read 2026-11-10, reconfirmed 2026-11-19); cogent.com (read 2026-11-10, reconfirmed 2026-11-19); cogent.com/ai/autonomy-levels (read 2026-11-10, reconfirmed 2026-11-19); cogent.com/ai/cogent-ai-engine (read 2026-11-10, reconfirmed 2026-11-19); cogent.com/company/about (read 2026-11-10) | Cogent Security (prioritizes and prepares the fix). Vendor statements are the vendor's. None found means none found on the pages read on 2026-11-19. ### Prioritizes and prepares the fix: Dux Security | Field | Dux Security, as published | |---|---| | Official page | https://dux.io/ | | What it patches | Mitigations such as a missing control or configuration change rather than patches. | | How it deploys | Mitigations are ones the customer deploys on its own; the platform tags assets and ties data sources together. | | Approval and rings | none found on 2026-11-19: approval or staging controls. | | Compliance reporting | none found on 2026-11-19 | | Price, published or by quote | none found on 2026-11-19 | | Rolls patches out itself | Not on the pages read: vendor page says mitigations are ones the customer deploys on its own. | | Does well (vendor's description) | Favors lightweight mitigations such as a missing control or config change instead of a patch. | | Limited | Mitigations are deployed by the customer; none found on 2026-11-19: generated pull requests, tested code fixes or approval-gated automated changes. | | Sources and read dates | dux.io (read 2026-11-10, reconfirmed 2026-11-19) | Dux Security (prioritizes and prepares the fix). Vendor statements are the vendor's. None found means none found on the pages read on 2026-11-19. ### Prioritizes and prepares the fix: Maze | Field | Maze, as published | |---|---| | Official page | https://mazehq.com/ | | What it patches | Fixes for proven-exploitable vulnerabilities in code and cloud; several fix options per issue; one fix can cover 30 or more CVEs. | | How it deploys | Generates and validates fixes and routes them with the investigation to the owning developer or coding agent; the customer's team controls what gets merged. | | Approval and rings | Customer team controls merge; agents verify the fix resolves the issue without introducing new ones. | | Compliance reporting | Vendor lists ISO 27001 and SOC 2 Type II certifications for itself; none found on 2026-11-19: patch compliance reports. | | Price, published or by quote | none found on 2026-11-19 (vendor says pricing is based on the size of the cloud infrastructure; no price list) | | Rolls patches out itself | Not on the pages read: fixes are routed to developers; none found on 2026-11-19: a feature that installs patches on hosts. | | Does well (vendor's description) | Offers several fix options and bundles proven-exploitable CVEs into single fixes. | | Limited | Pricing is quoted by cloud size with no public price list. | | Sources and read dates | mazehq.com/platform/cloud (read 2026-11-10, reconfirmed 2026-11-19); mazehq.com/solutions/remediation (read 2026-11-10, reconfirmed 2026-11-19) | Maze (prioritizes and prepares the fix). Vendor statements are the vendor's. None found means none found on the pages read on 2026-11-19. ### Prioritizes and prepares the fix: Onit Security | Field | Onit Security, as published | |---|---| | Official page | https://onit.security/ | | What it patches | Patch or version changes per asset (as a plan) and interim mitigations such as disabling a feature or tightening a firewall rule. | | How it deploys | A Remediation Agent builds a step-by-step plan (patch or version, deployment path, restart and validation steps, rollback); the published text describes a plan, not an opened pull request. | | Approval and rings | Human approval gate on every agent action, with audit trail and one-step reversal; approved decisions become logged, reversible standing rules. | | Compliance reporting | Audit trail on agent actions; none found on 2026-11-19: framework reports. | | Price, published or by quote | none found on 2026-11-19 | | Rolls patches out itself | Not on the pages read: vendor states nothing executes without approval; none found on 2026-11-19: its own patch-distribution engine. | | Does well (vendor's description) | Puts a human approval gate and a one-step reversal on every remediation and mitigation action. | | Limited | Remediation text describes a plan rather than an opened pull request. | | Sources and read dates | onit.security/blog/ai-agents-vulnerability-management (read 2026-11-10, reconfirmed 2026-11-19); onit.security/company (read 2026-11-10, reconfirmed 2026-11-19); onit.security/platform (read 2026-11-10, reconfirmed 2026-11-19) | Onit Security (prioritizes and prepares the fix). Vendor statements are the vendor's. None found means none found on the pages read on 2026-11-19. ### Prioritizes and prepares the fix: Qualys | Field | Qualys, as published | |---|---| | Official page | https://www.qualys.com/ | | What it patches | Windows, Linux and macOS operating systems plus third-party applications through Qualys Patch Management; patchless options (mitigate, uninstall, custom script, isolate) when no patch exists. | | How it deploys | Qualys Patch Management deploys from a central dashboard using the same agent as VMDR; TruRisk Eliminate coordinates remediation across Qualys and third-party tools. | | Approval and rings | "Patch reliability score" picks zero-touch (high confidence), ring-staged (medium) or manual CAB (low); customer-set policies and maintenance windows; ServiceNow change integration; automatic rollback. | | Compliance reporting | Patch page ties patching to SLAs and bidirectional CMDB and ITSM integrations; none found on 2026-11-19: a patch compliance report description on the patch page. | | Price, published or by quote | none found on 2026-11-19 (free trial offered for TruRisk Eliminate) | | Rolls patches out itself | Yes, in a separate module. Qualys Patch Management deploys patches itself (page read 2026-11-19). | | Does well (vendor's description) | Gates patch deployment on "a reliability score": zero-touch, ring-staged or manual CAB, with automatic rollback. | | Limited | Patch deployment sits in a separate module (see the row above); none found on 2026-11-19: a price. | | Sources and read dates | blog.qualys.com/product-tech/2026/08/03/zero-day-remediation-operational-resiliency-trurisk-eliminate (read 2026-11-10); qualys.com/apps/agentic-ai (read 2026-11-10, reconfirmed 2026-11-19); qualys.com/apps/patch-management (read 2026-11-10, reconfirmed 2026-11-19); qualys.com/apps/trurisk-eliminate (read 2026-11-10, reconfirmed 2026-11-19) | Qualys (prioritizes and prepares the fix). Vendor statements are the vendor's. None found means none found on the pages read on 2026-11-19. ### Prioritizes and prepares the fix: Rapid7 | Field | Rapid7, as published | |---|---| | Official page | https://www.rapid7.com/ | | What it patches | Exposures in its Exposure Command platform; the pages read describe remediation guidance and workflows, not patch installation. | | How it deploys | No-code native automation for remediation workflows, tickets and notifications across 500+ integrations; none found on 2026-11-19: a Rapid7 feature that installs patches on hosts. | | Approval and rings | none found on 2026-11-19 | | Compliance reporting | Exposure Command lists an Enforce compliance capability (policy drift alerts); none found on 2026-11-19: patch compliance reports. | | Price, published or by quote | none found on 2026-11-19 (usage-based by asset type; no amounts) | | Rolls patches out itself | Not on the pages read: none found on 2026-11-19: patch deployment on the Exposure Command, InsightVM and pricing pages read. | | Does well (vendor's description) | Combines exploit likelihood, reachability and business context with automated remediation workflows and 500+ integrations. | | Limited | None found on 2026-11-19: a tested pull request or virtual patch in the remediation text read. | | Sources and read dates | rapid7.com/blog/post/ai-gartner-report-attack-paths-closing-faster-than-patchable (read 2026-11-10, reconfirmed 2026-11-19); rapid7.com/products/command/exposure-management (read 2026-11-10, reconfirmed 2026-11-19); rapid7.com/products/command/pricing (read 2026-11-10, reconfirmed 2026-11-19) | Rapid7 (prioritizes and prepares the fix). Vendor statements are the vendor's. None found means none found on the pages read on 2026-11-19. ### Prioritizes and prepares the fix: Rival Security | Field | Rival Security, as published | |---|---| | Official page | https://rival.security/ | | What it patches | Pull requests for code and dependency findings, WAF rule changes, and plans for legacy apps that cannot upgrade libraries. | | How it deploys | Plans the fix, tests it, and opens a pull request for human review; blog says agents can also suggest WAF rules and apply configurations. | | Approval and rings | Pull request goes to a person for review; docs.rival.security required a password on 2026-11-19, so approval controls could not be verified. | | Compliance reporting | Agents produce vulnerability reports and every action is traced and auditable per the home page; none found on 2026-11-19: framework compliance reports. | | Price, published or by quote | none found on 2026-11-19 (rival.security/pricing returns page not found; book-a-demo only) | | Rolls patches out itself | Rival does not roll patches out itself. None found on 2026-11-19: a feature that rolls patches out to hosts, on rival.security home, use-cases and the PHP2Shell post; the pages describe pull requests, WAF rules and applied configurations. | | Does well (vendor's description) | Describes the remediation flow as plan, test and open a pull request for human review. | | Limited | Its own scanning shown covers dependencies, code and secrets in CI/CD; for other findings it works from the scanners already in place. | | Sources and read dates | docs.rival.security (read 2026-11-10, reconfirmed 2026-11-19); rival.security (read 2026-11-10, reconfirmed 2026-11-19); rival.security/blog/php2shell-black-october-2026 (read 2026-11-10, reconfirmed 2026-11-19); rival.security/book-a-demo-form (read 2026-11-10); rival.security/pricing (read 2026-11-19); rival.security/use-cases (read 2026-11-10, reconfirmed 2026-11-19) | Rival Security (prioritizes and prepares the fix). Vendor statements are the vendor's. None found means none found on the pages read on 2026-11-19. ### Prioritizes and prepares the fix: Seemplicity | Field | Seemplicity, as published | |---|---| | Official page | https://seemplicity.ai/ | | What it patches | Response options per finding: patches, compensating controls and targeted configuration changes; code fixes handed to developers. | | How it deploys | Routes work to owners in existing tools and gives guidance or fix-ready output; the pages read describe guidance and tickets rather than direct patch installation. | | Approval and rings | Each option carries a Readiness Indicator (deploy now or review first); customer-built approval gates in workflows. | | Compliance reporting | Home page lists audit-ready reporting under Autonomous Remediation (read through the fetch tool on 2026-11-19). | | Price, published or by quote | none found on 2026-11-19 | | Rolls patches out itself | Not on the pages read: delivery is into existing workflows as guidance and tickets; none found on 2026-11-19: its own patch-distribution engine. | | Does well (vendor's description) | Shows several response options per finding, each with a readiness indicator, and keeps all alternatives visible. | | Limited | None found on 2026-11-19: a price, or patch installation by the product itself on the pages read. | | Sources and read dates | seemplicity.ai (read 2026-11-10); seemplicity.ai/automated-vulnerability-remediation (read 2026-11-10); seemplicity.ai/news/ai-analysts-autonomous-vulnerability-response (read 2026-11-10); seemplicity.ai/news/response-options (read 2026-11-10); seemplicity.ai/platform/agentic-workforce (read 2026-11-10) | Seemplicity (prioritizes and prepares the fix). Vendor statements are the vendor's. None found means none found on the pages read on 2026-11-19. ### Prioritizes and prepares the fix: Tamnoon | Field | Tamnoon, as published | |---|---| | Official page | https://www.tamnoon.io/ | | What it patches | Cloud security findings from CNAPPs: configuration changes, with infrastructure-as-code templates suggested via GitHub. | | How it deploys | Runs each approved fix through the customer's own change process; a fix is not finished until a rescan returns clean. | | Approval and rings | Expert-supervised AI with customer review of everything; each finding "rated safe, risky or awaiting data"; declined changes are published with evidence. | | Compliance reporting | none found on 2026-11-19 | | Price, published or by quote | none found on 2026-11-19 | | Rolls patches out itself | Not on the pages read: changes run through the customer's own change process. | | Does well (vendor's description) | Publishes the findings it declined to change, with the evidence. | | Limited | Covers cloud exposure findings; none found on 2026-11-19: operating system patching. | | Sources and read dates | tamnoon.io (read 2026-11-10, reconfirmed 2026-11-19); tamnoon.io/about (read 2026-11-10); tamnoon.io/integrations (read 2026-11-10, reconfirmed 2026-11-19); tamnoon.io/product (read 2026-11-10, reconfirmed 2026-11-19) | Tamnoon (prioritizes and prepares the fix). Vendor statements are the vendor's. None found means none found on the pages read on 2026-11-19. ### Prioritizes and prepares the fix: Tenable | Field | Tenable, as published | |---|---| | Official page | https://www.tenable.com/ | | What it patches | Windows (including drivers and BIOS), Mac and Linux, with 20,000+ third-party applications and more than 250,000 unique patches. | | How it deploys | Tenable Patch Management applies policy-based autonomous patching, on-premises or in the cloud; Hexa AI can create tickets and connect with patch tools. | | Approval and rings | Policy controls for deployments, testing and approvals; schedule, pause or roll back; patches that fail testing go to a block list; SLAs by criticality and exploitability. | | Compliance reporting | Separate console shows remediation progress and compliance status to each team. | | Price, published or by quote | none found on 2026-11-19 for Patch Management (annual subscription priced by asset, no amount); prerequisite Tenable One Vulnerability Management lists USD 3,500 for 100 assets for one year | | Rolls patches out itself | Yes, in a separate module. Tenable Patch Management deploys patches itself (page read 2026-11-19). | | Does well (vendor's description) | Applies policy-based autonomous patching with the ability to schedule, pause or roll back deployments. | | Limited | Requires an existing license for a Tenable vulnerability or exposure product. | | Sources and read dates | tenable.com/products/patch-management (read 2026-11-10, reconfirmed 2026-11-19); tenable.com/products/tenable-one/capabilities/hexa-ai (read 2026-11-10, reconfirmed 2026-11-19); tenable.com/products/tenable-one/pricing (read 2026-11-10, reconfirmed 2026-11-19); tenable.com/products/vulnerability-management (read 2026-11-10, reconfirmed 2026-11-19) | Tenable (prioritizes and prepares the fix). Vendor statements are the vendor's. None found means none found on the pages read on 2026-11-19. ### Prioritizes and prepares the fix: Vicarius | Field | Vicarius, as published | |---|---| | Official page | https://www.vicarius.io/ | | What it patches | Windows, macOS, Linux and 20,000+ third-party apps; scripts for other fixes; in-memory patchless protection when no patch exists or none can be applied. | | How it deploys | vPatch deploys on demand, on a schedule or by rule through the vRx agent; vShield blocks exploit paths in memory with no reboot. | | Approval and rings | Patch groups with separate policies and dynamic membership; AI-generated scripts stay drafts until a team member approves; vRx compares detected and target versions after deployment. | | Compliance reporting | vComply lists 100+ CIS benchmarks, PCI-DSS, HIPAA, CMMC and more; executive dashboards and audit-ready evidence. | | Price, published or by quote | by quote (annual subscription by managed endpoint asset count; no amounts) | | Rolls patches out itself | Yes, in a separate module. vPatch is Vicarius's own patch deployment (page read 2026-11-19); classified as prioritize with its own deployment. | | Does well (vendor's description) | Runs patching across operating systems and 20,000+ third-party apps and holds AI-generated scripts as drafts until a person approves. | | Limited | None found on 2026-11-19: list prices. | | Sources and read dates | vicarius.io (read 2026-11-10, reconfirmed 2026-11-19); vicarius.io/features/patch-management (read 2026-11-10, reconfirmed 2026-11-19); vicarius.io/features/patchless-protection (read 2026-11-10, reconfirmed 2026-11-19); vicarius.io/features/scriptai (read 2026-11-10, reconfirmed 2026-11-19); vicarius.io/pricing (read 2026-11-10, reconfirmed 2026-11-19); vicarius.io/solution/vulnerability-remediation (read 2026-11-10, reconfirmed 2026-11-19) | Vicarius (prioritizes and prepares the fix). Vendor statements are the vendor's. None found means none found on the pages read on 2026-11-19. ### Prioritizes and prepares the fix: Zafran | Field | Zafran, as published | |---|---| | Official page | https://www.zafran.io/ | | What it patches | Mitigations through existing controls (WAF, firewall, EDR) before a patch; patch or upgrade work as work items for the owner. | | How it deploys | Can push a compensating control such as a WAF rule; patch remediation is delivered as a ticketing work item, not a pull request. | | Approval and rings | none found on 2026-11-19: documented approval gates per agent. | | Compliance reporting | none found on 2026-11-19 | | Price, published or by quote | none found on 2026-11-19 | | Rolls patches out itself | Not on the pages read: mitigations are pushed through the customer's existing controls; patches are ticketed. | | Does well (vendor's description) | Reads live configuration of EDR, WAF and firewall controls and can push a mitigation before a patch exists. | | Limited | Patch work is delivered as a ticket work item rather than a pull request. | | Sources and read dates | zafran.io (read 2026-11-10, reconfirmed 2026-11-19); zafran.io/platform (read 2026-11-10, reconfirmed 2026-11-19); zafran.io/resources/zafran-launches-attack-chain-killswitch-in-collaboration-with-google-threat-intelligence (read 2026-11-10, reconfirmed 2026-11-19) | Zafran (prioritizes and prepares the fix). Vendor statements are the vendor's. None found means none found on the pages read on 2026-11-19. ### Questions **what does patch management software do** It automates parts of the process NIST defines: finding missing updates, deploying them by policy or schedule, and reporting status. The deploy-kind tools above install patches; the prioritize-kind tools decide what to patch first and prepare the change, usually handing the rollout to another tool. **automated patch management tools** The directory lists 16 tools that deploy patches and 15 that prioritize and prepare the fix, each with the same fields and read dates. Approval, rings and reporting differ by tool, so compare those fields against the policy's testing and approval steps. ### Sources - [backline.ai](https://backline.ai/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [backline.ai/company](https://backline.ai/company/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [backline.ai/product](https://backline.ai/product/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [blog.qualys.com/product-tech/2026/08/03/zero-day-remediation-operational-resiliency-trurisk-eliminate](https://blog.qualys.com/product-tech/2026/08/03/zero-day-remediation-operational-resiliency-trurisk-eliminate), read 19 Nov 2026 - [docs.rival.security](https://docs.rival.security), read 19 Nov 2026 - [documentation.ubuntu.com/landscape](https://documentation.ubuntu.com/landscape/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [dux.io](https://dux.io/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [help.hcl-software.com/bigfix](https://help.hcl-software.com/bigfix/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [help.hcl-software.com/bigfix/10.0/patch](https://help.hcl-software.com/bigfix/10.0/patch/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [help.hcl-software.com/bigfix/10.0/patch/Patch/Patch_Windows/c_introduction.html](https://help.hcl-software.com/bigfix/10.0/patch/Patch/Patch_Windows/c_introduction.html), read 19 Nov 2026 - [jumpcloud.com/platform/patch-management](https://jumpcloud.com/platform/patch-management), read 19 Nov 2026 - [jumpcloud.com/pricing](https://jumpcloud.com/pricing), read 19 Nov 2026 - [learn.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/intune/fundamentals/licenses](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/intune/fundamentals/licenses), read 19 Nov 2026 - [learn.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/intune/protect/windows-10-update-rings](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/intune/protect/windows-10-update-rings), read 19 Nov 2026 - [learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-server-update-services/get-started/windows-server-update-services-wsus](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-server-update-services/get-started/windows-server-update-services-wsus), read 19 Nov 2026 - [learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/get-started/removed-deprecated-features-windows-server-2025](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/get-started/removed-deprecated-features-windows-server-2025), read 19 Nov 2026 - [learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/overview/windows-autopatch-overview](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/overview/windows-autopatch-overview), read 19 Nov 2026 - [mazehq.com/platform/cloud](https://mazehq.com/platform/cloud), read 19 Nov 2026 - [mazehq.com/solutions/remediation](https://mazehq.com/solutions/remediation), read 19 Nov 2026 - [onit.security/blog/ai-agents-vulnerability-management](https://onit.security/blog/ai-agents-vulnerability-management/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [onit.security/company](https://onit.security/company/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [onit.security/platform](https://onit.security/platform/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [rival.security](https://rival.security/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [rival.security/blog/php2shell-black-october-2026](https://rival.security/blog/php2shell-black-october-2026), read 19 Nov 2026 - [rival.security/book-a-demo-form](https://rival.security/book-a-demo-form), read 19 Nov 2026 - [rival.security/pricing](https://rival.security/pricing), read 19 Nov 2026 - [rival.security/use-cases](https://rival.security/use-cases), read 19 Nov 2026 - [seemplicity.ai](https://seemplicity.ai/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [seemplicity.ai/automated-vulnerability-remediation](https://seemplicity.ai/automated-vulnerability-remediation/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [seemplicity.ai/news/ai-analysts-autonomous-vulnerability-response](https://seemplicity.ai/news/ai-analysts-autonomous-vulnerability-response/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [seemplicity.ai/news/response-options](https://seemplicity.ai/news/response-options/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [seemplicity.ai/platform/agentic-workforce](https://seemplicity.ai/platform/agentic-workforce/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [siliconangle.com/2026/11/03/exclusive-cogent-securitys-vr-1-1-model-outscores-claude-code-and-codex-on-vulnerability-repair](https://siliconangle.com/2026/11/03/exclusive-cogent-securitys-vr-1-1-model-outscores-claude-code-and-codex-on-vulnerability-repair/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [tamnoon.io](https://tamnoon.io/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [ubuntu.com/pricing/pro](https://ubuntu.com/pricing/pro), read 19 Nov 2026 - [ubuntu.com/pro](https://ubuntu.com/pro), read 19 Nov 2026 - [action1.com/patch-management](https://www.action1.com/patch-management/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [action1.com/pricing](https://www.action1.com/pricing/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [astelia.io/ai-info-page](https://www.astelia.io/ai-info-page), read 19 Nov 2026 - [astelia.io/careers](https://www.astelia.io/careers), read 19 Nov 2026 - [astelia.io/post/closing-the-exposure-loop](https://www.astelia.io/post/closing-the-exposure-loop), read 19 Nov 2026 - [astelia.io/use-cases/deploy-astelia-agents](https://www.astelia.io/use-cases/deploy-astelia-agents), read 19 Nov 2026 - [astelia.io/use-cases/streamline-remediation](https://www.astelia.io/use-cases/streamline-remediation), read 19 Nov 2026 - [automox.com](https://www.automox.com/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [automox.com/platform/patching](https://www.automox.com/platform/patching), read 19 Nov 2026 - [automox.com/platform/patching/cross-os-patch-management](https://www.automox.com/platform/patching/cross-os-patch-management), read 19 Nov 2026 - [automox.com/platform/reporting](https://www.automox.com/platform/reporting), read 19 Nov 2026 - [automox.com/pricing](https://www.automox.com/pricing), read 19 Nov 2026 - [averlon.ai](https://www.averlon.ai/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [averlon.ai/about](https://www.averlon.ai/about), read 19 Nov 2026 - [averlon.ai/blog/automating-remediation-application-infrastructure-security-issues](https://www.averlon.ai/blog/automating-remediation-application-infrastructure-security-issues), read 19 Nov 2026 - [averlon.ai/platform](https://www.averlon.ai/platform), read 19 Nov 2026 - [averlon.ai/why-averlon](https://www.averlon.ai/why-averlon), read 19 Nov 2026 - [cogent.com](https://www.cogent.com/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [cogent.com/ai/autonomy-levels](https://www.cogent.com/ai/autonomy-levels), read 19 Nov 2026 - [cogent.com/ai/cogent-ai-engine](https://www.cogent.com/ai/cogent-ai-engine), read 19 Nov 2026 - [cogent.com/company/about](https://www.cogent.com/company/about), read 19 Nov 2026 - [datto.com/products/rmm](https://www.datto.com/products/rmm/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [ivanti.com/products/ivanti-neurons-for-patch-management](https://www.ivanti.com/products/ivanti-neurons-for-patch-management), read 19 Nov 2026 - [jamf.com/blog/streamline-patch-management](https://www.jamf.com/blog/streamline-patch-management/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [jamf.com/blog/whats-new-in-patch](https://www.jamf.com/blog/whats-new-in-patch/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [jamf.com/pricing](https://www.jamf.com/pricing/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [jamf.com/products/jamf-pro](https://www.jamf.com/products/jamf-pro/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [jamf.com/products/jamf-pro/patch-management](https://www.jamf.com/products/jamf-pro/patch-management/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [kaseya.com/products/kaseya-vsa](https://www.kaseya.com/products/kaseya-vsa/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [kaseya.com/products/rmm-software](https://www.kaseya.com/products/rmm-software/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [kaseya.com/products/rmm-software/patch-management](https://www.kaseya.com/products/rmm-software/patch-management/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [manageengine.com/patch-management](https://www.manageengine.com/patch-management/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [microsoft.com/en-us/security/business/microsoft-intune-pricing](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/business/microsoft-intune-pricing), read 19 Nov 2026 - [ninjaone.com/patch-management](https://www.ninjaone.com/patch-management/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [pdq.com/pdq-connect](https://www.pdq.com/pdq-connect/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [pdq.com/pdq-deploy](https://www.pdq.com/pdq-deploy/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [pdq.com/pricing](https://www.pdq.com/pricing/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [qualys.com/apps/agentic-ai](https://www.qualys.com/apps/agentic-ai), read 19 Nov 2026 - [qualys.com/apps/patch-management](https://www.qualys.com/apps/patch-management/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [qualys.com/apps/trurisk-eliminate](https://www.qualys.com/apps/trurisk-eliminate/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [rapid7.com/blog/post/ai-gartner-report-attack-paths-closing-faster-than-patchable](https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/ai-gartner-report-attack-paths-closing-faster-than-patchable/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [rapid7.com/products/command/exposure-management](https://www.rapid7.com/products/command/exposure-management/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [rapid7.com/products/command/pricing](https://www.rapid7.com/products/command/pricing/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [redhat.com/en/technologies/management/satellite](https://www.redhat.com/en/technologies/management/satellite), read 19 Nov 2026 - [tamnoon.io/about](https://www.tamnoon.io/about), read 19 Nov 2026 - [tamnoon.io/integrations](https://www.tamnoon.io/integrations), read 19 Nov 2026 - [tamnoon.io/product](https://www.tamnoon.io/product), read 19 Nov 2026 - [tanium.com/products/tanium-deploy](https://www.tanium.com/products/tanium-deploy/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [tanium.com/products/tanium-patch](https://www.tanium.com/products/tanium-patch/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [tenable.com/products/patch-management](https://www.tenable.com/products/patch-management), read 19 Nov 2026 - [tenable.com/products/tenable-one/capabilities/hexa-ai](https://www.tenable.com/products/tenable-one/capabilities/hexa-ai), read 19 Nov 2026 - [tenable.com/products/tenable-one/pricing](https://www.tenable.com/products/tenable-one/pricing), read 19 Nov 2026 - [tenable.com/products/vulnerability-management](https://www.tenable.com/products/vulnerability-management), read 19 Nov 2026 - [vicarius.io](https://www.vicarius.io/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [vicarius.io/features/patch-management](https://www.vicarius.io/features/patch-management), read 19 Nov 2026 - [vicarius.io/features/patchless-protection](https://www.vicarius.io/features/patchless-protection), read 19 Nov 2026 - [vicarius.io/features/scriptai](https://www.vicarius.io/features/scriptai), read 19 Nov 2026 - [vicarius.io/pricing](https://www.vicarius.io/pricing), read 19 Nov 2026 - [vicarius.io/solution/vulnerability-remediation](https://www.vicarius.io/solution/vulnerability-remediation), read 19 Nov 2026 - [zafran.io](https://www.zafran.io/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [zafran.io/platform](https://www.zafran.io/platform), read 19 Nov 2026 - [zafran.io/resources/zafran-launches-attack-chain-killswitch-in-collaboration-with-google-threat-intelligence](https://www.zafran.io/resources/zafran-launches-attack-chain-killswitch-in-collaboration-with-google-threat-intelligence), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Patch Window Table: Deadlines in 12 Frameworks](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/) - [Patch Maintenance Window Policy Clause](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/maintenance-windows/) - [Patch Testing and Staging Policy Clause](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/testing-and-staging/) - [Automated Patch Management: Defaults a Policy Must Set](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/automated-patch-management/) - [Patch Management Glossary: 32 Terms, Sourced](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/glossary/) --- # Patch Management Process in 9 Steps (NIST SP 800-40r4) Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Patch management process The patch management process has nine steps: inventory, monitor for releases, assess and prioritize, acquire and test, approve and schedule, deploy, verify, report, and review the cycle. They follow NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 (April 2022), which defines the work as identifying, prioritizing, acquiring, installing and verifying patches. Read 19 Nov 2026. ### The nine steps NIST defines enterprise patch management as “the process of identifying, prioritizing, acquiring, installing, and verifying the installation of patches, updates, and upgrades throughout an organization” ([NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4](https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/40/r4/final)). This site splits that definition into nine steps so that each one can be owned, timed and audited on its own. Each step has its own page with inputs, actions, outputs and the record to keep. 1. [Inventory](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/inventory/): list every asset with its software, its owner and its outage limits. Output: one record per asset that a later step can filter by maintenance group. 2. [Monitor for releases](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/monitor-for-releases/): subscribe to each vendor's advisory channel and to the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities feed. Output: a dated list of releases that touch assets you own. 3. [Assess and prioritize](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/assess-and-prioritize/): decide for each release which risk response applies and how fast. Output: a response and a deadline per asset group. 4. [Acquire and test](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/acquire-and-test/): validate the patch, then try it on canary assets. Output: a pass or fail with the evidence. 5. [Approve and schedule](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/approve-and-schedule/): get change approval and fix the window, including the grace period after which installation is forced. Output: an approved change with a window. 6. [Deploy](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/deploy/): distribute, install and restart in stages, with a rollback path. Output: install logs per asset. 7. [Verify](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/verify/): confirm the patch is installed and in effect, then keep checking that it stays installed. Output: a status per asset that separates installed from effective. 8. [Report](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/report/): turn asset-level status into measures per maintenance group and deadline. Output: a dated report with the denominator stated. 9. [Review the cycle](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/review-the-cycle/): review exceptions, deadlines and tooling, and feed changes back to the policy. Output: a dated review with decisions. ### How the steps map to NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 | Step | Where NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 covers it | What the source says in short | |---|---|---| | 1 Inventory | Section 3.2 | Keep inventories current by automation; scan-based monthly or quarterly updates “should no longer be used” | | 2 Monitor | Section 2.2, item 1 | Know when new vulnerabilities affect assets, for example through vendor feeds and the NVD | | 3 Assess and prioritize | Sections 2.3.1 and 3.3 | Four risk responses: accept, mitigate, transfer, avoid; four scenarios | | 4 Acquire and test | Sections 2.3.1 and 3.5.1 | Validate authenticity and integrity; canary assets act as the test | | 5 Approve and schedule | Sections 2.3.1 and 3.5.1 | Schedule through change management; force installation after a grace period | | 6 Deploy | Section 2.3.2 | Distribute, validate, install, change state (restart), resolve issues | | 7 Verify | Sections 2.3.3 and 2.3.4 | Confirm the patch took effect; monitor that it stays installed | | 8 Report | Section 3.6 | Metrics must weigh asset and vulnerability importance | | 9 Review | Sections 3.5.4 and 3.5.5 | Re-evaluate alternatives to patching; review every exception regularly | Section numbers are from the NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 PDF, read 19 Nov 2026. The split into nine steps is this site's, not NIST's. ### What the policy fixes for the whole process NIST says routine patching “is often postponed and neglected,” which “provides many additional windows of opportunity for attackers” ([NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, section 3.3](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf)). A policy answers that by naming an owner and a clock for every step above, not only for deployment. The clock values per framework are on the [patch window table](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/); the policy text for them is in [severity and patch windows](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/severity-and-patch-windows/). The process also differs by asset. A laptop fleet and a medical device share the nine steps but not the windows, so the eleven [asset class pages](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/) give the vendor rhythm and the usual constraints for each class. Short answers to common questions about these steps are in the [FAQ](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/faq/). ### Questions **patch management process steps** Nine steps on this site: inventory, monitor for releases, assess and prioritize, acquire and test, approve and schedule, deploy, verify, report, and review the cycle. NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 groups the same work into identifying, prioritizing, acquiring, installing and verifying patches. **what is the second phase of the patch management process lifecycle** In NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, section 2.2, the second item of the life cycle is to plan the risk response: assess the risk, choose accept, mitigate, transfer or avoid, and decide how to carry it out. In this site's nine steps that work is step 3, assess and prioritize. **patch management process flow** The flow is linear with one loop: steps 1 to 8 run in order for each release, and step 9 feeds exceptions and deadline changes back into step 1 and the policy. NIST adds that verification should continue after install, to detect a patch being uninstalled. ### Sources - [NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Planning (April 2022)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NIST CSRC, SP 800-40 Rev. 4 publication page](https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/40/r4/final), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Step 1: Patch Management Asset Inventory](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/inventory/) - [Patch Window Table: Deadlines in 12 Frameworks](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/) - [Severity and Patch Windows: What Each Framework Sets](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/severity-and-patch-windows/) - [Patching by Asset Type: Windows to OT Windows](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/) --- # Step 1: Patch Management Asset Inventory Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/inventory/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Patch management asset inventory step A patch inventory lists each asset, its software down to package level, its owner and its outage limits. NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 section 3.2 says updating inventories monthly or quarterly by vulnerability scan “should no longer be used”; it asks for automated, continuous discovery. Read 19 Nov 2026. ### Inputs and what the step must produce Step 1 of [the nine-step process](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/) feeds every later step: without it, [monitoring for releases](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/monitor-for-releases/) has nothing to match against. NIST asks for software inventories of “physical and virtual computing assets, including OT, IoT, and container assets,” and accepts that a complete one may be impossible: the realistic goal is “a close-to-comprehensive inventory” kept by automation ([NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, section 3.2](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf)). Two further sources can fill gaps. Platform interfaces in cloud services can report software continuously, and a vendor's software bill of materials adds package-level detail. CISA describes an SBOM as “a nested inventory, a list of ingredients that make up software components” ([CISA, SBOM](https://www.cisa.gov/sbom)). ### Fields to record per asset | Group | Fields NIST lists as examples | Used later by | |---|---|---| | Technical | Platform type (IT, OT, IoT, mobile, cloud, VM); who administers it; the tool that manages it; network connectivity; controls already in place; primary users and their privileges | Deploy, verify | | Mission or business | Role and importance; laws or policies that set how soon a flaw must be fixed; contractual limits on patching; limits on risk responses | Assess and prioritize, approve and schedule | Source: NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, section 3.2, read 19 Nov 2026. The lists are examples in the source; an organization chooses its own. The mission column is where a patch window comes from. NIST's own examples of such a limit are a “highly regulated asset” that can only be patched by its manufacturer after testing and certification, and an asset that “can only be rebooted during a monthly maintenance outage.” Record those as fields, not as notes, so the [maintenance group](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/assess-and-prioritize/) can be built by filter. ### A fact that changes the unit of work NIST's guidance is that patching is approached “from a per-asset perspective,” and decisions should not rest on software and version alone, because each asset's characteristics give context. CISA's BOD 26-04 (issued 10 Jun 2026) repeats the idea: its footnote defines an asset as “the unit of work for patching as defined in NIST SP 800-40 Rev 4” ([CISA, BOD 26-04](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk)). A policy that counts findings per software package instead of per asset cannot reproduce that timeline logic. ### The record to keep - The inventory export with a date and the discovery method for each asset (agent, platform interface, network discovery). - The date each asset was last seen, so stale entries are visible. - The maintenance group assigned to each asset and who approved the assignment. - For NIST, the patching history per asset: it “may be particularly helpful to incident responders during an investigation.” How the inventory requirement is worded in a policy is on [asset inventory requirement](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/asset-inventory-requirement/). ### Sources - [NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Planning (April 2022)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CISA, Software Bill of Materials (SBOM)](https://www.cisa.gov/sbom), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CISA, BOD 26-04, footnote 4](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Patch Management Process in 9 Steps (NIST SP 800-40r4)](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/) - [Step 2: How to Track Vendor Patch Releases](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/monitor-for-releases/) - [Step 3: How to Prioritize Patches by Risk Response](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/assess-and-prioritize/) - [Asset Inventory Requirement in a Patch Policy](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/asset-inventory-requirement/) --- # Step 2: How to Track Vendor Patch Releases Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/monitor-for-releases/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## How to track vendor patch releases Track vendor releases by their published rhythm. Microsoft ships on the second Tuesday (next: 8 Dec 2026, then 12 Jan 2027), Oracle on the third Tuesday of January, April, July and October (next: 19 Jan 2027), Fortinet on the second Tuesday, Android on the first Monday. Read 19 Nov 2026. ### Release calendar for the next 90 days A calendar is only a prompt: every vendor below reserves the right to publish outside it. The table lists the rule each vendor states and the next dates that follow from it as of 19 Nov 2026. Dates after the vendor's own list were computed from the rule and are marked. | Vendor or feed | Stated rhythm | Next dates | |---|---|---| | Microsoft (Windows) | Security update on the second Tuesday, typically 10:00 AM Pacific; optional preview update in the fourth week; out-of-band as needed | 8 Dec 2026, 12 Jan 2027 (computed from the rule) | | Fortinet | Advisories on the second Tuesday of the month; critical issues may go out of cycle | 8 Dec 2026, 12 Jan 2027 (computed) | | Oracle | Critical Patch Update on the third Tuesday of January, April, July and October; pre-release announcement the Thursday before | 19 Jan 2027, 20 Apr 2027 (listed by Oracle) | | Android | Bulletin on the first Monday of each month, with two patch levels (the 1st and the 5th) | 7 Dec 2026, 4 Jan 2027 (computed) | | Cisco | Individual advisories usually on a Wednesday at 1600 GMT; bundles for FXOS and NX-OS (fourth Wednesday of February and August), IOS XR (second Wednesday of March and September), IOS and IOS XE (fourth Wednesday of March and September) | 24 Feb 2027, 10 Mar 2027, 24 Mar 2027 (computed) | | Kubernetes | Monthly patch release, cherry-pick deadline a few days before | 15 Dec 2026, 12 Jan 2027 (listed by the project) | | Apple | No fixed day stated on the security releases page | Last listed: iOS 27.2.1 and macOS releases on 9 Nov 2026; HomeView 27.2.1 on 18 Nov 2026 | Sources: vendor pages listed below, read 19 Nov 2026. Where the page lists dates they are quoted; otherwise the date is computed from the stated rule. ### Feeds that are not vendor calendars CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog is machine-readable. On 19 Nov 2026 the JSON feed showed catalog version 2026.11.18 with 1,786 entries, of which 302 were added in 2026 through 18 November (a count made from the feed's dateAdded field) ([CISA KEV feed](https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json)). CISA's BOD 26-04 tells federal agencies to “monitor KEV Catalog updates” and offers email alerts for additions; a private organization can subscribe the same way and treat an addition as a trigger for [assessment](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/assess-and-prioritize/). Not every vendor posts to CISA. For operational technology, NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3 notes that “not all vendors report known vulnerabilities to CISA,” and advises vendor-specific notifications in addition ([NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r3.pdf)). ### Eight questions to put to each software maker NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 section 3.7 offers a sample questionnaire for procurement that doubles as a monitoring checklist. Its items include how often the maker expects to release emergency updates, for how many years it commits to fixing vulnerabilities, whether updates follow a schedule “(weekly, monthly, quarterly, etc.),” how disruptive a patch is (restart or reboot), and whether rollback is provided for uninstalling patches. Put the answers beside each vendor in the inventory, and record the channel you subscribed to, the date, and who receives it. ### The record to keep - The subscription list: vendor, channel, owner, date last confirmed. - A dated log of releases received and the asset groups each touches. - A note when a vendor published outside its stated rhythm, since that is when a calendar-only process fails. Class-specific rhythms are on the pages for [Windows](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/windows-endpoints/), [network devices](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/network-devices-and-firmware/) and [databases](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/databases/). ### Sources - [Microsoft Learn, Update release cycle for Windows clients](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/deployment/update/release-cycle), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Fortinet PSIRT policy, communications plan](https://www.fortiguard.com/psirt_policy), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Oracle, Critical Patch Updates, Security Alerts and Bulletins](https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Android Open Source Project, Android Security Bulletins](https://source.android.com/docs/security/bulletin/asb-overview), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Cisco Security Vulnerability Policy, disclosure schedule](https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/resources/security_vulnerability_policy.html), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Kubernetes, Patch Releases](https://kubernetes.io/releases/patch-releases/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Apple, security releases](https://support.apple.com/en-us/100100), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CISA, KEV catalog JSON feed](https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CISA, BOD 26-04](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Planning (April 2022)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3, Guide to OT Security](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r3.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Patch Management Process in 9 Steps (NIST SP 800-40r4)](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/) - [Step 1: Patch Management Asset Inventory](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/inventory/) - [Step 3: How to Prioritize Patches by Risk Response](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/assess-and-prioritize/) - [Windows Patch Management Policy: Windows Rhythm](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/windows-endpoints/) - [Patch Management Compliance Dates: 7 Dec 2026 and Back](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/dates-to-know/) --- # Step 3: How to Prioritize Patches by Risk Response Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/assess-and-prioritize/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## How to prioritize patches Prioritize a patch by first choosing a risk response, then setting speed. CISA's BOD 26-04 (issued 10 Jun 2026) sets urgency from four variables: asset exposure, Known Exploited Vulnerabilities status, exploit automation and technical impact. Its fastest tier is three days plus forensic triage. Read 19 Nov 2026. ### Choose the response before the speed NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 section 3.3 lists four responses: accept (rely on existing controls), mitigate (including patching, but also disabling a feature or adding segmentation), transfer (insurance, or moving to SaaS where the provider patches) and avoid (uninstall or decommission). SP 800-218 asks for the same decision: “Make a risk-based decision as to whether each vulnerability will be remediated or if the risk will be addressed through other means.” A patch is one of several outcomes of this step, and the outcome is written down before the clock starts. Choosing a mitigation does not close the item: see [exceptions clause](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-exceptions-clause/) for the record. The numbers each framework allows are on the [patch window table](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/), and the policy wording is in [severity and patch windows](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/severity-and-patch-windows/). The [process overview](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/) shows where this step sits. ### The four variables CISA uses | Variable | Question in BOD 26-04 | Who supplies the answer | |---|---|---| | Asset exposure | Is the vulnerable asset publicly exposed? | The agency, using CISA's Internet Exposure Reduction Guidance | | KEV status | Is the CVE ID on CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog? | CISA, for every CVE | | Exploit automation | Can an adversary automate all the steps needed to exploit it? | CISA's Vulnrichment Program | | Technical impact | Does the adversary gain partial or total control after exploitation? | CISA's Vulnrichment Program | Source: CISA BOD 26-04, read 19 Nov 2026. The directive binds federal civilian agencies; other organizations may borrow the method. The directive's Table 1 turns these four answers into deadlines. The page text states one value outright: the entries marked “& forensic triage” must be remediated or mitigated within three days and the asset triaged for compromise. Other tiers are given in the table figure, which this site read by eye and does not reproduce here; see the directive for them. Days are calendar days. ### What changes mid-clock BOD 26-04 treats each asset's timeline as “dynamic as facts change”: removing a system from the internet changes “Publicly Exposed” from Yes to No and moves the required timeline back, while a vulnerability newly added to the KEV catalog shortens it. The timeline starts at whichever comes first, the catalog addition or the agency identifying the vulnerability on an asset. A private policy can copy this by stating that the clock is per asset and restarts on a stated change of exposure, with the change recorded. ### Why speed matters: one dated measurement Mandiant's analysis of 138 vulnerabilities exploited in the wild and disclosed in 2023 found an average time to exploit of five days, down from 32 days across 2021 and 2022 and 63 days across 2018 and 2019 (published 15 Oct 2024; it excludes 15 outliers, and without that exclusion the 2023 average is 47 days). It is a third-party analysis of one year's sample ([Google Cloud, Mandiant](https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/time-to-exploit-trends-2023)). On 18 Nov 2026 the KEV feed held 1,786 entries, 361 of them flagged as used in known ransomware campaigns (counts from the [CISA feed](https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json)). ### The record to keep - The risk response chosen per release and per maintenance group, with the date and the approver. - The four variable answers used, and where each came from. - The deadline derived, and the date it was revised if exposure changed. - For emergencies, the scenario used; see [emergency patch clause](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/emergency-patch-clause/). ### Sources - [CISA, BOD 26-04, Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk (issued 10 Jun 2026)](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Planning (April 2022)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NIST SP 800-218 (SSDF) v1.1, RV.2.2](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-218.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Google Cloud Threat Intelligence, time-to-exploit trends 2023 (15 Oct 2024)](https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/time-to-exploit-trends-2023), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CISA, KEV catalog JSON feed](https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Patch Management Process in 9 Steps (NIST SP 800-40r4)](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/) - [Step 2: How to Track Vendor Patch Releases](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/monitor-for-releases/) - [Step 4: Patch Testing Process with Canary Rings](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/acquire-and-test/) - [Patch Window Table: Deadlines in 12 Frameworks](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/) - [Patch Management Policy Exceptions Clause Template](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-exceptions-clause/) --- # Step 4: Patch Testing Process with Canary Rings Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/acquire-and-test/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Patch testing process Test a patch by validating it, then patching a small canary group first. NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 suggests a first round of administrators lasting a few days, then early adopters for a few weeks; in an emergency the canary period can shrink to minutes or hours. Read 19 Nov 2026. ### Validate before you test Authenticity and integrity come first. NIST says a patch “should be confirmed, preferably by automated means, before the patch is tested or installed,” because it could have come from a rogue source or been tampered with in transit ([NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, section 2.3.1](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf)). Record the hash or signature check and its result with the patch identifier. Where this fits: it follows [assess and prioritize](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/assess-and-prioritize/) and precedes [approval](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/approve-and-schedule/); the policy section is [testing and staging](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/testing-and-staging/). ### Canary rings NIST's routine plan uses phased deployment in which a small subset “act as canaries.” For larger rollouts it describes two rounds: a small first round of technically knowledgeable users lasting a few days, then a larger round of willing early adopters for a few weeks, ideally representative of everyone who will later get the patch. For emergencies NIST keeps the canary step but compresses it: “a few minutes to a few hours” (section 3.5.2). A policy states the ring sizes and minimum durations per maintenance group so the test is not decided under pressure. | Control | What the vendor documents | Use in testing | |---|---|---| | Windows update rings in Intune | Rings set deferral periods, restart settings and deadlines; a ring can be paused for up to 35 days, then the pause expires | Stage test, pilot and production rings; the 35-day cap bounds how long a ring can hold back | | Microsoft optional preview update | Released in the fourth week of the month, “typically used for early validation of the monthly security update” | Install the preview on test rings about two weeks before the second-Tuesday release | | AWS Patch Manager default baselines | Windows Server and several Linux baselines auto-approve 7 days after release; the 7-day wait is not applied to Debian or Ubuntu, where release dates are unreliable | The delay is a built-in test window; a custom baseline is needed to shorten it | Sources: Microsoft Learn and AWS documentation, read 19 Nov 2026. ### Limits of testing Testing cannot cover everything. NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3 warns for operational technology that “a patch may remove a vulnerability, but it can also introduce a greater risk from a production or safety perspective,” and advises regression testing and, where possible, offline system testing. See [OT and medical devices](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/ot-and-medical-devices/) for those windows. Hotpatch updates for Windows Server do not support automatic rollback: a problem means uninstalling the update and installing the last working baseline, which needs a restart ([Microsoft Learn](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/get-started/hotpatch)). ### The record to keep - The validation result for each patch (what was checked, by whom or by which tool). - Ring membership: which assets were canaries, and the dates each ring started and ended. - The decision to widen, hold, or switch to a mitigation, with the evidence that drove it. - Defects found, with the vendor ticket, so [approval](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/approve-and-schedule/) can cite them. ### Sources - [NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Planning (April 2022)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3, section 6.2.11](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r3.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Microsoft Learn, Intune Windows update rings](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/intune/protect/windows-10-update-rings), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Microsoft Learn, Update release cycle](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/deployment/update/release-cycle), read 19 Nov 2026 - [AWS Systems Manager, predefined and custom patch baselines](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/systems-manager/latest/userguide/patch-manager-predefined-and-custom-patch-baselines.html), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Microsoft Learn, Hotpatch for Windows Server](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/get-started/hotpatch), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Patch Management Process in 9 Steps (NIST SP 800-40r4)](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/) - [Step 5: Patch Approval Process and Scheduling](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/approve-and-schedule/) - [Step 3: How to Prioritize Patches by Risk Response](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/assess-and-prioritize/) - [Patch Testing and Staging Policy Clause](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/testing-and-staging/) - [OT Patch Management Policy and Medical Devices](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/ot-and-medical-devices/) --- # Step 5: Patch Approval Process and Scheduling Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/approve-and-schedule/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Patch approval process A patch approval process turns a tested patch into an approved change with a window. NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 says routine patches need not install at once but must be forced after a grace period, directly or by blocking network access for unpatched assets. Read 19 Nov 2026. ### What approval decides Approval fixes three things: which maintenance group gets the patch, when the window opens and closes, and the date after which installation is forced. NIST notes that many organizations schedule deployments “as part of their enterprise change management activities,” and that a routine patch “does not necessitate immediate installation, but at some point, patches must be installed.” Forcing can be direct (trigger the install) or indirect, such as preventing network access for unpatched assets ([NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, sections 2.3.1 and 3.5.1](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf)). The approver should see the [test evidence](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/acquire-and-test/) and the asset's outage limits from the [inventory](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/inventory/). ### Scheduling controls and what each one actually enforces | Platform | Control | Detail to write into the procedure | |---|---|---| | Intune, iOS/iPadOS and macOS | Declarative software update policy: “Enforce Latest” | A delay in days before the deadline, counted from Apple's release or from when the policy is set, plus an install time on a 24-hour clock; the delay sets the enforcement date, not when the update is offered | | Intune, Windows | Update rings | Deferral, restart and deadline settings per ring; pause up to 35 days | | Azure Update Manager | Maintenance configurations | Recurring schedules at daily, weekly or hourly cadence; machines in one availability set patched in overlapping schedules may fail or be skipped, so split them across schedules or lengthen the window | | Azure Update Manager | Pre-events and post-events | A pre-event can turn machines on before patching; cancelling a run after a failed pre-event must be started by you, or the run goes ahead in the window | | AWS Systems Manager | Maintenance window running a Scan or Install task, or a patch policy | The patch baseline decides what is approved; the window decides when | Sources: Microsoft Learn and AWS documentation, read 19 Nov 2026. The Azure point about reboots matters for the window length: the registry keys that manage restart “can cause your machines to reboot” even if the schedule says Never Reboot. ### Windows where only the asset's own constraints apply Some assets cannot take a general window. NIST's inventory examples include an asset that can be rebooted only during a monthly maintenance outage, and for operational technology SP 800-82 Rev. 3 says patching “should be deployed during planned OT outages.” Write those windows into the maintenance group, not into the exception list. The wording of a window clause is on [maintenance windows](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/maintenance-windows/). ### The record to keep - The change record: patch identifiers, groups, window, approver, rollback plan. - The forced-install date and the mechanism chosen for it. - Any approval refused or deferred, with the reason and the new date. ### Sources - [NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Planning (April 2022)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Microsoft Learn, Intune Apple software update policies](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/intune/protect/software-updates-ios), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Microsoft Learn, Azure Update Manager scheduled patching](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/update-manager/scheduled-patching), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Microsoft Learn, Azure Update Manager pre and post events](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/update-manager/pre-post-scripts-overview), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Microsoft Learn, Intune Windows update rings](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/intune/protect/windows-10-update-rings), read 19 Nov 2026 - [AWS Systems Manager Patch Manager](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/systems-manager/latest/userguide/patch-manager.html), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r3.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Patch Management Process in 9 Steps (NIST SP 800-40r4)](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/) - [Step 6: Patch Deployment Process and Rollback](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/deploy/) - [Patch Maintenance Window Policy Clause](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/maintenance-windows/) - [Step 4: Patch Testing Process with Canary Rings](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/acquire-and-test/) --- # Step 6: Patch Deployment Process and Rollback Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/deploy/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Patch deployment process Patch deployment has five parts in NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4: distribute, validate, install, change software state (such as a restart), and resolve issues. A rollback path is part of it; Intune can uninstall the latest quality update, while Windows Server hotpatches cannot roll back automatically. Read 19 Nov 2026. ### The five parts NIST section 2.3.2 says deployment varies with the type of software (firmware, operating system, application), the platform (IT, OT, IoT, mobile, cloud, VM, container), whether the asset is managed and where it sits, and limits such as bandwidth. Its steps are to distribute, validate again, install, change state, and resolve issues. “Resolve issues” includes side effects such as altering security settings, and can mean “uninstalling the patch, reverting to the previous version of the software, or restoring the software or asset from backups” ([NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf)). This step follows [approve and schedule](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/approve-and-schedule/) and is checked by [verify](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/verify/); systems that cannot restart are in [patching systems that cannot be rebooted](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/systems-that-cannot-reboot/). ### Mechanisms and their rollback | Mechanism | How it deploys | Rollback the documentation describes | |---|---|---| | Ubuntu unattended-upgrades | Installed by default; applies security updates without interaction; runs once per day by default; can reboot if an update requires it | None described on the page; logs are in /var/log/unattended-upgrades | | Intune Windows update rings | Client-side deferral, restart and deadline settings | Administrator can uninstall the latest quality update; Intune then pauses that update type on the ring, and when the pause ends the update reinstalls if still applicable. Feature update uninstall is limited to a 2 to 60 day period | | Windows Server hotpatch | In-memory patches without restart, on a baseline that refreshes every three months | No automatic rollback; uninstall the update and install the last working baseline, which needs a restart | | AWS Patch Manager | Baseline approves; install task or patch policy applies | Not described on the baseline pages; the compliance state reports failures (see verify) | Sources: Ubuntu Server documentation, Microsoft Learn, AWS documentation, read 19 Nov 2026. ### Reinstall after rollback The Intune detail is easy to miss: uninstalling a quality update also pauses that update type, and the pause lasts no more than 35 days. After it ends, devices reinstall the update if it still applies. A procedure that rolls back must therefore set a date by which a fixed patch or a mitigation replaces it, or the devices will take the faulty update again. Ubuntu's page also notes that adding a package repository does not make unattended-upgrades consider it for updates, so third-party repositories need their own entry. ### The record to keep - Install logs per asset with the patch version before and after. - Restart status: installed but not restarted is a separate state (see [verify](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/verify/)). - Each rollback: who decided, what replaced the patch, and by when. - Assets that missed the window and the mechanism used to force them, per [approve and schedule](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/approve-and-schedule/). ### Questions **patch management rollback process** A rollback process names who may reverse a patch, how, and what replaces it. In Intune an administrator can uninstall the latest quality update, but updates of that type are then paused for up to 35 days and reinstall afterward if still applicable. Windows Server hotpatches have no automatic rollback and need a restart to undo. ### Sources - [NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Planning (April 2022)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Ubuntu Server documentation, automatic updates](https://documentation.ubuntu.com/server/how-to/software/automatic-updates/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Microsoft Learn, Intune Windows update rings](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/intune/protect/windows-10-update-rings), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Microsoft Learn, Hotpatch for Windows Server](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/get-started/hotpatch), read 19 Nov 2026 - [AWS Systems Manager, patch compliance states](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/systems-manager/latest/userguide/patch-manager-compliance-states.html), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Patch Management Process in 9 Steps (NIST SP 800-40r4)](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/) - [Step 7: How to Verify Patches Are Installed](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/verify/) - [Step 5: Patch Approval Process and Scheduling](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/approve-and-schedule/) - [Patching Systems That Cannot Be Rebooted](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/systems-that-cannot-reboot/) --- # Step 7: How to Verify Patches Are Installed Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/verify/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## How to verify patches are installed Verify in two ways: the patch is installed and it has taken effect, then monitor that it stays installed. In AWS Patch Manager a node with a patch installed but not yet restarted is INSTALLED_PENDING_REBOOT, which AWS classes as Compliant. A policy should count it separately. Read 19 Nov 2026. ### Installed is not the same as effective NIST defines verification as confirming “that the patch is installed and has taken effect” and says that automated means “are generally needed to achieve verification at scale” ([NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, sections 2.2 and 2.3.3](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf)). The gap between the two is the restart. Patching a service or kernel often changes nothing in the running process until it restarts, which is why [deployment](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/deploy/) records the restart status. ### Status values from a real tool AWS Systems Manager Patch Manager reports a state for each patch on each node. The mapping below is from the vendor's documentation and shows how a tool's word “compliant” can hide an open exposure. | Patch state | Meaning in AWS documentation | Compliance value AWS assigns | |---|---|---| | INSTALLED | In the baseline and installed | Compliant | | INSTALLED_OTHER | Installed but not in or not approved by the baseline | Compliant | | INSTALLED_PENDING_REBOOT | Installed, but the node has not been rebooted since; AWS says it does not mean a reboot is required | Compliant | | INSTALLED_REJECTED | Installed but on the rejected list | Non-Compliant | | MISSING | Approved in the baseline but not installed | Non-Compliant | | FAILED | Approved but could not be installed | Non-Compliant | Source: AWS Systems Manager User Guide, patch compliance states (non-Debian, non-Ubuntu table), read 19 Nov 2026. AWS's own caution is that the pending-reboot state does not by itself mean a reboot is required, only that the node has not rebooted since the install. A policy can still demand a restart check where the vendor says the fix needs one; the [Windows](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/windows-endpoints/) and [Linux](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/linux-servers/) pages note where. ### Do not use history as proof Microsoft's Intune documentation says that after a quality update is rolled back, “device users continue to see the update listed in Windows settings > Updates > Update History.” A listing in an update history screen is therefore weak evidence; query the installed build or package version instead, and compare it with the version the patch should produce. ### Keep checking NIST's last lifecycle phase monitors that the patch is “still installed”: not uninstalled by a user or an attacker, not replaced by an unpatched version restored from backup, and not reset to a vulnerable factory-default state. A monthly re-check of a sample, plus a check after every restore from backup, covers all three. ### The record to keep - The verification query and its result per asset, with the date. - Counts by state, with pending-restart assets listed separately. - Restores from backup and factory resets, each followed by a re-check. ### Sources - [NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Planning (April 2022)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [AWS Systems Manager, patch compliance states](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/systems-manager/latest/userguide/patch-manager-compliance-states.html), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Microsoft Learn, Intune Windows update rings, uninstall](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/intune/protect/windows-10-update-rings), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Patch Management Process in 9 Steps (NIST SP 800-40r4)](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/) - [Step 6: Patch Deployment Process and Rollback](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/deploy/) - [Step 8: Patch Management Report Contents](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/report/) - [Windows Patch Management Policy: Windows Rhythm](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/windows-endpoints/) - [Linux Patch Management Policy by Distribution](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/linux-servers/) --- # Step 8: Patch Management Report Contents Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/report/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Patch management report A patch management report shows, per maintenance group and severity, the share patched by the deadline plus mean and median time to patch. NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 section 3.6 calls a plain percentage of patched vulnerabilities “not actionable.” Read 19 Nov 2026. ### Why one percentage is not a report NIST asks what “10 % of your assets were not being patched” would mean for risk: if those are the most important assets, “then not patching them might be a major problem,” and if they are the least important, it might be reasonable prioritization. Its fix is to weigh both sides: asset importance (low, moderate, high) and vulnerability importance (low, medium, high, critical), each defined by the organization ([NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, section 3.6](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf)). Each cell of NIST's notional matrix holds three numbers: percent patched by the maintenance plan's deadline, average time, and median time. The matrix in the publication is labeled notional, so do not cite its figures as benchmarks. ### Match the report to its reader NIST says audiences differ: it names the chief executive officer as a possible reader of enterprise-level metrics and a Linux system administrator as a reader who needs platform-level ones. It also warns that low-level data decides quality: collecting software data by passive instead of authenticated scans “will generally underreport vulnerabilities and thus skew the higher-level metrics.” For compliance readers, the [patch compliance rate](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/patch-compliance-rate/) page covers the single headline number and the [proof for an auditor](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/proving-patch-compliance-to-an-auditor/) page covers evidence. ### Report template ```text # Patch report: [period] Prepared on: [date]. Data as of: [date and time of last collection]. 1. Scope - Maintenance groups included, and the count of assets in each (the denominator). - Assets excluded and why (with exception IDs). 2. Result by group and severity For each maintenance group and each severity band: - Assets due in the period. - Percent patched by the deadline in the group's maintenance plan. - Mean and median days from release (or from the deadline start) to verified install. - Assets installed but awaiting restart, counted separately. 3. Open items - Assets past deadline, owner, days late, risk response in force (mitigation, isolation, exception). - Every exception: ID, expiry date, last review date. 4. Failures and rollbacks - Patches rolled back, cause, replacement date. 5. Data quality - Percent of assets with inventory data older than [x] days. - Collection method (authenticated or passive). 6. Decisions requested - Changes to deadlines, windows or tooling for the [review](/process/review-the-cycle/). ``` Pick the deadline each row is measured against from your [severity and patch window](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/severity-and-patch-windows/) section, and state the clock start. The fields to keep behind each number are in the record list of [verify](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/verify/). ### Sources - [NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Planning (April 2022)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Table 1 (notional)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Patch Management Process in 9 Steps (NIST SP 800-40r4)](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/) - [Step 7: How to Verify Patches Are Installed](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/verify/) - [Step 9: Patch Management Process Improvement](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/review-the-cycle/) - [Patch Management Metrics: What the Policy Should Report](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/reporting-and-metrics/) - [Patch Compliance Rate: Formula, Denominators, Clocks](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/patch-compliance-rate/) --- # Step 9: Patch Management Process Improvement Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/review-the-cycle/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Patch management process improvement Review the patch cycle on a stated schedule: exceptions regularly, alternatives to patching periodically, deadlines yearly. CISA reassesses BOD 26-04 Table 1 once per fiscal year, and the HIPAA Security Rule proposal of 6 Jan 2025 would require testing the patch policy at least every 12 months. Read 19 Nov 2026. ### What NIST asks to be reviewed NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 names three reviews. Exceptions: “all exceptions to maintenance plans should be reviewed regularly to determine if the maintenance plan can be implemented now,” and assets with similar long-term exceptions might need a separate maintenance group. Alternatives to patching for unpatchable assets: reevaluate periodically through a risk assessment and a cost-benefit analysis of mitigating, transferring or accepting the risk. Metrics: improve the low-level data so enterprise measures can be trusted ([sections 3.5.4, 3.5.5 and 3.6](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf)). The inputs are the [reports](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/report/) from step 8. ### Cycle lengths taken from published texts | Source | What is reviewed | Stated interval | Status on 19 Nov 2026 | |---|---|---|---| | CISA BOD 26-04 | Table 1 remediation timelines, in a data-driven reassessment | Once per fiscal year | In force for federal civilian agencies | | HIPAA Security Rule NPRM, 90 FR 898, proposed 164.308(a)(4)(ii)(B) | Review and test written patch policies and procedures | At least once every 12 months | Proposed 6 Jan 2025; no final rule found in the text read | | CIS Controls v8, safeguard 7.2 | The remediation strategy | Monthly or more frequent | Control text from the August 2023 guide; v8.1 wording not read | | CIS Controls v8, safeguard 7.1 | Documentation of the vulnerability management process | Annually | Same source and limit | Sources: CISA, Federal Register, CIS Controls v8 PDF, read 19 Nov 2026. See the [HIPAA](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/hipaa-security-rule/) and [CIS](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/cis-control-7/) pages. ### Triggers outside the calendar Some events should force a review before the date. A vendor that publishes outside its schedule, as [Cisco and Fortinet](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/network-devices-and-firmware/) say they may for actively exploited flaws, can make a calendar-based window stale. An end-of-support date can leave a group with no patches at all: Microsoft states that SQL Server extended support “includes only security updates,” and that after it ends Microsoft no longer provides servicing. When either happens, move the affected assets to the unpatchable maintenance group and set the mitigations NIST describes in [section 3.5.4](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/systems-that-cannot-reboot/). ### The record to keep - The review date, attendees by role, and the decisions, each with an owner and a due date. - The set of exceptions reviewed and their outcomes: closed, renewed with a new expiry, or moved to another group. - Policy changes that followed, with version numbers, so the [review and approval](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/review-and-approval/) section can point at them. ### Sources - [NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Planning (April 2022)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CISA, BOD 26-04, CISA actions](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Federal Register, HIPAA Security Rule NPRM, 90 FR 898 (6 Jan 2025)](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/06/2024-30983/hipaa-security-rule-to-strengthen-the-cybersecurity-of-electronic-protected-health-information), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CIS Controls v8 (August 2023 guide)](https://storage.pardot.com/799323/1693938137QgfIAdmE/CIS_Controls__v8__Critical_Security_Controls__2023_08.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Microsoft Learn, SQL Server end of support](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/sql-server/end-of-support/sql-server-end-of-life-overview), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Cisco Security Vulnerability Policy](https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/resources/security_vulnerability_policy.html), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Fortinet PSIRT policy](https://www.fortiguard.com/psirt_policy), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Patch Management Process in 9 Steps (NIST SP 800-40r4)](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/) - [Step 8: Patch Management Report Contents](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/report/) - [Patch Management Policy Approval and Revision](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/review-and-approval/) - [HIPAA Patch Rules: In Force Text and the 15/30 Day Proposal](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/hipaa-security-rule/) - [Patching Systems That Cannot Be Rebooted](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/systems-that-cannot-reboot/) --- # Patching by Asset Type: Windows to OT Windows Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Patching by asset type Eleven asset classes need different patch windows because their vendors ship on different rhythms: Microsoft on the second Tuesday, Oracle on four fixed dates a year, Kubernetes monthly, Android on the first Monday. NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 calls the grouping a maintenance group. Read 19 Nov 2026. ### Why a policy groups assets by class NIST defines the unit: “A maintenance group is a set of assets with similar characteristics that generally have the same software maintenance needs for each risk response scenario.” It then asks for a maintenance plan for each group, with “the timeframes for beginning and ending each action” ([NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, sections 3.4 and 3.5](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf)). Its examples of groups include containers running customer-facing applications in a public cloud, with outage restrictions described as “highly tolerant to downtime,” and OT and IoT assets “with life-safety impact.” A class page below is the starting point for one such group: it names the vendor rhythm, the usual constraint on the window, and the evidence to keep. ### The eleven classes | Class | Release rhythm in one line (read 19 Nov 2026) | Constraint that sets the window | |---|---|---| | Windows endpoints and servers | Second Tuesday, plus out-of-band | Restarts; 35-day cap on an Intune pause | | macOS | No fixed day; three macOS lines patched on 9 Nov 2026 | Several supported major versions at once | | Linux servers | Per-distribution errata; daily unattended runs on Ubuntu | Kernel and library restarts | | Network devices and firmware | Cisco bundles twice a year per product line; Fortinet second Tuesday | Software train and image upgrade | | Browsers and third-party apps | Chrome stable update on 17 Nov 2026; Extended Stable every 8 weeks | Inventory of what is installed | | Containers and images | Kubernetes monthly patch releases | Rebuild and redeploy, not patch in place | | Cloud virtual machines | Follows the operating system vendor | Shared responsibility and orchestration | | Databases | Oracle four dates a year; PostgreSQL at least every three months | Application compatibility | | Mobile devices | Android first Monday; Apple unscheduled | Manufacturer and carrier delivery | | OT and medical devices | Vendor-specific; CISA publishes advisories | Planned outages; certification | | Systems that cannot reboot | Hotpatch baselines every three months; live kernel patches | Live patch coverage limits | Each row links to the class page; the figures are sourced there. ### How to use these pages with the rest of the site The class pages give the supply side: what the vendor ships and when. The demand side, the number of days a framework allows, is on the [patch window table](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/), and the clause that connects them is [severity and patch windows](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/severity-and-patch-windows/). The steps that apply to every class are on the [process page](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/). ### Sources - [NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Planning (April 2022)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Patch Management Process in 9 Steps (NIST SP 800-40r4)](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/) - [Patch Window Table: Deadlines in 12 Frameworks](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/) - [Severity and Patch Windows: What Each Framework Sets](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/severity-and-patch-windows/) - [Windows Patch Management Policy: Windows Rhythm](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/windows-endpoints/) --- # Windows Patch Management Policy: Windows Rhythm Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/windows-endpoints/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Windows patch management policy Microsoft publishes the monthly Windows security update on the second Tuesday, typically 10:00 AM Pacific; the November 2026 release was 10 Nov and the next are 8 Dec 2026 and 12 Jan 2027. A Windows policy therefore sets its window relative to that Tuesday. Read 19 Nov 2026. ### The rhythm Microsoft publishes Microsoft's release-cycle page lists four release types: the monthly security update (second Tuesday, also called Patch Tuesday, Update Tuesday or B week), an optional non-security preview update in the fourth week of each month, out-of-band updates “as needed” for a recently identified issue, and feature updates ([Microsoft Learn](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/deployment/update/release-cycle)). Quality updates are cumulative, so an asset that skipped a month still catches up by installing the latest one. Size varies and the headline numbers mislead. The MSRC document titled “November 2026 Security Updates” (initial release 10 Nov 2026) holds 1,791 CVE entries. In a count of the document made for this site, 762 list a Windows product, 404 list only Azure Linux products, and 292 list Edge or Chromium; one is flagged as exploited. The document covers more than Windows, so 1,791 is not the size of the Windows update ([MSRC CVRF API](https://api.msrc.microsoft.com/cvrf/v3.0/cvrf/2026-Nov)). ### Window a policy can set Two published facts bound the window. The Cyber Essentials requirement is 14 days from release for updates the vendor describes as critical or high ([NCSC, requirements v3.3](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/sites/default/files/2026-11/Cyber-Essentials-Requirements-for-IT-Infrastructure-v3-3.pdf)). The longest hold-back Intune allows on a ring is 35 days per pause. A common structure is a pilot ring right after the preview update, a broad ring within the first week after the second Tuesday, and a forced restart deadline before day 14 for internet-facing and critical-or-high items. The per-framework numbers are on the [patch window table](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/). | Server patching tool | Default behavior documented | Implication | |---|---|---| | AWS Patch Manager, AWS-DefaultPatchBaseline | Approves Windows Server patches classed CriticalUpdates or SecurityUpdates with MSRC severity Critical or Important, auto-approved 7 days after release or update | Windows Server nodes under the default are not patched within 7 days; a custom baseline is needed for a shorter window | | Windows Server hotpatch | Baseline refreshes every three months; hotpatches in the two months between | Fewer restarts; see systems that cannot reboot | Sources: AWS Systems Manager and Microsoft Learn, read 19 Nov 2026. ### Testing and rollback Intune update rings stage test, pilot and production by deferral and deadline. An administrator can uninstall the latest quality update; Intune pauses that type on the ring, and the update returns when the pause ends. Feature updates can be uninstalled only within a configurable 2 to 60 day period ([Microsoft Learn](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/intune/protect/windows-10-update-rings)). The testing method is in [acquire and test](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/acquire-and-test/). ### Evidence an auditor asks for - The ring assignment and deadline settings, exported with a date. - Per-asset installed build numbers after the second Tuesday, not only the update history screen, which keeps showing a rolled-back update. - Exception list for assets held back, with expiry. ### Questions **what is patch management in windows** Patch management in Windows is the cycle of receiving Microsoft's monthly security update on the second Tuesday, testing it on a pilot group, deploying it with a tool such as Intune or a server patching service, and verifying the installed build. Microsoft also ships an optional preview in the fourth week and out-of-band fixes as needed. **patch management process windows server** For Windows Server, the process is the same nine steps with server-specific tools: a baseline (AWS's default waits 7 days after release), a maintenance window, a restart, and verification. Hotpatch on supported Windows Server 2022 and 2025 images reduces restarts to a quarterly baseline. ### Sources - [Microsoft Learn, Update release cycle for Windows clients](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/deployment/update/release-cycle), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Microsoft Learn, Intune Windows update rings](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/intune/protect/windows-10-update-rings), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Microsoft Security Response Center, CVRF November 2026 Security Updates](https://api.msrc.microsoft.com/cvrf/v3.0/cvrf/2026-Nov), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NCSC, Cyber Essentials Requirements for IT Infrastructure v3.3](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/sites/default/files/2026-11/Cyber-Essentials-Requirements-for-IT-Infrastructure-v3-3.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [AWS Systems Manager, predefined and custom patch baselines](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/systems-manager/latest/userguide/patch-manager-predefined-and-custom-patch-baselines.html), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Microsoft Learn, Hotpatch for Windows Server](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/get-started/hotpatch), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Step 4: Patch Testing Process with Canary Rings](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/acquire-and-test/) - [Cyber Essentials 14 Day Patching Rule (v3.3, April 2026)](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/cyber-essentials/) - [Patching Systems That Cannot Be Rebooted](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/systems-that-cannot-reboot/) - [Cloud Patch Management: AWS and Azure VMs](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/cloud-virtual-machines/) --- # macOS Patch Management: Three Lines at Once Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/macos/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## macOS patch management Apple patched three macOS lines on the same day, 9 Nov 2026: macOS Golden Gate 27.2.1, macOS Tahoe 26.7.3 and macOS Sequoia 15.8.3. A macOS policy must therefore cover each supported major version, because staying on one release line can still receive fixes. Read 19 Nov 2026. ### What Apple's page shows Apple's security releases page does not state a fixed release day. On 19 Nov 2026 it listed, among others, iOS 27.2.1 and macOS Golden Gate 27.2.1 on 9 Nov 2026, with macOS Tahoe 26.7.3 and macOS Sequoia 15.8.3 the same day, Xcode 27.2 on 29 Oct 2026, and tvOS 27.2.1 and HomeView 27.2.1 later in November ([Apple, security releases](https://support.apple.com/en-us/100100)). Because there is no calendar to plan around, the monitoring trigger is the page or Apple's mailing list, and the window starts at the release date on that page. See [monitor for releases](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/monitor-for-releases/). For phones on the same Apple mechanism see [mobile devices](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/mobile-devices/); the general method is in the [process overview](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/). ### Windows of time a policy can set The same page tells readers how to allow important background updates, so a policy should say whether those are permitted or controlled by management. For managed Macs, Intune supports two policy models using declarative device management. “Latest version” installs the newest eligible OS after a deferral in days at a set install time. “Targeted version” names the required OS version and a precise deadline, with an optional help URL; Microsoft describes it as suited to strict application compatibility or phased deployments ([Microsoft Learn](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/intune/protect/software-updates-ios)). A reasonable structure is Latest version with a short deferral for most, and Targeted version for the group with compatibility limits. | Control | Setting | Note | |---|---|---| | Intune, Enforce Latest | Delay in days; install time | The delay sets the enforcement date from Apple's release or the policy date; it does not delay when users are offered the update | | Intune, targeted version | Required version; deadline | Used for phased rollouts | | AWS Patch Manager, AWS-MacOSDefaultPatchBaseline | Approves macOS patches classed Security and packages with a current update | For EC2 Mac instances; no approval delay stated | Sources: Microsoft Learn and AWS documentation, read 19 Nov 2026. ### Testing, rollback and evidence Apple's page states a limit for its other platforms: once an update is installed on iOS, iPadOS, tvOS, watchOS or visionOS it cannot be downgraded. The page's note does not list macOS, and this site did not read a macOS downgrade statement, so a macOS rollback plan should rely on backups taken before the update rather than on a downgrade path. Evidence to keep: the policy export, the OS build per Mac after each release, and the list of Macs on a version that is no longer receiving fixes. The ring approach is described in [acquire and test](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/acquire-and-test/). ### Sources - [Apple, security releases](https://support.apple.com/en-us/100100), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Microsoft Learn, Intune software update policies for Apple devices](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/intune/protect/software-updates-ios), read 19 Nov 2026 - [AWS Systems Manager, predefined and custom patch baselines](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/systems-manager/latest/userguide/patch-manager-predefined-and-custom-patch-baselines.html), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Step 2: How to Track Vendor Patch Releases](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/monitor-for-releases/) - [Mobile Device Patch Management: Android, iOS](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/mobile-devices/) - [Step 4: Patch Testing Process with Canary Rings](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/acquire-and-test/) - [Patching by Asset Type: Windows to OT Windows](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/) --- # Linux Patch Management Policy by Distribution Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/linux-servers/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Linux patch management policy Linux servers have no single release day; each distribution publishes its own advisories. Red Hat classes flaws on a four-point scale (Low, Moderate, Important, Critical), and Ubuntu runs unattended-upgrades once per day by default. A Linux policy sets its window per distribution. Read 19 Nov 2026. ### Distribution rhythms Red Hat packages fixes as errata of three types: RHSA for security, RHBA for bug fixes and RHEA for enhancements. Its security classification has four levels. Critical is reserved for flaws “easily exploited by a remote unauthenticated attacker” that lead to system compromise without user interaction; flaws that need authentication, local or physical access, or an unlikely configuration “are not classified as Critical impact” ([Red Hat, severity classification](https://access.redhat.com/security/updates/classification)). A policy that says “critical within X days” must say whose scale it uses, since Red Hat's Critical is narrower than the usual CVSS usage. Ubuntu installs security updates automatically through the unattended-upgrades package, which is on by default, runs once per day, includes Expanded Security Maintenance when available, and can reboot the system when an update warrants it ([Ubuntu Server documentation](https://documentation.ubuntu.com/server/how-to/software/automatic-updates/)). A repository added later is not considered unless the configuration is changed. ### How one cloud tool treats each distribution | Distribution | AWS default baseline approval rule | Wait | |---|---|---| | Debian Server | Operating system security patches, all listed priorities | None: release dates not reliable in the repositories | | Red Hat Enterprise Linux | Security patches with severity Critical or Important, plus Bugfix | 7 days after release or update | | Oracle Linux | Security patches Important or Moderate; Bugfix after 7 days | 7 days | | SUSE Linux Enterprise Server | Security patches Critical or Important | 7 days | | Ubuntu Server | Operating system security patches, all listed priorities | None | Source: AWS Systems Manager, predefined baselines, read 19 Nov 2026. For Amazon Linux 2, the 7 days run from the Updated Date value in updateinfo.xml. The table shows why one policy number cannot be copied across distributions: the same tool delays one family by a week and none for another, and Moderate-severity RHEL security patches are not in the default baseline. Cloud-hosted Linux follows [cloud virtual machines](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/cloud-virtual-machines/), and the steps that apply to every class are on the [process page](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/). ### Window, testing and rollback Set the window by severity on the distribution's own scale, and keep a separate, shorter path for anything on the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities list. Test on a staging group of each distribution version in use. For kernel fixes without a restart, see [systems that cannot reboot](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/systems-that-cannot-reboot/); Red Hat's live kernel patches are for selected Important and Critical CVEs only. Package-level rollback depends on the package manager and snapshots, and the sources read here do not document it, so the policy should require a snapshot or image before the change. ### Evidence - The advisory identifiers applied per host (RHSA numbers, Ubuntu notices). - The unattended-upgrades log from /var/log/unattended-upgrades. - Hosts with kernels older than the one installed on disk, listed until restarted. The verification states are in [verify](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/verify/). ### Sources - [Red Hat, severity classification](https://access.redhat.com/security/updates/classification), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Red Hat, Explaining Red Hat Errata (RHSA, RHBA, RHEA)](https://access.redhat.com/articles/explaining_redhat_errata), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Ubuntu Server documentation, automatic updates](https://documentation.ubuntu.com/server/how-to/software/automatic-updates/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [AWS Systems Manager, predefined and custom patch baselines](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/systems-manager/latest/userguide/patch-manager-predefined-and-custom-patch-baselines.html), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Red Hat, live kernel patching](https://access.redhat.com/solutions/2206511), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Patching Systems That Cannot Be Rebooted](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/systems-that-cannot-reboot/) - [Step 7: How to Verify Patches Are Installed](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/verify/) - [Patch Window Table: Deadlines in 12 Frameworks](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/) - [Cloud Patch Management: AWS and Azure VMs](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/cloud-virtual-machines/) --- # Network Device Patch Management and Firmware Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/network-devices-and-firmware/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Network device patch management Network vendors publish on stated schedules with exceptions. Cisco bundles FXOS and NX-OS advisories on the fourth Wednesday of February and August, IOS XR on the second Wednesday of March and September, and IOS and IOS XE on the fourth Wednesday of March and September. Fortinet uses the second Tuesday. Read 19 Nov 2026. ### Cisco: bundles and the conditions that break them Cisco generally discloses advisories at 1600 GMT on a Wednesday and releases bundles twice a year for three product families. Its policy reserves the right to publish an individual advisory outside the schedule, and names the conditions: heightened public awareness of a serious vulnerability, learning of active exploitation, or coordinated disclosure with a third-party center ([Cisco Security Vulnerability Policy](https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/resources/security_vulnerability_policy.html)). The next bundle dates, computed from the rule, are 24 Feb 2027 (FXOS and NX-OS), 10 Mar 2027 (IOS XR) and 24 Mar 2027 (IOS and IOS XE). The policy consequence is a two-lane rule: a planned review lane on the bundle dates, and an unscheduled lane triggered by a vendor out-of-cycle notice or a KEV addition. The same rhythms appear in the calendar in [monitor for releases](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/monitor-for-releases/), and the table of asset classes is at [patching by asset type](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/). ### Fortinet: which branches get a fix | Fortinet severity (CVSS band) | Branches Fortinet says it fixes | Publication | |---|---|---| | Critical, 9.0 to 10.0 | All supported versions | Monthly or out-of-cycle advisory | | High, 7.0 to 8.9 | All supported versions | Monthly advisory | | Medium, 4.0 to 6.9 | Current and prior version | Monthly advisory | | Low, 2.0 to 3.9 | Latest supported version | Monthly advisory | Source: Fortinet PSIRT policy, read 19 Nov 2026. This is Fortinet's statement of its own practice; products with a rapid release cycle may be limited to the previous four minor versions. Fortinet publishes on the second Tuesday of the month (next: 8 Dec 2026 and 12 Jan 2027, computed). The table matters for the window: a device on an older branch may have no fix for a medium issue and so needs an upgrade, not a patch. Plan the upgrade path in advance. Juniper's schedule could not be read from this environment on 19 Nov 2026 and is not described. ### Firmware and the window NIST notes that some installations “require administrator privileges, such as installing firmware patches for a system basic input/output system,” and points to NIST SP 800-147 on BIOS updates. The usual constraint for a network device is an outage: a single gateway has no spare, so the window is set by when the business can lose it, and rollback is the previous image kept on the device or in a repository. Write those facts into the [maintenance group](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/) and the [maintenance windows clause](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/maintenance-windows/). ### Evidence - Image version per device and the advisory it addresses. - The date a vendor bundle or out-of-cycle notice was received, and the date the device was fixed. - Devices on end-of-support software, kept with the compensating controls from the exceptions record. ### Questions **what is patch management in networking** In networking it is the controlled upgrade of device software and firmware against vendor advisories. Cisco publishes bundles for IOS and IOS XE on the fourth Wednesday of March and September, and Fortinet publishes monthly on the second Tuesday, so the work follows both a calendar and unscheduled notices. ### Sources - [Cisco Security Vulnerability Policy](https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/resources/security_vulnerability_policy.html), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Fortinet PSIRT policy](https://www.fortiguard.com/psirt_policy), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Planning (April 2022)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Step 2: How to Track Vendor Patch Releases](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/monitor-for-releases/) - [Patch Maintenance Window Policy Clause](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/maintenance-windows/) - [Patching by Asset Type: Windows to OT Windows](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/) - [Patch Management Policy Exceptions Clause Template](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-exceptions-clause/) --- # Third-Party Application Patching and Browsers Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/browsers-and-third-party-apps/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Third party application patching Third-party applications need their own patch window because no single operating system tool covers them. Chrome shipped a desktop stable update on 17 Nov 2026, and CIS Controls v8 safeguard 7.4 asks for application updates through automated patch management “on a monthly, or more frequent, basis.” Read 19 Nov 2026. ### Browsers: a rhythm measured in days Google's Chrome Releases blog showed a Stable Channel Update for Desktop dated Tuesday, 17 Nov 2026 ([Chrome Releases](https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/)). Google's enterprise help page describes five channels and says the Stable channel “is updated every 2 weeks for major releases,” the Extended Stable channel every 8 weeks, with Extended Stable users still receiving security fixes ([Chrome Enterprise Help](https://support.google.com/chrome/a/answer/9027636)). It advises keeping 5% of users on Beta, which gets a two-week preview. Those are Google's statements on the page as read on 19 Nov 2026; Firefox's release calendar and Adobe's security bulletin pages could not be read from this environment on that date and are not described here. A policy for browsers should therefore state a window in days, not in months, and say whether a managed browser may auto-update outside the change window. The question of which channel a group uses is also a maintenance-group decision (see [assess and prioritize](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/assess-and-prioritize/)). ### What the standards say about applications | Source | Text | Consequence for the policy | |---|---|---| | CIS Controls v8, safeguard 7.4 (August 2023 guide) | “Perform application updates on enterprise assets through automated patch management on a monthly, or more frequent, basis.” | A written cadence of at most a month for applications, by automated tooling | | NIST SP 800-218 (SSDF) PW.4.4 | Verify that acquired commercial, open-source and other third-party components comply with the organization's requirements throughout their life cycles | Components are checked over time, not once at purchase | | NIST SP 800-218 RV.1.1 | Gather information from acquirers, users and public sources on vulnerabilities in the software and its third-party components | Monitoring includes the libraries inside products, not only the products | | AWS Patch Manager, Windows OS-Applications baseline | For applications released by Microsoft it approves all patches, auto-approved 7 days after release or update | Microsoft applications can ride the same tool; other vendors need their own source | Sources: CIS Controls v8 PDF, NIST SP 800-218 v1.1 PDF, AWS documentation, read 19 Nov 2026. CIS v8.1 wording was not read. ### Finding what is installed The usual failure is the application nobody listed. NIST's inventory advice applies in full: keep a software inventory per asset down to package level, and use an SBOM from the vendor where one exists. For open source libraries inside your own software, see the [third-party and open source patching guide](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/third-party-and-open-source-patching/). The inventory step is [step 1](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/inventory/). ### Testing, rollback and evidence - Test on the pilot group in the week of release; applications with plug-ins and macros need the longest. - Keep the previous installer version in the repository for rollback; a browser rollback also needs the profile policy to allow an older version. - Evidence: application version per asset with date, the channel assigned to each group, and the list of unmanaged installs found and their disposition. ### Sources - [Chrome Releases blog](https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Google Chrome Enterprise Help, release channels](https://support.google.com/chrome/a/answer/9027636), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CIS Controls v8 (August 2023 guide), safeguard 7.4](https://storage.pardot.com/799323/1693938137QgfIAdmE/CIS_Controls__v8__Critical_Security_Controls__2023_08.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NIST SP 800-218 (SSDF) v1.1](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-218.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [AWS Systems Manager, predefined and custom patch baselines](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/systems-manager/latest/userguide/patch-manager-predefined-and-custom-patch-baselines.html), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Third-Party and Open Source Patching in a Policy](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/third-party-and-open-source-patching/) - [Step 1: Patch Management Asset Inventory](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/inventory/) - [CIS Control 7: Monthly Patching Safeguards 7.1 to 7.7](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/cis-control-7/) - [Step 3: How to Prioritize Patches by Risk Response](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/assess-and-prioritize/) --- # Container Image Patching: Rebuild, Do Not Patch Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/containers-and-images/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Container image patching Container images are patched by rebuilding and redeploying, not by changing a running container. NIST SP 800-190 says a container needing an upgrade “is simply destroyed and replaced.” Kubernetes ships patch releases monthly, next on 15 Dec 2026, and supports each series about 14 months. Read 19 Nov 2026. ### What replaces the install step NIST SP 800-190 describes containers as stateless entities that are “deployed but not changed”: when contents must change, the container is destroyed and replaced with a new one. It follows that “all vulnerability management, including patches and configuration settings, is typically taken care of by the developer when building a new image version,” which shifts responsibility from operations to developers and calls for coordination between them ([NIST SP 800-190](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-190.pdf)). The policy hook is a maximum age for an image or its base layer, and a rebuild trigger when the base publisher releases a fix. Docker's guidance says the same in practical terms: an image is a snapshot, including every base image and library, so rebuild regularly. A tag such as the ubuntu 24.04 tag may resolve to a newer underlying image over time as the publisher rebuilds it with security patches; the build flag --pull makes the builder check for and download a newer base image even if one is cached, and --no-cache re-runs all steps, so the two are used together for a fresh build (Docker build guidance, listed in the sources below). The image rebuild belongs to the [deploy step](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/deploy/); the hosts follow the [Linux server window](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/linux-servers/). ### The orchestrator is also software | Kubernetes series | Maintenance mode | End of life | |---|---|---| | 1.36 | 28 Apr 2027 | 28 Jun 2027 | | 1.37 | 28 Aug 2027 | 28 Oct 2027 | Source: Kubernetes patch releases page, read 19 Nov 2026. Kubernetes says its typical patch cadence is monthly, a bit faster (one to two weeks) after a new minor release, with critical fixes allowed outside the cadence. Upcoming targets on the page are 15 Dec 2026 and 12 Jan 2027. Each series gets roughly fourteen months: twelve standard, then two in maintenance mode, where extra releases may fix CVE-assigned vulnerabilities, dependency issues including base image updates, and critical core problems ([Kubernetes](https://kubernetes.io/releases/patch-releases/)). The consequence is a cluster-version deadline in the policy, not only an image rule. ### Where live patching stops Microsoft's hotpatch for Windows Server does not apply to container images: its page states that “Windows Server container base images” are not supported. Container hosts can be hotpatched; the images still need rebuilding. See [systems that cannot reboot](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/systems-that-cannot-reboot/). ### Window, rollback and evidence - Window: images rebuilt on the base publisher's release, deployed through the normal pipeline; hosts patched on the Linux or Windows windows. - Rollback: redeploy the previous immutable image version; keep the last known good version tagged. - NIST adds that remote shells should never be enabled inside containers, so the fix path stays a redeploy. - Evidence: image build date and base image digest per workload, the inventory of running image versions, and the cluster version. ### Sources - [NIST SP 800-190, Application Container Security Guide](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-190.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Docker Docs, Building guidance, rebuild your images often](https://docs.docker.com/build/building/best-practices/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Kubernetes, Patch Releases](https://kubernetes.io/releases/patch-releases/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Microsoft Learn, Hotpatch for Windows Server](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/get-started/hotpatch), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Linux Patch Management Policy by Distribution](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/linux-servers/) - [Patching Systems That Cannot Be Rebooted](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/systems-that-cannot-reboot/) - [Step 6: Patch Deployment Process and Rollback](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/deploy/) - [Third-Party and Open Source Patching in a Policy](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/third-party-and-open-source-patching/) --- # Cloud Patch Management: AWS and Azure VMs Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/cloud-virtual-machines/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Cloud patch management Cloud virtual machines are patched by the customer unless a managed service does it. AWS Patch Manager runs by patch policy, maintenance window or on-demand Patch now, and Azure Update Manager uses maintenance configurations, up to 250 schedules per subscription per region. Read 19 Nov 2026. ### Who patches what NIST lists “the party who administrates the asset (for example IT department, third party, end user, vendor/manufacturer, shared responsibility model)” among the fields to inventory, and names moving to SaaS, where the provider patches, as a way to transfer risk ([NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf)). For virtual machines the guest operating system is the customer's. The cloud provider's host maintenance is a separate matter and outside this page. Guest operating system windows come from the [Windows](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/windows-endpoints/) and [Linux](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/linux-servers/) pages, and the process steps are in the [overview](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/). ### Two orchestration models compared | Feature | AWS Systems Manager Patch Manager | Azure Update Manager | |---|---|---| | How patching is scheduled | Patch policy in Quick Setup (single policy across accounts and Regions with AWS Organizations), maintenance window, or on-demand Patch now | Maintenance configurations: recurring schedules, daily, weekly or hourly | | What decides the patches | Patch baselines, predefined or custom; default Windows Server and many Linux baselines wait 7 days | Update classifications chosen in the schedule | | Status vocabulary | INSTALLED, INSTALLED_PENDING_REBOOT, MISSING, FAILED and others | Per-machine results in the service | | Documented limit worth planning around | Windows Server default baselines include a 7-day auto-approval delay; a custom baseline is needed to install sooner | 250 schedules per subscription per region; 3,000 resource associations per schedule | | Hooks | Maintenance window tasks | Pre-events and post-events; a failed pre-event must be cancelled by you or the run proceeds | Sources: AWS Systems Manager User Guide and Microsoft Learn, read 19 Nov 2026. Vendor descriptions of their own services. Azure also states that VMs created from a supported Windows Server image have Automatic VM Guest Patching enabled by default, which means a policy must say whether that behavior is acceptable or turned off in favor of a customer-managed schedule. Machines in the same Azure availability set that patch in overlapping schedules may be skipped or fail if the window overruns; split them or lengthen the window. ### Testing, rollback and evidence Use tags or groups to run a canary group first, and take a snapshot or image before the install. The sources read here document the baselines and schedules, not rollback; the [deploy step](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/deploy/) covers what to record. Evidence for an auditor: the baseline or configuration identifier and its date, the compliance report showing installed and missing patches, and the list of nodes with patches installed but not restarted (AWS counts that as compliant, so report it separately; see [verify](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/verify/)). ### Questions **automated patch management aws** In AWS, automated patching is done by Systems Manager Patch Manager. A patch baseline decides which patches are approved, and a patch policy in Quick Setup, a maintenance window or a Patch now operation applies them. Default Windows Server baselines wait 7 days after release before approving. **aws patch management policy** An AWS patch management policy can be written as a Patch Manager patch policy: one Quick Setup configuration that defines schedules and baselines for an AWS Organizations scope. The written policy should also state which baseline is used and who owns exceptions. ### Sources - [AWS Systems Manager Patch Manager](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/systems-manager/latest/userguide/patch-manager.html), read 19 Nov 2026 - [AWS Systems Manager, predefined and custom patch baselines](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/systems-manager/latest/userguide/patch-manager-predefined-and-custom-patch-baselines.html), read 19 Nov 2026 - [AWS Systems Manager, patch compliance states](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/systems-manager/latest/userguide/patch-manager-compliance-states.html), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Microsoft Learn, Azure Update Manager scheduled patching](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/update-manager/scheduled-patching), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Microsoft Learn, Hotpatch for Windows Server](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/get-started/hotpatch), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Planning (April 2022)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Step 6: Patch Deployment Process and Rollback](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/deploy/) - [Step 7: How to Verify Patches Are Installed](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/verify/) - [Windows Patch Management Policy: Windows Rhythm](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/windows-endpoints/) - [Linux Patch Management Policy by Distribution](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/linux-servers/) --- # Database Patch Management: Oracle, SQL Server Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/databases/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Database patch management Oracle publishes Critical Patch Updates on the third Tuesday of January, April, July and October; the next are 19 Jan, 20 Apr, 20 Jul and 19 Oct 2027. PostgreSQL releases minor versions at least every three months. A database window follows those dates. Read 19 Nov 2026. ### Oracle: four dates and revisions Oracle states that Critical Patch Updates are collections of patches for multiple vulnerabilities, address flaws in Oracle code and in third-party components, are usually cumulative, and are available to customers with valid support contracts. A pre-release announcement appears on the Thursday before each release. The page also shows that an advisory is revised after release: the October 2026 update stood at Rev 3 on 4 Nov 2026, and the July 2026 update at Rev 7 on 20 Aug 2026 ([Oracle](https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/)). A policy should say that the revision history is reread, not only the release day, and that the deadline runs from the release unless stated otherwise. ### Other engines | Engine | Published rhythm and support | What the policy should note | |---|---|---| | PostgreSQL | Minor releases (security, low-risk and frequent bug fixes) at least once every three months; a critical fix may come out of cycle; each major version supported 5 years | Minor upgrades need no dump and restore: stop the server, install binaries, restart; read the release notes first | | SQL Server | At least 10 years per version: 5 mainstream plus 5 extended; extended support includes only security updates; Extended Security Updates available up to three years past end of support | Past extended support, servicing stops; plan migration or paid ESU | | Oracle Database | Quarterly Critical Patch Update dates above | Oracle says the patches are usually cumulative; confirm in each advisory that it covers the missed quarter | Sources: PostgreSQL versioning policy, Microsoft Learn (SQL Server end of support), Oracle, read 19 Nov 2026. ### Window, testing and rollback Databases are usually patched in a restart window agreed with the application owner, and NIST's example maintenance groups record outage restrictions per group. Because a PostgreSQL minor release replaces binaries and restarts the server, the downtime is short; an Oracle quarterly update is larger and should be rehearsed on a clone first. Rollback is a restore or the previous software home: take a backup and record its identifier before the change. The sources read for this page do not document engine-level rollback, so the policy should require the backup, not assume the engine will reverse itself. ### Evidence - Patch level per instance after each cycle, against the quarterly advisory. - The backup identifier and the restore test date. - Instances on versions past their support end date, linked to the exceptions record in [exceptions clause](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-exceptions-clause/). The dates feed the calendar in [monitor for releases](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/monitor-for-releases/); the wording of the window is in [maintenance windows](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/maintenance-windows/). ### Sources - [Oracle, Critical Patch Updates, Security Alerts and Bulletins](https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [PostgreSQL, versioning policy](https://www.postgresql.org/support/versioning/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Microsoft Learn, SQL Server end of support options](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/sql-server/end-of-support/sql-server-end-of-life-overview), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Planning (April 2022)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Step 2: How to Track Vendor Patch Releases](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/monitor-for-releases/) - [Patch Maintenance Window Policy Clause](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/maintenance-windows/) - [Patch Management Policy Exceptions Clause Template](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-exceptions-clause/) - [Patching by Asset Type: Windows to OT Windows](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/) --- # Mobile Device Patch Management: Android, iOS Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/mobile-devices/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Mobile device patch management Android security bulletins publish on the first Monday of each month; the November 2026 bulletin (2 Nov) carried patch levels 2026-11-01 and 2026-11-05, and the next is 7 Dec 2026. Apple fixed three iOS lines on 9 Nov 2026, so a mobile policy must map each device model to its line. Read 19 Nov 2026. ### Android The Android Security Bulletins page says bulletins are published on the first Monday of each month, moving to the next work day if that Monday is a holiday. Each lists two security patch levels: November 2026 shows 2026-11-01 and 2026-11-05, October 2026 shows 2026-10-01 and 2026-10-05. Platform fixes reach the open-source tree 24 to 48 hours after the quarterly bulletin (March, June, September, December), device and chipset makers may publish their own details, and the page lists Google, LG, Motorola, Nokia, OnePlus, Oppo, Samsung and Vivo ([Android Open Source Project](https://source.android.com/docs/security/bulletin/asb-overview)). The month's bulletin is therefore not the same as the date a given handset gets the fix: the policy should measure by the patch level reported on the device. The release calendar is in [monitor for releases](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/monitor-for-releases/), and all classes are listed at [patching by asset type](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/). ### Apple Apple's security releases page shows iOS 27.2.1 and iPadOS 27.2.1, iOS 26.7.3 and iPadOS 26.7.3, and iOS 18.7.12 and iPadOS 18.7.12 all dated 9 Nov 2026. The last one covers iPhone XS, XS Max, XR and iPad 7th generation, which are not eligible for the newer lines. It also states that after an update is installed on iOS or iPadOS it cannot be downgraded ([Apple](https://support.apple.com/en-us/100100)). The consequence: the rollback plan for iPhones is to hold the update during testing, because there is no way back after install. | Platform | Cadence evidence | Enforcement option read | |---|---|---| | Android | First Monday; two patch levels per bulletin | Check the reported patch level in management; the sources read here do not document an enforcement setting | | iOS and iPadOS | Unscheduled; three lines patched 9 Nov 2026 | Intune: Latest version policy (deferral in days and install time) or Targeted version policy (named version and deadline) | Sources: Android Open Source Project, Apple, Microsoft Learn, read 19 Nov 2026. ### Window and evidence A mobile fleet has no maintenance window in the server sense; the deadline is the enforcement date. Intune's delay in days runs from Apple's release or from the date the policy is set, and the install time is on a 24-hour clock. A short deferral for the fleet and a Targeted version for a pilot group follows the canary idea from [acquire and test](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/acquire-and-test/). Evidence: the policy export, the OS version and patch level per device, and the devices that no longer receive fixes. The [macOS page](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/macos/) covers laptops on the same Apple mechanism. ### Sources - [Android Open Source Project, Android Security Bulletins](https://source.android.com/docs/security/bulletin/asb-overview), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Apple, security releases](https://support.apple.com/en-us/100100), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Microsoft Learn, Intune Apple software update policies](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/intune/protect/software-updates-ios), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [macOS Patch Management: Three Lines at Once](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/macos/) - [Step 4: Patch Testing Process with Canary Rings](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/acquire-and-test/) - [Step 2: How to Track Vendor Patch Releases](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/monitor-for-releases/) - [Patching by Asset Type: Windows to OT Windows](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/) --- # OT Patch Management Policy and Medical Devices Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/ot-and-medical-devices/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## OT patch management policy Operational technology is patched during planned outages after testing. NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3 says to test on a sandbox where possible and to deploy during scheduled maintenance windows; FDA's 2016 guidance expects manufacturers to tell customers within 30 days and fix within 60 days in its stated circumstances. Read 19 Nov 2026. ### What NIST asks of an OT patch process NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3 (September 2023) says organizations should have “a systematic, accountable, and documented OT patch management process,” which covers how to monitor for patches, when to apply them, how to test them, “and how to select compensating controls to limit exposure of the vulnerable system when patching is delayed.” It warns that a patch may introduce “a greater risk from a production or safety perspective” and may change how the OS works with control applications, that many OT systems run unsupported operating systems with no patch, and that knowledgeable OT personnel decide when and how to deploy. It suggests a separate automated process for OT, and prioritizing components in DMZ environments and vulnerabilities that threaten availability, integrity or remote access ([NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r3.pdf)). It names NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, NERC CIP-007 and ISA 62443-2-3 as sources for procedures; the latter two were not read for this page. ### Where the vulnerabilities come from The same document notes that many OT vulnerabilities are published as CISA advisories but not all vendors report to CISA, so subscribe to vendor-specific notices as well. The monitoring step is in [monitor for releases](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/monitor-for-releases/). Where no patch exists, the asset moves to the unpatchable group in [systems that cannot reboot](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/systems-that-cannot-reboot/). ### Medical devices: whose clock is it FDA's Postmarket Management of Cybersecurity in Medical Devices guidance (issued 28 Dec 2016) is addressed to manufacturers, and it matters to a hospital policy because it tells you what to expect. For a vulnerability with uncontrolled risk, FDA does not intend to enforce part 806 reporting if there are no known serious adverse events or deaths, the manufacturer communicates with customers and identifies interim compensating controls as soon as possible and no later than 30 days after learning of it, and it distributes a validated fix as soon as possible and no later than 60 days after learning of it. Cybersecurity “routine updates and patches” are changes for controlled-risk vulnerabilities and are generally not reportable as corrections under 21 CFR part 806 ([FDA guidance PDF](https://www.fda.gov/media/95862/download)). | Question | Source says | Policy line | |---|---|---| | Who patches a regulated device | The manufacturer validates changes; FDA's guidance is addressed to manufacturers | Do not patch outside the vendor's process; ask for the validated update | | When is a customer told | Within 30 days of the manufacturer learning of an uncontrolled-risk vulnerability, in the conditions stated | Record the notice date and the interim controls | | When is a fix expected | Within 60 days under the same conditions | Track the date; use controls in the meantime | Source: FDA guidance (December 2016; the PDF read carries a later note on the Quality Management System Regulation), read 19 Nov 2026. The guidance is nonbinding. ### Window, testing and evidence Set the window by the process owner's outage calendar, test offline or with the vendor, keep a recovery plan, and record the vendor's approval for any change. Evidence: the vendor notice and the date received, the test record, the outage ticket, and the compensating controls while patching is delayed. The record of such controls belongs in [exceptions clause](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-exceptions-clause/). ### Sources - [NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3, Guide to OT Security (September 2023)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r3.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [FDA, Postmarket Management of Cybersecurity in Medical Devices (December 2016)](https://www.fda.gov/media/95862/download), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Planning (April 2022)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Step 2: How to Track Vendor Patch Releases](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/monitor-for-releases/) - [Patching Systems That Cannot Be Rebooted](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/systems-that-cannot-reboot/) - [Patch Management Policy Exceptions Clause Template](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-exceptions-clause/) - [Patching by Asset Type: Windows to OT Windows](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/) --- # Patching Systems That Cannot Be Rebooted Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/systems-that-cannot-reboot/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Patching systems that cannot be rebooted Live patching covers security fixes without a restart but never all of them. Windows Server hotpatch uses four planned baselines and eight hotpatches a year; Red Hat live kernel patches cover selected Important and Critical CVEs for 6 months after the errata date. A policy must name what still needs a restart. Read 19 Nov 2026. ### Three live patching schemes and their limits | Scheme | What it covers (vendor statement) | Limits stated by the vendor | |---|---|---| | Windows Server hotpatch (Microsoft) | Security updates without restart; baseline refreshes every three months, hotpatches in the next two months; a planned year has four baselines and eight hotpatches | Restart needed for non-security updates, .NET and non-Windows updates such as drivers and firmware; unplanned baselines (for example a zero-day that cannot be hotpatched) replace a hotpatch month and require a restart; no automatic rollback; only listed Windows Server 2022 and 2025 images; container base images unsupported | | Canonical Livepatch (Ubuntu Pro) | Critical and high severity kernel vulnerabilities, patched “between security maintenance windows, while the system runs” | Kernel only; coverage 10 years with Ubuntu Pro and 5 more with the Legacy add-on | | Red Hat live kernel patching | Selected Important and Critical CVEs; patches are cumulative | Supported without extra cost for 6 months after the kernel errata release date; only x86_64 and ppc64le; none released for RHEL 6 and 5 | Sources: Microsoft Learn, ubuntu.com, Red Hat knowledgebase (updated 1 Sep 2026), read 19 Nov 2026. Vendor statements about their own products. Upstream, the Linux kernel documentation explains the reason: “There are many situations where users are reluctant to reboot a system.” It also states a hard limit: only functions that can be traced can be patched ([kernel.org](https://docs.kernel.org/livepatch/livepatch.html)). The older kpatch project says that starting with Linux 6.19 it is deprecated and in maintenance mode ([GitHub](https://github.com/dynup/kpatch)); that is a statement about the upstream project, not about any vendor's product. ### The policy has to say what live patching does not remove Each scheme leaves a residual. A hotpatch calendar has months where a restart is needed; a Livepatch is limited to high and critical kernel flaws; a Red Hat live patch stops being supported after six months without extended update support, after which a restart is needed anyway. Write the restart windows into the policy: the quarterly baseline for Windows Server, and a scheduled kernel restart at least when the live patch support period ends. Hotpatch prerequisites also matter for [Windows servers](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/windows-endpoints/) and [Linux servers](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/linux-servers/). ### When nothing can be applied NIST names a fourth scenario for assets that cannot be patched or must run without interruption: “implementation of isolation or other methods to mitigate the risk.” Its advice is to have an approved set of methods per maintenance group, reviewed in advance by security architects, such as micro-segmentation, and to reevaluate them periodically ([NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, sections 3.3 and 3.5.4](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf)). The written exception, with its expiry, is covered in the [exceptions clause](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-exceptions-clause/). ### Evidence - The live patch identifiers applied and the kernel or build they apply to. - The date of the last full restart per system, so the gap between restarts is visible. - For isolated assets, the approved method, who reviewed it, and the next review date. ### Sources - [Microsoft Learn, Hotpatch for Windows Server](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/get-started/hotpatch), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Canonical, Livepatch](https://ubuntu.com/security/livepatch), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Red Hat, live kernel patching](https://access.redhat.com/solutions/2206511), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Linux kernel documentation, livepatch](https://docs.kernel.org/livepatch/livepatch.html), read 19 Nov 2026 - [kpatch project README](https://github.com/dynup/kpatch), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Planning (April 2022)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Windows Patch Management Policy: Windows Rhythm](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/windows-endpoints/) - [Linux Patch Management Policy by Distribution](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/linux-servers/) - [Patch Management Policy Exceptions Clause Template](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-exceptions-clause/) - [Step 6: Patch Deployment Process and Rollback](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/deploy/) --- # Patch Management Policy Builder and Templates Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Patch Management Policy: build one from the clauses it has to meet A patch management policy is the written rule that says which assets are patched, who approves, and how fast, by severity. The builder below assembles one from clauses read on 19 Nov 2026, including CISA BOD 26-04 (3, 14 and 60 days), UK Cyber Essentials v3.3 (14 days) and NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4. ### What the builder produces You choose a company size, the frameworks that apply to you and the asset classes you run. The builder, which runs in your browser and sends nothing, returns policy text with a patch window for each severity, and downloads as .docx and PDF. Each framework number in the output comes from the table below or from the [patch window table](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/), with its source and read date. Where no selected framework sets a number, the builder shows the general policy template's suggested default and labels it "Suggested default (site template)". Where a framework sets no number, the builder does not present one as the framework's. It shows the template's suggested default, labeled as a default, and a field marked "Not set: fill in" where the template has none. That affects more frameworks than most templates admit: NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, NIS2, DORA and NYDFS Part 500 all leave the day count to the organization. The text sits inside the nine sections described in [the policy sections](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/). The same text, filled for a company type, is in [the template set](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/), and the companion [procedure](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-management-procedure/) says how each step is carried out. ### Patch windows the builder draws on | Source | Window stated | Who it binds | Status on 19 Nov 2026 | |---|---|---|---| | CISA BOD 26-04 (issued 10 Jun 2026) | 3 days (with forensic triage for the highest-risk rows), 14 days, 60 days, or fix on system upgrade | Federal agency assets | In force; revoked BOD 19-02 and BOD 22-01 | | UK Cyber Essentials v3.3 | 14 days of release for fixes the vendor calls critical or high risk | Certified organizations | Effective 27 Apr 2026 | | PCI DSS v4.0.1 | One month from release for critical vulnerabilities, per PCI SSC FAQ 1597 | Cardholder data environments | Standard text could not be read on 19 Nov 2026; FAQ 1597 read | | CIS Controls v8, 7.3 and 7.4 | Monthly, or more frequent | Operating systems and applications | Guidance | | FedRAMP legacy POA&M page | 30 days critical and high, 90 moderate, 180 low, from discovery | Legacy Rev5 providers | Legacy documentation | | HIPAA Security Rule NPRM | 15 calendar days critical, 30 high (proposed) | Covered entities and business associates | Proposal of 6 Jan 2025; no final rule found on 19 Nov 2026 | | NIS2, DORA, NYDFS 500.5 | No number: reasonable time, own deadlines, timely | Entities in scope | In force | Windows by source, read 19 Nov 2026. Each row has its own page under /patch-windows/. ISO/IEC 27001 Annex A 8.8 and SOC 2 clause text could not be read on 19 Nov 2026 and are not in the table. Severity means different things in each row: BOD 26-04 uses four inputs (publicly exposed, in the KEV catalog, automatable, technical impact), Cyber Essentials uses the vendor's own words, PCI uses critical only. The [method page](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/method/) explains how the builder reconciles them. ### Where to go next - Writing from scratch: [how to write a patch management policy](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/how-to-write-a-patch-management-policy/). - Definitions first: [what a patch management policy is](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/what-is-a-patch-management-policy/). - The steps behind the policy: [the patch management process](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/). - Dates that change windows: [dates to know](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/dates-to-know/). ### Sources - [CISA, BOD 26-04, Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NCSC, Cyber Essentials Requirements for IT Infrastructure v3.3, Security Update Management](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/sites/default/files/2026-11/Cyber-Essentials-Requirements-for-IT-Infrastructure-v3-3.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [PCI SSC blog, Just Published: PCI DSS v4.0.1 (11 Jun 2024)](https://blog.pcisecuritystandards.org/just-published-pci-dss-v4-0-1), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CIS Controls v8 (August 2023 guide), Control 7 safeguards](https://storage.pardot.com/799323/1693938137QgfIAdmE/CIS_Controls__v8__Critical_Security_Controls__2023_08.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [FedRAMP legacy playbook, POA&M, Remediation Requirements](https://www.fedramp.gov/legacy/playbook/csp/authorization/poam/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Federal Register, HIPAA Security Rule NPRM, 90 FR 898 (6 Jan 2025)](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/06/2024-30983/hipaa-security-rule-to-strengthen-the-cybersecurity-of-electronic-protected-health-information), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Planning (April 2022)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [EUR-Lex, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2690, Annex points 6.6.1 and 6.6.2](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L_202402690), read 19 Nov 2026 - [EUR-Lex, Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1774, Article 10(4)(d)](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32024R1774), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Cornell LII, 23 NYCRR 500.5](https://www.law.cornell.edu/regulations/new-york/23-NYCRR-500.5), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Patch Management Policy Template Set, 10 Documents](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/) - [Patch Window Table: Deadlines in 12 Frameworks](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/) - [Patch Management Process in 9 Steps (NIST SP 800-40r4)](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/) - [Patch Management Guides: 13 Guides, Each Sourced](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/) - [Patch Management Policy Sections: The Nine to Include](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/) --- # How the Patch Window Table Is Built and Read Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/method/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## How the patch window table is built Every window on this site was read from the issuer's own text on 19 Nov 2026 and carries a quote, a URL and that read date. Four texts could not be opened that day: the PCI DSS v4.0.1 requirements, ISO/IEC 27001 Annex A 8.8, the SOC 2 criteria and the Essential Eight maturity model. ### What a row holds A row in the [patch window table](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/) has eight fields: framework, version, clause number, the clause text, the timing, who it applies to, the severity basis and the source URL with its read date. The clause text is quoted verbatim and kept short. The timing field is the issuer's number or the words "no number set"; it is never inferred from other documents. Each row is labeled primary (standards and government text), vendor (a company describing its own product or schedule) or third-party. Microsoft's release schedule is labeled vendor even though Microsoft is the primary source for it. ### Texts that could not be read | Text | What happened on 19 Nov 2026 | What the site does | |---|---|---| | PCI DSS v4.0.1 requirement text | The standard PDF returned HTTP 403 and the library needs an agreement form | Quotes PCI SSC FAQ 1597 (Requirement 6.3.3, one month for critical) and the blog summary; the standard's own wording is not quoted | | ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A 8.8 | iso.org returned HTTP 403; the text is paywalled | No clause text, no timing | | SOC 2 criteria CC7.1 and CC8.1 | The AICPA page needs a script and an account | No clause text, no timing | | Essential Eight maturity model | cyber.gov.au did not load by curl or by the fetch tool | No row written | | BOD 26-04 Table 1 | The table is an image on the page; values were read by eye | Marked as read from an image | | HHS fact sheet on the HIPAA NPRM | HTTP 403 | The Federal Register text is used instead | Gaps recorded on 19 Nov 2026. A gap is stated as "could not be read", never filled from memory. The corrections page lists the same gaps as [open items](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/corrections/). ### How the builder picks a window For each severity the builder looks at the frameworks you ticked, lists the numbers they state, and offers the shortest one as the default, shown with the framework it came from. Severity names are mapped by the words each issuer uses: Cyber Essentials "critical or high risk" and PCI "critical" map to the highest two levels; BOD 26-04 is mapped by its Table 1 rows, not by a single label. Clocks differ too. Cyber Essentials counts from release, FedRAMP's legacy page from discovery, the HIPAA proposal from "identifying the need to patch", and BOD 26-04 from the KEV listing or the agency's identification, whichever comes first. The builder prints the clock start next to every window so two numbers are never compared without it. ### What the site does not do No tool in the [directory](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/tools/) is graded or called better than another; the same eight fields are read for each, vendors appear alphabetically, and claims are labeled as the vendor's. Clause readings are not legal or audit advice; the assessor or regulator reads the clause in force. For the editorial rules see the [editorial policy](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/editorial-policy/). ### Sources - [PCI SSC blog, Just Published: PCI DSS v4.0.1 (11 Jun 2024)](https://blog.pcisecuritystandards.org/just-published-pci-dss-v4-0-1), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CISA, BOD 26-04, Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Federal Register, HIPAA Security Rule NPRM, 90 FR 898 (6 Jan 2025)](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/06/2024-30983/hipaa-security-rule-to-strengthen-the-cybersecurity-of-electronic-protected-health-information), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NCSC, Cyber Essentials Requirements for IT Infrastructure v3.3, Security Update Management](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/sites/default/files/2026-11/Cyber-Essentials-Requirements-for-IT-Infrastructure-v3-3.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [FedRAMP legacy playbook, POA&M, Remediation Requirements](https://www.fedramp.gov/legacy/playbook/csp/authorization/poam/), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Patch Window Table: Deadlines in 12 Frameworks](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/) - [Patch Window Table Method: Row Rules and Read Log](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/method/) - [Editorial Policy: sources, labels and read dates](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/editorial-policy/) - [Corrections Log and Open Source Gaps, Edition 1](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/corrections/) --- # About Patch Management Policy: scope and sources Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/about/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## About Patch Management Policy Patch Management Policy covers routine patching: policy templates, patch windows by framework, the process step by step and the guides that explain them. The first edition went live on 19 Nov 2026. It is a set of static files with no cookies and no analytics. ### What is here - A [template set](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/) for a general policy, company-type variants, a procedure and an exceptions clause, each as a page, a .docx file and a PDF. - The [patch window table](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/), one page per framework, with every clause quoted and dated. - [The process](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/) in nine steps and [patching by asset class](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/). - A [directory](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/tools/) of 31 tools in two kinds kept apart: 16 that deploy patches and 15 that prioritize and prepare them. - [Guides](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/), a [glossary](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/glossary/) and a [dates page](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/dates-to-know/). ### What is not here Emergency patching for a newly disclosed vulnerability, remediation timelines for findings in general, and the decision to accept a risk are separate subjects and are not covered. The exceptions clause here is policy wording only. ### How the site is built The pages are static files stored on Amazon S3 and served by Amazon CloudFront. The site sets no cookies, runs no analytics and loads no third-party scripts. The policy builder on the [home page](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/) runs in your browser and sends nothing. CloudFront writes access logs to a private bucket and they are deleted after 400 days. The fields are those listed in the [AWS standard logs reference](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonCloudFront/latest/DeveloperGuide/standard-logs-reference.html). Details are on the [privacy page](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/privacy/). ### License and citing Templates and data files are published under [CC BY 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). Cite them with this line: "Patch Management Policy, patchmanagementpolicy.com, template set, first edition 19 Nov 2026, CC BY 4.0." Add the page address and the date you read it. Rules for sources, labels and corrections are in the [editorial policy](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/editorial-policy/). Write to [editor@patchmanagementpolicy.com](mailto:editor@patchmanagementpolicy.com); see [contact](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/contact/). The edition number is the date: the first edition is 19 Nov 2026. Each page shows its own published and modified dates, so a citation can name the version of the page it used. ### Sources - [AWS, CloudFront standard logs reference](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonCloudFront/latest/DeveloperGuide/standard-logs-reference.html), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Creative Commons, CC BY 4.0 license](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Editorial Policy: sources, labels and read dates](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/editorial-policy/) - [Contact the Editor of Patch Management Policy](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/contact/) - [Privacy: what this site logs and for how long](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/privacy/) - [Patch Management Policy Template Set, 10 Documents](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/) --- # Editorial Policy: sources, labels and read dates Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/editorial-policy/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Editorial policy Every fact on this site carries a source URL and a read date, and every number carries both. Sources are labeled primary, vendor or third-party. The first edition, dated 19 Nov 2026, lists 31 tools in the directory: 16 that deploy patches and 15 that prioritize them, each read by the same eight fields. ### Sourcing rules 1. A standard or regulation is quoted from its own text. If the text could not be opened, the page says "could not be read on 19 Nov 2026" and writes nothing in its place. 2. A quote is short and verbatim. A claim in our own words sits beside the quote that supports it. 3. A number appears only with its source and the date it was read. A number we counted ourselves, such as an entry count in a public feed, says so. 4. Absence is dated: "none found on 19 Nov 2026", never a flat statement that something does not exist. 5. Security content stays at preconditions, detection, mitigation and fix. No exploit code, proof-of-concept steps or payloads. ### Labels | Label | Meaning | Example on this site | |---|---|---| | Primary | Standards, laws, government directives | CISA BOD 26-04, NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 | | Vendor | A company describing its own product, price or schedule | Microsoft's Patch Tuesday rule, any tool's feature page | | Third-party | Analysis by someone who is not the maker | Mandiant time-to-exploit study | Labels used in the data files and on the pages, as of 19 Nov 2026. ### Tools in the directory Each tool in the [directory](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/tools/) is read through the same eight fields: what it patches, how it deploys, approval and staging, compliance reporting, pricing, what it does well as the vendor states it, limits found, and dated facts. Vendors are listed alphabetically within their kind. No tool is graded or called better than another, and a vendor's claim is shown as the vendor's. ### Hosting and mail The site is static files on Amazon S3 served by Amazon CloudFront, with no cookies, no analytics and no third-party scripts. Logs are covered on the [privacy page](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/privacy/). Templates and data are under CC BY 4.0, with the cite line on the [about page](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/about/). ### Changing a page A correction changes the page text, moves the page's modified date and is entered on the [corrections page](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/corrections/) with the date, the page and what changed. Report an error to [editor@patchmanagementpolicy.com](mailto:editor@patchmanagementpolicy.com). The way clauses are read is described in the [method](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/method/). How the templates and data may be reused, and what a reader may rely on, is set out in the [terms of use](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/terms/). ### Sources - [NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Planning (April 2022)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CISA, BOD 26-04, Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [How the Patch Window Table Is Built and Read](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/method/) - [Corrections Log and Open Source Gaps, Edition 1](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/corrections/) - [About Patch Management Policy: scope and sources](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/about/) - [Patch Management Tools Directory: Two Kinds, Same Fields](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/tools/) --- # Corrections Log and Open Source Gaps, Edition 1 Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/corrections/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Corrections The corrections log is empty as of 19 Nov 2026, the date of the first edition. When a page changes because of an error, the entry gives the date, the page and the change. Five source gaps are open and listed below, because a gap can become an error the day the text is readable. ### Log | Date | Page | What was wrong | What changed | |---|---|---|---| | None yet | None | None | None | Corrections log, empty as of 19 Nov 2026. New entries are added first. ### Open gaps from the first edition These are not errors; they are statements the site could not check against the issuer's text on 19 Nov 2026. Each is marked on the page it affects. A gap leaves this list when the text is read, and a page that said something different is corrected with an entry in the log above. Two gaps closed before the first edition went out and are not listed: the FedRAMP notice NTC-0014 and the clause number for the PCI DSS one-month rule, which were read in full from fedramp.gov and from PCI SSC FAQ 1597 on 19 Nov 2026. 1. PCI DSS v4.0.1: the requirement text returned HTTP 403. The one-month window and the number 6.3.3 come from PCI SSC FAQ 1597 (May 2025), not from the standard. 2. ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A 8.8 and SOC 2 criteria CC7.1 and CC8.1: clause text not read. 3. CISA BOD 26-04 Table 1: values were read from an image by eye. 4. CIS Controls: wording is from the v8 guide of August 2023; the v8.1 wording of 7.3, 7.4 and 7.7 is unconfirmed. 5. Essential Eight maturity model: not readable, so no row exists. ### How to report an error Write to [editor@patchmanagementpolicy.com](mailto:editor@patchmanagementpolicy.com) with the page address, the sentence, and the issuer's text or URL that shows the difference. A source that the site could not read is the most useful thing to send; the [contact page](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/contact/) lists what else helps. What counts as a correction: a wrong number, a wrong clause reference, a wrong date, a label that does not match the source, a link that no longer supports the claim. Wording changes that do not alter a fact are not logged. See the [editorial policy](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/editorial-policy/) for the rules and the [patch window table](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/) for the rows affected. ### Sources - [PCI SSC blog, Just Published: PCI DSS v4.0.1 (11 Jun 2024)](https://blog.pcisecuritystandards.org/just-published-pci-dss-v4-0-1), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CISA, BOD 26-04, Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk), read 19 Nov 2026 - [FedRAMP, notice NTC-0014](https://www.fedramp.gov/notices/0014/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CIS Controls v8 (August 2023 guide), Control 7 safeguards](https://storage.pardot.com/799323/1693938137QgfIAdmE/CIS_Controls__v8__Critical_Security_Controls__2023_08.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Editorial Policy: sources, labels and read dates](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/editorial-policy/) - [Contact the Editor of Patch Management Policy](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/contact/) - [How the Patch Window Table Is Built and Read](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/method/) - [Patch Window Table: Deadlines in 12 Frameworks](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/) --- # Contact the Editor of Patch Management Policy Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/contact/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Contact Write to editor@patchmanagementpolicy.com. The most useful message names a page, quotes the sentence and links the issuer's text. Messages about a source that could not be read on 19 Nov 2026, such as PCI DSS v4.0.1 or ISO/IEC 27001 Annex A 8.8, are especially welcome. ### Address [editor@patchmanagementpolicy.com](mailto:editor@patchmanagementpolicy.com). There is no contact form, because the site runs no server-side code and loads no scripts; the address is a plain mail link. No response time is promised. A confirmed correction is entered on the [corrections page](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/corrections/) with its date. Mail is the only channel. If you quote a clause in your message, give the issuer's own URL, not a copy, so the reading can be compared with the text in force. ### What to include, by kind of message | You are writing about | Include | |---|---| | A wrong number or clause | Page address, the sentence, the issuer's text or URL, and the date you read it | | A source the site could not read | Which one (see the method), the passage you can read, and where it is published | | A tool entry in the directory | The tool, the field, the vendor page that shows the difference, and the date | | A template | Which one in the template set, the sentence, and the framework clause it should match | | A change in a framework | The framework, the new effective date and the issuer's notice | Message guide, edition of 19 Nov 2026. ### Items that change on a known date Some entries have a date that will move the table. Writing about these is useful before the date, not after: the FedRAMP vulnerability detection and response rules become mandatory on 7 Dec 2026 with a grace period to 7 Mar 2027 (per notice NTC-0014, read in full on 19 Nov 2026), and CISA states that it reassesses BOD 26-04 Table 1 once per fiscal year. Messages are used to answer you and to fix the site, as set out on the [privacy page](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/privacy/). License for reuse of what you find here is on the [about page](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/about/). ### Sources - [CISA, BOD 26-04, Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk), read 19 Nov 2026 - [FedRAMP, notice NTC-0014](https://www.fedramp.gov/notices/0014/), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Corrections Log and Open Source Gaps, Edition 1](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/corrections/) - [How the Patch Window Table Is Built and Read](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/method/) - [About Patch Management Policy: scope and sources](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/about/) - [Privacy: what this site logs and for how long](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/privacy/) --- # Privacy: what this site logs and for how long Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/privacy/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Privacy Visitors to this site get no cookies, no analytics and no third-party scripts. Amazon CloudFront writes access logs to a private bucket and they are deleted after 400 days. The policy builder runs in your browser and sends nothing. This describes the first edition of 19 Nov 2026. ### What is collected | Item | Collected? | Detail | |---|---|---| | Cookies | No | None are set | | Analytics or tracking scripts | No | None are loaded; there are no third-party scripts | | Builder input (company size, frameworks, asset classes) | No | The builder runs in the browser; nothing is sent to a server | | Server access logs | Yes | CloudFront standard logs, private S3 bucket, deleted after 400 days | | Mail you send | Yes | Held in the mailbox for editor@patchmanagementpolicy.com | Data handling as of 19 Nov 2026. ### Access logs The site is static files on Amazon S3 served by Amazon CloudFront. Each request to CloudFront can produce a log line. The fields are those defined in the [AWS standard logs reference](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonCloudFront/latest/DeveloperGuide/standard-logs-reference.html); that page is the authority on what a line contains. The logs are kept in a private bucket, not a public one, and objects older than 400 days are deleted. No analytics service receives them. ### Mail A message to [editor@patchmanagementpolicy.com](mailto:editor@patchmanagementpolicy.com) is used to answer it and, if it shows an error, to correct a page and to write the entry on the [corrections page](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/corrections/). Corrections entries name the page and the change, not the sender. To ask what a log line or a mail thread holds about you, or to have it removed, write to the same address with the approximate time of your visit. The rules for the rest of the site are in the [terms](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/terms/) and the [about page](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/about/). The builder on the [home page](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/) has no network call of its own: company size, frameworks and asset classes you pick stay in the page in your browser and are gone when you close it, unless you download the .docx or PDF it produces. Downloaded files are on your device, not ours. The reuse-related parts of the site, such as quoting a page, are covered by the [terms of use](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/terms/). ### Sources - [AWS, CloudFront standard logs reference](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonCloudFront/latest/DeveloperGuide/standard-logs-reference.html), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Terms of Use: license, citing and reliance](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/terms/) - [About Patch Management Policy: scope and sources](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/about/) - [Contact the Editor of Patch Management Policy](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/contact/) - [Corrections Log and Open Source Gaps, Edition 1](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/corrections/) --- # Terms of Use: license, citing and reliance Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/terms/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Terms of use Templates and data files on this site are published under CC BY 4.0 as of the first edition, 19 Nov 2026. You may copy, adapt and redistribute them with attribution. The cite line is on this page. Page text may be quoted with a link to the page. ### License Templates (.docx, PDF and the text on the template pages) and data files (JSON and CSV of the patch window table, dates and directory) are under [CC BY 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). Attribution line to use: ```text Patch Management Policy, patchmanagementpolicy.com, [template or dataset name], first edition 19 Nov 2026, CC BY 4.0. Read on [date]. ``` Quotes from standards, directives and vendor pages keep their owners' terms; the site quotes only short passages and links the source in each case. They are not covered by the licence above. ### What the templates are A template is starting text, filled from clauses read on the dates shown. It becomes your policy when your organization approves it, sets the fields marked for you to fill, and names its owners. Whether a policy meets PCI DSS, HIPAA, FedRAMP or another framework is decided by your assessor or regulator, reading the clause text in force on the day; several of those texts could not be read on 19 Nov 2026, as listed in the [method](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/method/). The [policy builder](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/) and the [template set](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/) state each window with its source so you can check it against the issuer. ### Links and changes Links to other sites are to the source of a fact. A link is not an endorsement, and a listing in the [directory](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/tools/) is a reading of the vendor's own pages, not a recommendation. Pages change when sources change; the modified date on each page and the [corrections page](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/corrections/) show when. Data handling is on the [privacy page](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/privacy/). Reuse rule in one line: you may copy a template into your own policy, change it and publish it, provided the attribution line stays with the copy or the document credits the source. The factual tables (windows, dates, directory fields) may be reused the same way, and the read dates should travel with them, because a number without its date cannot be checked. ### Sources - [Creative Commons, CC BY 4.0 license](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Privacy: what this site logs and for how long](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/privacy/) - [About Patch Management Policy: scope and sources](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/about/) - [Patch Management Policy Template Set, 10 Documents](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/) - [Editorial Policy: sources, labels and read dates](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/editorial-policy/) --- # What a Patch Management Policy Is and Must State Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/what-is-a-patch-management-policy/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## What is a patch management policy A patch management policy is the document an organization approves to make patching mandatory: it names the assets covered, the owners, the deadlines by severity, how exceptions are handled and when the policy is reviewed. NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 (April 2022) calls the working detail a maintenance plan. ### What it contains The policy states rules; the [procedure](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-management-procedure/) states steps. A policy says that critical fixes are installed within a set number of days and who may approve a delay. The procedure says how a technician stages, deploys and verifies. Keeping them apart means the policy changes once a year and the procedure changes when tooling does. 1. Purpose and scope: which assets, which software, which owners. 2. Roles: who approves, who deploys, who reports. 3. Inventory duty: no asset is patched that is not known. 4. Severity and windows: the deadline per severity and where the clock starts. 5. Testing and staging, maintenance windows, exceptions, reporting, review. ### Which outside text asks for which part | Policy part | Outside text | What it says (short quote) | |---|---|---| | Deadlines and escalation | DORA RTS 2024/1774, Article 10(4)(d) | "set deadlines for the installation of software and hardware patches and updates and escalation procedures in case those deadlines cannot be met" | | Deadlines left to you, with a documented exception | NIS2 Implementing Regulation 2024/2690, 6.6.1(a) and 6.6.2 | "security patches are applied within a reasonable time after they become available"; patches may be skipped when disadvantages outweigh benefits | | A plan per group of assets | NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, section 3.5 | "Organizations should define a maintenance plan for each maintenance group" | | Annual review | CIS Controls v8, 7.1 | Review documentation "annually, or when significant enterprise changes occur" | | Review and test every 12 months | HIPAA Security Rule NPRM, proposed 164.308(a)(4)(ii)(B) | Proposed only, published 6 Jan 2025, not in force on the day of the last check | Policy parts and the clauses behind them, read 19 Nov 2026. Only the NPRM row carries a review period measured in months; DORA and NIS2 do not give a day count, so a policy that quotes them still has to choose its own. The [patch window table](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/) shows which frameworks do set numbers. ### What the policy leaves out It does not carry the list of products, the names of tools or the current week's schedule. Those change faster than an approval cycle. Link them, as an appendix, from the [policy sections](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/). To write one now, follow [how to write a patch management policy](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/how-to-write-a-patch-management-policy/) or fill the [template](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-management-policy-template/). ### Questions **what is a patch management policy** A patch management policy is the approved document that makes patching mandatory and sets who is covered, who approves, the deadline per severity, how exceptions work and when it is reviewed. The steps that carry it out go in a separate procedure. Clauses behind each part are in the table above. **what is patch management policy** It is the same document: the written rule for identifying, prioritizing, installing and verifying patches. NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 defines the process it governs, and the [policy sections](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/) explain each part. ### Sources - [EUR-Lex, Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1774, Article 10(4)(d)](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32024R1774), read 19 Nov 2026 - [EUR-Lex, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2690, Annex points 6.6.1 and 6.6.2](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L_202402690), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Planning (April 2022)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CIS Controls v8 (August 2023 guide), Control 7 safeguards](https://storage.pardot.com/799323/1693938137QgfIAdmE/CIS_Controls__v8__Critical_Security_Controls__2023_08.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Federal Register, HIPAA Security Rule NPRM, 90 FR 898 (6 Jan 2025)](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/06/2024-30983/hipaa-security-rule-to-strengthen-the-cybersecurity-of-electronic-protected-health-information), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [How to Write a Patch Management Policy in 9 Sections](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/how-to-write-a-patch-management-policy/) - [General Patch Management Policy Template, Full Text](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-management-policy-template/) - [Patch Management Policy Sections: The Nine to Include](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/) - [Patch Window Table: Deadlines in 12 Frameworks](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/) --- # How to Write a Patch Management Policy in 9 Sections Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/how-to-write-a-patch-management-policy/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## How to write a patch management policy Write a patch management policy in nine sections, in this order: purpose, roles, inventory, windows, testing, maintenance windows, exceptions, reporting, review. Fix the windows last, from the frameworks that bind you, as read on 19 Nov 2026: Cyber Essentials v3.3 asks for 14 days, BOD 26-04 for 3, 14 or 60. ### Steps 1. List the frameworks that bind you. Each one decides which numbers you may not exceed; start from the [patch window table](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/). 2. Group the assets. NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 section 3.4 defines a maintenance group as assets that "generally have the same software maintenance needs"; a group, not a server, gets a rule. 3. Write a plan per group for each scenario NIST names: routine, emergency patching, emergency mitigation, unpatchable assets (section 3.5). 4. Set windows by severity, naming the clock start (release, discovery, or KEV listing). 5. Add a canary stage to routine plans: NIST section 3.5.1 has a small subset receive the patch first, expanding if impact is minimal. 6. Write the exceptions clause from the [exceptions clause](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-exceptions-clause/). 7. State the metrics you will report; see [patch compliance rate](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/patch-compliance-rate/). 8. Name an approver and a review interval. CIS Controls v8 safeguard 7.1 uses annual review. 9. Attach, do not embed, the product list and tool settings. ### Skeleton to fill ```text # Patch Management Policy 1. Purpose and scope This policy applies to [asset classes] owned or managed by [organization]. 2. Roles Approver: [role]. Deployer: [role]. Reporter: [role]. 3. Inventory No asset is in scope of a patch deadline until it is in [inventory name]. 4. Windows Critical: [days] from [release | discovery | KEV listing]. High: [days] from [clock start]. Other: as set in the maintenance plan for the group. 5. Testing Routine patches go first to [canary group] for [days]. 6. Maintenance windows [Day and hour] per group; reboots are [rule]. 7. Exceptions See the exceptions clause. Each exception has an owner, a reason, a control and an end date. 8. Reporting [Measure] is reported to [role] every [period]. 9. Review Reviewed every [12 months] or after [event]. Approved by [role] on [date]. ``` The fully worded versions are in the [template set](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/). Windows left in brackets are yours to set: NIST, NIS2, DORA and NYDFS 500.5 give no number, so the table cannot supply one. ### Order matters Writing windows first produces numbers nobody can meet. Writing the group definitions and the exceptions clause first shows which assets cannot meet any window, and those become the exceptions rather than a silent miss. The [process steps](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/) show where each section is used. ### Questions **how to create a patch management policy** Write nine sections in order (purpose, roles, inventory, windows, testing, maintenance windows, exceptions, reporting, review) and set windows last, from the frameworks that bind you. Group assets first, as NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 does with maintenance groups. ### Sources - [NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Planning (April 2022)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CIS Controls v8 (August 2023 guide), Control 7 safeguards](https://storage.pardot.com/799323/1693938137QgfIAdmE/CIS_Controls__v8__Critical_Security_Controls__2023_08.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NCSC, Cyber Essentials Requirements for IT Infrastructure v3.3, Security Update Management](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/sites/default/files/2026-11/Cyber-Essentials-Requirements-for-IT-Infrastructure-v3-3.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CISA, BOD 26-04, Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [General Patch Management Policy Template, Full Text](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-management-policy-template/) - [Patch Window Table: Deadlines in 12 Frameworks](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/) - [Patch Management Policy Sections: The Nine to Include](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/) - [Patch Management Process in 9 Steps (NIST SP 800-40r4)](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/) --- # The Patch Management Lifecycle: Five Verbs From NIST Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/patch-management-lifecycle/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Patch management lifecycle NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 (April 2022) defines enterprise patch management as identifying, prioritizing, acquiring, installing and verifying patches, updates and upgrades. That is five phases in a loop, and prioritizing is the second. The sequence repeats with every release, not once per year. ### The five phases | Phase | What happens | Process page | |---|---|---| | 1 Identify | Know the assets and learn of fixes for them | Inventory and monitor for releases | | 2 Prioritize | Decide how urgent each fix is for each group | Assess and prioritize | | 3 Acquire | Obtain the patch and test it | Acquire and test | | 4 Install | Approve, schedule, deploy | Approve and schedule and deploy | | 5 Verify | Confirm the install, report | Verify and report | The verbs are quoted from NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 (csrc.nist.gov publication page, read 19 Nov 2026); the process pages are this site's finer split of them. ### Why it is a loop NIST treats patching as preventive maintenance: "patching should be viewed as a normal and necessary part of reliably achieving the organization's missions." A loop that has no step for the next cycle drifts; the last page of the process is [the cycle check](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/review-the-cycle/). The install phase ends with a forced step. For routine patching NIST asks organizations to "offer flexibility with how soon routine patches are to be installed, while also forcing installation after a grace period has ended" (section 3.5.1). Forcing can be direct, like triggering patch execution, or indirect, like preventing network access for unpatched assets until they are patched. The grace period is therefore a dated field in the plan, and the force step is what turns a deadline into an outcome. Four scenarios feed the same loop in NIST's model: routine patching, emergency patching, emergency mitigation and unpatchable assets. They share the five verbs but differ in timing, so a policy needs a plan for each. ### Where the loop meets other functions How patch management differs from the vulnerability side is in [its own guide](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/patch-management-vs-vulnerability-management/), and the [glossary](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/glossary/) defines the terms used here. ### Questions **what is the second phase of the patch management process lifecycle** Prioritizing. NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 lists the phases as identifying, prioritizing, acquiring, installing and verifying. Other sources split the phases differently, so name the model you are quoting. **patch management lifecycle** The lifecycle is the loop of identify, prioritize, acquire, install, verify, repeated with every release. Each phase has a page under [the process](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/). ### Sources - [NIST CSRC, SP 800-40 Rev. 4 publication page](https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/40/r4/final), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Planning (April 2022)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Patch Management Process in 9 Steps (NIST SP 800-40r4)](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/) - [What Is Patch Management? Definition and Scale in 2026](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/what-is-patch-management/) - [Patch Management vs Vulnerability Management Compared](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/patch-management-vs-vulnerability-management/) - [Patch Management Glossary: 32 Terms, Sourced](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/glossary/) --- # Patch Management vs Vulnerability Management Compared Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/patch-management-vs-vulnerability-management/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Patch management vs vulnerability management Patch management installs fixes; vulnerability management finds weaknesses and chooses the response, of which a patch is one. NIST SP 800-218 RV.2.2 asks for a decision whether each vulnerability "will be remediated or if the risk will be addressed through other means". Patching carries out the first branch. ### The two side by side | Question | Patch management | Vulnerability management | |---|---|---| | Starting point | A vendor releases a fix | A weakness is found or reported | | Main output | Fix installed and verified on named assets | A decision per finding: remediate, or another response | | Typical cadence in the clauses read | Monthly or more frequent (CIS 7.3, 7.4); 14 days of release (Cyber Essentials v3.3) | Internal scans quarterly or more frequent (CIS 7.5); externally exposed monthly or more frequent (7.6) | | Defined by NIST as | "identifying, prioritizing, acquiring, installing, and verifying the installation of patches" (SP 800-40 Rev. 4) | Gather information on vulnerabilities, then "make a risk-based decision" (SP 800-218 RV.1.1, RV.2.2) | | Fails when | A patch exists and is not installed in time | A finding is never triaged, or has no patch | Comparison from the clauses linked below, read 19 Nov 2026. CIS Controls v8 shows how they join: safeguards 7.3 and 7.4 (automated patching of operating systems and applications) sit in the same control as 7.1 (a documented vulnerability management process) and 7.5 to 7.7 (scans and remediation). ### Where one hands to the other Vulnerability management prioritizes. BOD 26-04 (10 Jun 2026) shows an example of the hand-off: four inputs (publicly exposed, in the KEV catalog, automatable, technical impact) select one of 3, 14 or 60 days or a fix at upgrade. The patch process then needs to meet that date. NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 calls patching one way of the risk response "mitigate", beside accept, transfer and avoid, which is the point at which the two meet. A patch policy that reads "critical within 14 days" has already assumed the severity call. Naming who makes it (the scanner, the vendor's word, or a human) is a clause in its own right; see the [severity and patch window section](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/severity-and-patch-windows/). ### What this site does not cover Building a vulnerability management program is not covered here. For the patch side only, read [what is patch management](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/what-is-patch-management/) and the [patch management program guide](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/patch-management-program/). ### Questions **patch management vs vulnerability management** Patch management installs and verifies fixes; vulnerability management finds weaknesses and picks a response, and a patch is only one response. CIS Controls v8 puts both under Control 7, with different cadences. **what is vulnerability and patch management** It is the pair of functions: finding and triaging weaknesses, then installing the fixes. The [comparison guide](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/patch-management-vs-vulnerability-management/) sets out where each starts and stops. ### Sources - [NIST SP 800-218 v1.1, Secure Software Development Framework, PW.4.4, RV.1.1, RV.2.2](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-218.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CIS Controls v8 (August 2023 guide), Control 7 safeguards](https://storage.pardot.com/799323/1693938137QgfIAdmE/CIS_Controls__v8__Critical_Security_Controls__2023_08.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Planning (April 2022)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CISA, BOD 26-04, Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NCSC, Cyber Essentials Requirements for IT Infrastructure v3.3, Security Update Management](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/sites/default/files/2026-11/Cyber-Essentials-Requirements-for-IT-Infrastructure-v3-3.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [What Is Patch Management? Definition and Scale in 2026](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/what-is-patch-management/) - [Severity and Patch Windows: What Each Framework Sets](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/severity-and-patch-windows/) - [CISA BOD 26-04 Remediation Timelines, Row by Row](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/cisa-bod-26-04/) - [Patch Management Program: Six Groups and What Proves Each](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/patch-management-program/) --- # Hotfix vs Patch: What NIST's Glossary Says Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/hotfix-vs-patch/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Hotfix vs patch NIST's glossary, read 19 Nov 2026, defines hotfix as "Microsoft's term for 'patch'" (from SP 800-44 Version 2). For a policy the two words name one thing, so one definition of patch and one deadline by severity cover both. Microsoft's own terminology page names four packages, not a separate hotfix. ### What NIST's glossary defines | Term | NIST glossary definition (quoted) | Source document named | |---|---|---| | Hotfix | "Microsoft's term for 'patch.'" | NIST SP 800-44 Version 2 | | Patch | "A 'repair job' for a piece of programming; also known as a 'fix.'" It is "the immediate solution that is provided to users"; developers "often find a better solution to provide when they package the product for its next release." | NIST SP 800-44 Version 2 and SP 800-45 Version 2 | | Patch | "Software component that, when installed, directly modifies files or device settings related to a different software component without changing the version number or release details for the related software component." | CNSSI 4009-2022, from ISO/IEC 19770-2:2015 | NIST CSRC glossary entries for hotfix and patch, read 19 Nov 2026 (csrc.nist.gov/glossary). Label: primary. The glossary does not define hotfix independently: the whole entry is the phrase quoted in the table. The answer to the question in the title, as far as a primary source goes, is that a hotfix is a patch under a Microsoft name. ### Where the two patch definitions differ The CNSSI definition carries a test: a patch leaves the version number and release details of the related software unchanged. Many vendor fixes arrive as a new version or a cumulative package. Microsoft's standard terminology page defines an update rollup as "a tested, cumulative set of hotfixes, security updates, critical updates, and updates," and its quality update page says security updates are "typically released on the second Tuesday of each month, though they can be released at any time" ([Microsoft Learn](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/deployment/standard-terminology-software-updates)). A policy that defined patch by the CNSSI test would leave out a package that changes the version number. The SP 800-44 wording points the other way: the patch is the immediate fix and may later be replaced by a better solution in the next release. For a deadline, that matters because the window runs from the vendor's release of the fix, whatever its name or whether the version number moves. ### The definition to write into the policy Suggested definition: **Patch.** Any vendor-released change to software or firmware that fixes a flaw, including a security update, hotfix, update rollup, service pack, firmware update or out-of-band release. A deadline in section 4 attaches to the flaw's severity, whatever the package is called and whether or not it changes the version number. On 19 Nov 2026 Microsoft's terminology page defined security update, update, update rollup and service pack, and the word hotfix appeared only inside the rollup and service pack definitions. A non-security update, which Microsoft describes as a fix for a "noncritical, non-security-related bug," can go on the monthly maintenance window without a severity deadline. The [glossary](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/glossary/) and [policy sections](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/) carry the surrounding wording, and [how often to patch](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/how-often-to-patch/) sets the cadence for each source. Other short definitions are answered in the [FAQ](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/faq/). ### Sources - [NIST CSRC Glossary, hotfix (source: NIST SP 800-44 Version 2)](https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/hotfix), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NIST CSRC Glossary, patch (sources: CNSSI 4009-2022, SP 800-44 Version 2, SP 800-45 Version 2)](https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/patch), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Microsoft Learn, Standard terminology for software updates](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/deployment/standard-terminology-software-updates), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Microsoft Learn, Windows quality updates quick start](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/deployment/update/waas-quick-start), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [How Often to Patch: Cadences From the Clauses Read](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/how-often-to-patch/) - [Patch Management Glossary: 32 Terms, Sourced](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/glossary/) - [Patch Management Policy Sections: The Nine to Include](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/) - [What Is Patch Management? Definition and Scale in 2026](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/what-is-patch-management/) --- # How Often to Patch: Cadences From the Clauses Read Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/how-often-to-patch/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## How often should you perform patch management Patch on a fixed monthly cycle and meet a separate deadline for urgent fixes. CIS Controls v8 asks for operating system and application updates monthly or more often; Cyber Essentials v3.3 asks for critical or high fixes within 14 days of release; BOD 26-04 sets 3, 14 or 60 days. Read 19 Nov 2026. ### Cadence by source | Source | Cadence or deadline | Clock starts | |---|---|---| | CIS Controls v8, 7.3 and 7.4 | Monthly, or more frequent | Not stated | | UK Cyber Essentials v3.3 | 14 days, for critical or high risk fixes | Release | | PCI DSS v4.0.1 (PCI SSC FAQ 1597) | One month, critical vulnerabilities | Release | | CISA BOD 26-04 | 3, 14 or 60 days, or fix on system upgrade | KEV listing or agency identification, whichever is first | | FedRAMP legacy POA&M page | 30 days critical and high, 90 moderate, 180 low | Discovery | | NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 | No number; emergency patching "in the following hours or days" | Per plan | Read 19 Nov 2026. ISO/IEC 27001 and SOC 2 are absent because their text could not be read. ### The monthly rhythm Microsoft says the monthly security update is published on the second Tuesday, "typically at 10:00 AM Pacific Time". From that rule the next dates are 8 Dec 2026, 12 Jan 2027 and 9 Feb 2027; 10 Nov 2026 matched the release date in Microsoft's security update data. A 14-day window that starts at release therefore ends on 22 Dec 2026 for the December cycle. Size varies and counting it takes care. Microsoft's November 2026 security update document lists 1,791 CVE entries, of which 762 list a Windows product (counted from the CVRF document on 19 Nov 2026). It spans more than Windows, so 1,791 is not the Windows cycle's size. ### Turning it into a rule 1. Fix one monthly maintenance window per group; see [maintenance windows](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/maintenance-windows/). 2. Set a separate, shorter deadline for critical and high fixes and name the clock start. 3. Write that a KEV listing or a vendor's out-of-band release is handled under the emergency clause, not the monthly cycle. 4. Report misses by group, as in [patch compliance rate](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/patch-compliance-rate/). The dates above are also kept on the [dates page](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/dates-to-know/). Every deadline in the table has its own page in the [patch window table](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/). Short answers to related questions are in the [FAQ](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/faq/). ### Questions **how often should you perform patch management** Monthly at a minimum, with a shorter deadline for urgent fixes. CIS Controls v8 asks monthly or more frequent; Cyber Essentials v3.3 asks 14 days of release for critical or high fixes. ### Sources - [CIS Controls v8 (August 2023 guide), Control 7 safeguards](https://storage.pardot.com/799323/1693938137QgfIAdmE/CIS_Controls__v8__Critical_Security_Controls__2023_08.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NCSC, Cyber Essentials Requirements for IT Infrastructure v3.3, Security Update Management](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/sites/default/files/2026-11/Cyber-Essentials-Requirements-for-IT-Infrastructure-v3-3.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [PCI SSC blog, Just Published: PCI DSS v4.0.1 (11 Jun 2024)](https://blog.pcisecuritystandards.org/just-published-pci-dss-v4-0-1), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CISA, BOD 26-04, Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk), read 19 Nov 2026 - [FedRAMP legacy playbook, POA&M, Remediation Requirements](https://www.fedramp.gov/legacy/playbook/csp/authorization/poam/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Planning (April 2022)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Microsoft Learn, Update release cycle for Windows clients](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/deployment/update/release-cycle), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Microsoft MSRC CVRF API, November 2026 Security Updates](https://api.msrc.microsoft.com/cvrf/v3.0/cvrf/2026-Nov), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Patch Window Table: Deadlines in 12 Frameworks](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/) - [Patch Maintenance Window Policy Clause](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/maintenance-windows/) - [Patch Management Compliance Dates: 7 Dec 2026 and Back](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/dates-to-know/) - [Patch Compliance Rate: Formula, Denominators, Clocks](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/patch-compliance-rate/) --- # Proving Patch Compliance to an Auditor: the Evidence Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/proving-patch-compliance-to-an-auditor/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Patch compliance report: what an auditor can check A patch compliance report an auditor can test lists each asset, the date the fix became available, the date it was installed and the deadline that applied. Cyber Essentials v3.3 measures from release; FedRAMP's legacy page from discovery. The clock start must be on the report. Read 19 Nov 2026. ### Fields to keep per patch per asset ```text Evidence record (one row per asset per patch) - Asset ID and group - Patch or advisory ID - Severity and who assigned it (vendor wording, scanner, or reviewer) - Clock start: release | discovery | KEV listing, with the date - Deadline applied and the policy clause it came from - Install date and the verification method - Exception ID, if any, with owner, control and end date - Result: within deadline | late | excepted ``` Each field answers a test an assessor can run. Cyber Essentials v3.3 needs the release date to compute "within 14 days of release". An exception under NIS2 point 6.6.2 needs the documented reason. The proposed HIPAA rule would require the patch policy itself to be reviewed and tested every 12 months, so the review date is evidence too. ### What tools say they export These are vendor statements, read 19 Nov 2026, in alphabetical order. Action1 says it can export audit evidence and schedule customized reports. Automox says it offers 20 prebuilt reports, exportable as PDF, CSV or XLSX. Microsoft documents Intune and Autopatch reports for devices that are "Not up to date". Each is a feature claim; whether a given export satisfies an auditor is for the auditor to say. The [directory](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/tools/) records the reporting fields for each tool, deploy kind and prioritize kind kept apart. ### Gaps to state openly PCI DSS v4.0.1 requirement text could not be read on 19 Nov 2026, so this page cannot quote the standard's evidence requirements. The evidence the Council's FAQs 1597 and 1572 point to is on the [PCI DSS patch window page](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/pci-dss/); read the requirement in the standard you are assessed against before copying a list. The same applies to ISO/IEC 27001 and SOC 2. Next: the rate that sits above these records is in [patch compliance rate](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/patch-compliance-rate/), and the reporting section of the policy is in [reporting and metrics](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/reporting-and-metrics/). ### Questions **patch compliance report** It is a per-asset record of what was patched, when the fix became available, when it was installed and which deadline applied. The record format is in [the evidence guide](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/proving-patch-compliance-to-an-auditor/). **what is patch compliance report** A patch compliance report shows, for a set of assets, which fixes are installed against the deadline in the policy. It is only checkable if the clock start and any exceptions are on it. ### Sources - [NCSC, Cyber Essentials Requirements for IT Infrastructure v3.3, Security Update Management](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/sites/default/files/2026-11/Cyber-Essentials-Requirements-for-IT-Infrastructure-v3-3.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [FedRAMP legacy playbook, POA&M, Remediation Requirements](https://www.fedramp.gov/legacy/playbook/csp/authorization/poam/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [EUR-Lex, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2690, Annex points 6.6.1 and 6.6.2](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L_202402690), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Federal Register, HIPAA Security Rule NPRM, 90 FR 898 (6 Jan 2025)](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/06/2024-30983/hipaa-security-rule-to-strengthen-the-cybersecurity-of-electronic-protected-health-information), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Action1, product site](https://www.action1.com/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Automox, pricing page](https://www.automox.com/pricing), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Microsoft Learn, Windows Autopatch overview](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/overview/windows-autopatch-overview), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Patch Compliance Rate: Formula, Denominators, Clocks](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/patch-compliance-rate/) - [Patch Management Metrics: What the Policy Should Report](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/reporting-and-metrics/) - [Patch Management Tools Directory: Two Kinds, Same Fields](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/tools/) - [Step 8: Patch Management Report Contents](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/report/) --- # Patch Compliance Rate: Formula, Denominators, Clocks Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/patch-compliance-rate/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## What is patch compliance rate Patch compliance rate is the share of in-scope assets that received a required patch within its deadline: assets on time divided by assets due. In the clauses read on 19 Nov 2026, none sets a target percentage, so the number is yours to define. Clock starts differ: release, discovery or KEV listing. ### Formula and a worked example Rate = assets patched within the deadline / assets whose deadline has passed. Example, invented for illustration and not data: 1,000 assets are due for a critical fix; 940 installed within 14 days; the rate is 94.0 percent. The 60 that are late are listed by group, not averaged away. | Variant | Numerator | Denominator | Use | |---|---|---|---| | Within-window rate | Installed by the deadline | Assets whose deadline passed | Proves the policy deadline was met | | Current-state rate | Installed today, any date | All in-scope assets | Shows exposure now | | Exception-adjusted rate | Within window plus documented exceptions | Assets due | Shows how much of the gap is owned; report it beside the first, never instead | Variants defined by this site; no framework read on 19 Nov 2026 defines them. ### Why two organizations cannot compare rates The deadline differs by source and so does the clock. Cyber Essentials v3.3 counts "within 14 days of release". FedRAMP's legacy page counts 30 days for critical and high "of discovery". BOD 26-04 starts at the KEV listing or the agency's identification, whichever comes first. The HIPAA proposal counts from "identifying the need to patch". A rate is only meaningful with the deadline and the clock stated next to it. Scope moves it as well: the denominator must say whether it includes assets outside the inventory, which by definition cannot be counted; see [asset inventory requirement](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/asset-inventory-requirement/). ### Where to publish it Put the formula, the clock and the severity in the policy's reporting clause ([reporting and metrics](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/reporting-and-metrics/)). Keep the supporting records described in [proving patch compliance to an auditor](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/proving-patch-compliance-to-an-auditor/). Microsoft's Autopatch overview describes a view of managed devices that are "Not up to date", which is a current-state view in this table's terms. Dashboards are the tool's own; their wording is recorded per tool in the [directory](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/tools/). ### Questions **what is patch compliance rate** It is the share of in-scope assets patched within the deadline, assets on time divided by assets due. No clause read on 19 Nov 2026 sets a target percentage. **what is patch compliance** Patch compliance is whether assets have the required patches within the deadline the policy or a framework sets. The measure is the [patch compliance rate](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/patch-compliance-rate/). ### Sources - [NCSC, Cyber Essentials Requirements for IT Infrastructure v3.3, Security Update Management](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/sites/default/files/2026-11/Cyber-Essentials-Requirements-for-IT-Infrastructure-v3-3.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [FedRAMP legacy playbook, POA&M, Remediation Requirements](https://www.fedramp.gov/legacy/playbook/csp/authorization/poam/), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CISA, BOD 26-04, Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Federal Register, HIPAA Security Rule NPRM, 90 FR 898 (6 Jan 2025)](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/06/2024-30983/hipaa-security-rule-to-strengthen-the-cybersecurity-of-electronic-protected-health-information), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Microsoft Learn, Windows Autopatch overview](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/overview/windows-autopatch-overview), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Proving Patch Compliance to an Auditor: the Evidence](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/proving-patch-compliance-to-an-auditor/) - [Patch Management Metrics: What the Policy Should Report](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/reporting-and-metrics/) - [Asset Inventory Requirement in a Patch Policy](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/asset-inventory-requirement/) - [Patch Window Table: Deadlines in 12 Frameworks](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/) --- # Third-Party and Open Source Patching in a Policy Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/third-party-and-open-source-patching/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Third-party patch management policy A policy must name third-party and open source components, because operating system patching does not reach them. NIST SP 800-218 v1.1 PW.4.4 asks to verify acquired third-party and open source components "throughout their life cycles", and RV.1.1 to gather vulnerability information about them. Read 19 Nov 2026. ### What the framework text asks | Practice | Clause | Quote | |---|---|---| | Verify components through their life | SSDF PW.4.4 | "comply with the requirements, as defined by the organization, throughout their life cycles" | | Check for unfixed public flaws | SSDF PW.4.4 example | "Regularly check whether there are publicly known vulnerabilities in the software modules and services that vendors have not yet fixed." | | Gather information on components | SSDF RV.1.1 | "potential vulnerabilities in the software and third-party components that the software uses" | | Pick a response | SSDF RV.2.2 | Decide whether each is remediated or "addressed through other means" | NIST SP 800-218 v1.1 (February 2022), read 19 Nov 2026. A newer revision may exist; none was checked. ### Inventory first CISA describes an SBOM as "a nested inventory, a list of ingredients that make up software components". CISA's SBOM page lists a 2026 update to the minimum elements; that guidance was not opened for this page. An SBOM answers the question a third-party clause depends on: which component, in which product, at which version. - Browsers and plug-ins: name them as in scope and put them on the same window as the operating system. See [browsers and third-party apps](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/browsers-and-third-party-apps/). - Libraries inside your own software: belongs to the product team, not the endpoint team. - Container base images: rebuilt, not patched in place; see [containers and images](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/containers-and-images/). - Components with no vendor fix: handled by the exceptions clause, with a review date. ### Policy wording ```text Third-party and open source software is in scope of this policy. The owner of each product keeps a list of components and versions, checks it for publicly known vulnerabilities at least [monthly], and applies fixes within the window for the severity. A component with no available fix is handled under the exceptions clause. ``` The wording leaves the interval and the severity source for you. A directory of tools that patch third-party titles, with each vendor's own count, is in the [tools directory](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/tools/); no count is given here because vendors define a title differently. ### Sources - [NIST SP 800-218 v1.1, Secure Software Development Framework, PW.4.4, RV.1.1, RV.2.2](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-218.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CISA, Software Bill of Materials](https://www.cisa.gov/sbom), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Third-Party Application Patching and Browsers](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/browsers-and-third-party-apps/) - [Container Image Patching: Rebuild, Do Not Patch](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/containers-and-images/) - [Patch Management Tools Directory: Two Kinds, Same Fields](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/tools/) - [Patch Management Policy Exceptions Clause Template](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-exceptions-clause/) --- # Automated Patch Management: Defaults a Policy Must Set Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/automated-patch-management/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Automated patch management Automated patch tools ship defaults that decide what is installed and when. On 19 Nov 2026 the AWS Windows Server baseline auto-approved Critical and Important updates 7 days after release, and Azure automatic guest patching installed within 30 days. CIS Controls v8 7.3 asks for monthly or faster. ### Defaults stated in the vendors' documentation | Platform (alphabetical) | Default behavior stated | Figure | Source | |---|---|---|---| | AWS Systems Manager, Debian Server baseline | "Immediately approves all operating system security-related patches" of priority Required, Important, Standard, Optional or Extra | No wait | AWS predefined baselines | | AWS Systems Manager, CentOS Stream baseline | Approves "all updates 7 days after they become available, including nonsecurity updates" | 7 days | AWS predefined baselines | | AWS Systems Manager, Windows Server baseline (AWS-DefaultPatchBaseline) | Approves CriticalUpdates and SecurityUpdates with an MSRC severity of Critical or Important, "auto-approved 7 days after they are released or updated" | 7 days | AWS predefined baselines | | Azure automatic VM guest patching | Downloads and applies patches classified Critical or Security; "installed within 30 days of the monthly patch releases", in off-peak hours of the VM's time zone, and only while the VM is running | 30 days | Microsoft Learn | | Azure VM patch mode when none is set | Windows VMs default to Automatic Updates (AutomaticByOS); Linux VMs default to the image's own configuration (ImageDefault); neither supports availability-first patching | Not applicable | Microsoft Learn, automatic VM guest patching | | Windows Autopatch, quality updates | Monthly security updates are approved automatically by default and other updates manually; the deferral for automatic approval allows 0 to 30 days, and Microsoft says to "keep quality update deferrals under three days" | 0 to 30 days | Microsoft Learn | Vendor documentation read 19 Nov 2026; statements are the vendor's. Other tools are in the [directory](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/tools/). ### What the defaults do to a policy's windows Three consequences follow from the table, and the arithmetic is this site's. First, a window of 14 days from release (Cyber Essentials v3.3) cannot be met by a tool whose stated behavior is installation within 30 days of release, so the schedule must be set shorter than the default. Second, the AWS Windows Server baseline names only Critical and Important MSRC severities; a policy that gives Moderate or Low items a window needs a second rule, because the default filter does not select them. Third, the Debian baseline approves with no wait while the Windows and CentOS baselines wait 7 days, so one policy window applied across mixed fleets starts its install clock from different points unless the approval delay is recorded for each baseline. CIS Controls v8 safeguard 7.3 asks to "Perform operating system updates on enterprise assets through automated patch management on a monthly, or more frequent, basis" ([CIS Controls v8](https://storage.pardot.com/799323/1693938137QgfIAdmE/CIS_Controls__v8__Critical_Security_Controls__2023_08.pdf)). Monthly is a cadence, so the tool's own setting is the evidence for it. How the approval delay in an AWS baseline is bounded is in [patch management practices](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/patch-management-practices/). ### What stays in the policy - Approval: who may change an approval delay, since the AWS value can be set anywhere from 0 to 360 days and a change moves every window downstream. - Rings: which groups are first. NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 section 3.5.1 calls the first subset "canaries", and Autopatch rings carry their own deferral. - Reboots: when a restart may be forced (see [maintenance windows](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/maintenance-windows/)); Azure installs only while the VM is running, so a powered-off VM waits for its next assessment. - Failures: a failed install is a missed deadline until it is retried or recorded as an exception. - Scope: assets the tool does not manage, listed, because a compliance rate computed from the tool's list hides them. A tool patches what it has a catalog for. Third-party titles, firmware and appliances usually need another route; see [third-party and open source patching](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/third-party-and-open-source-patching/) and [network devices and firmware](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/network-devices-and-firmware/). Wording for automated approval belongs in the [process step for approval](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/approve-and-schedule/). ### Questions **automated patch management** It is software that detects missing patches and installs them on a schedule, in rings. CIS Controls v8 7.3 asks for it for operating systems monthly or more often. **automated patch management aws** In AWS Systems Manager Patch Manager, a patch baseline sets which patches are approved and after how many days. The predefined Windows Server baseline approves Critical and Important updates 7 days after release. ### Sources - [CIS Controls v8 (August 2023 guide), Control 7 safeguards](https://storage.pardot.com/799323/1693938137QgfIAdmE/CIS_Controls__v8__Critical_Security_Controls__2023_08.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [AWS Systems Manager User Guide, predefined and custom patch baselines](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/systems-manager/latest/userguide/patch-manager-predefined-and-custom-patch-baselines.html), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Microsoft Learn, Automatic guest patching for Azure virtual machines and scale sets](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-machines/automatic-vm-guest-patching), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Microsoft Learn, Windows Autopatch, Windows quality updates](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/manage/windows-autopatch-windows-quality-update-overview), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NCSC, Cyber Essentials Requirements for IT Infrastructure v3.3, Security Update Management](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/sites/default/files/2026-11/Cyber-Essentials-Requirements-for-IT-Infrastructure-v3-3.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Planning (April 2022)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Patch Management Tools Directory: Two Kinds, Same Fields](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/tools/) - [Patch Maintenance Window Policy Clause](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/maintenance-windows/) - [Step 5: Patch Approval Process and Scheduling](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/approve-and-schedule/) - [Third-Party and Open Source Patching in a Policy](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/third-party-and-open-source-patching/) - [Patch management practices, each with its source](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/patch-management-practices/) --- # What Is Patch Management? Definition and Scale in 2026 Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/what-is-patch-management/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## What is patch management Patch management is the process of identifying, prioritizing, acquiring, installing and verifying patches, updates and upgrades across an organization (NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, April 2022). On 19 Nov 2026 the CISA KEV catalog held 1,786 entries, which is why it needs to be a routine and not an event. ### Definition and what it covers The NIST definition covers patches, updates and upgrades, on operating systems, applications and firmware. Patching is, in NIST's words, a "normal and necessary part" of keeping systems reliable, not only a security step. In cyber security it is how a known flaw is removed. Patch management software automates the install and reports on it; see [automated patch management](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/automated-patch-management/). ### Scale as of 19 Nov 2026 | Measure | Value | Source and note | |---|---|---| | Entries in the CISA KEV catalog | 1,786 (version 2026.11.18) | CISA JSON feed, primary | | KEV entries added by year | 186 in 2024, 245 in 2025, 302 in 2026 to 18 Nov | Our count from the same feed | | KEV entries flagged known ransomware use | 361 | Our count from the same feed | | CVE records published, 2025 | 49,972 | NVD API, sum of four date windows | | CVE records published, 1 Jan to 18 Nov 2026 | 102,901 | NVD API; counts can change as NVD reprocesses | Read 19 Nov 2026. The KEV count is for exploited flaws; most CVE records are never in it. Mandiant's analysis of 138 vulnerabilities exploited in the wild reported an average time to exploit of five days for 2023, against 32 days for 2021 and 2022 (third-party; published 15 Oct 2024). It excluded 15 outliers; without them the 2023 average is 47 days. ### Why it is a policy matter The deadline, the owner and the exceptions are decisions, and they are written once in a [patch management policy](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/what-is-a-patch-management-policy/) rather than argued per patch. The steps are in [the process](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/), and the first thing most auditors ask for is the [compliance record](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/proving-patch-compliance-to-an-auditor/). Short answers to 17 common questions are collected in the [FAQ](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/faq/). ### Questions **what is patch management** Patch management is the process of identifying, prioritizing, acquiring, installing and verifying patches, updates and upgrades (NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4). It is run as a routine cycle with a faster path for urgent fixes. **what is patch management in cyber security** It is how known software flaws are removed before they are used against you. The CISA KEV catalog held 1,786 exploited flaws on 19 Nov 2026. **what is patch management and why is it important** It is the routine of installing and verifying fixes, and it matters because attackers use known flaws: Mandiant measured an average of five days from disclosure to exploitation for 2023 (published 15 Oct 2024). **what is patch management in windows** On Windows it is built around the monthly security update, published on the second Tuesday, with optional preview updates in the fourth week and out-of-band releases as needed. **what is patch management in networking** It is the same cycle applied to routers, switches, firewalls and their firmware, usually with tighter maintenance windows. See [network devices and firmware](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/network-devices-and-firmware/). ### Sources - [NIST CSRC, SP 800-40 Rev. 4 publication page](https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/40/r4/final), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Planning (April 2022)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CISA, Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog JSON feed](https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NIST NVD API 2.0, CVE records by publication date](https://services.nvd.nist.gov/rest/json/cves/2.0), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Google Cloud / Mandiant, Time-to-Exploit Trends 2023 (15 Oct 2024)](https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/time-to-exploit-trends-2023), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [What a Patch Management Policy Is and Must State](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/what-is-a-patch-management-policy/) - [Patch Management Process in 9 Steps (NIST SP 800-40r4)](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/) - [Automated Patch Management: Defaults a Policy Must Set](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/automated-patch-management/) - [Proving Patch Compliance to an Auditor: the Evidence](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/proving-patch-compliance-to-an-auditor/) --- # Patch Management Program: Six Groups and What Proves Each Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/patch-management-program/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Patch management program NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 (April 2022) builds a patch program on maintenance groups: sets of assets with similar needs, each with a plan for each of four scenarios. Section 3.4 gives six example groups. Read on 19 Nov 2026, they show how to start and what record proves each step. ### Six example groups from NIST section 3.4 NIST defines a maintenance group as "a set of assets with similar characteristics that generally have the same software maintenance needs for each risk response scenario." Section 3.4 lists six simplified examples, reproduced here by the four attributes NIST gives for each ([NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf)). | Group | Software to patch | Outage restriction | Existing mitigations | Impact if compromised | |---|---|---|---|---| | Mobile workforce laptops | Firmware, operating systems, client applications | Tolerant to downtime | Endpoint security controls on the laptops | Moderate | | On-premises datacenter | Firmware, operating systems, applications for server platforms | Scheduled outage windows for all non-emergency situations | Network-based access controls and controls on the assets | High | | Legacy OT assets | None; software no longer supported and cannot be patched | Scheduled outage windows for all non-emergency situations | Network isolation, physical security controls | High | | Smartphones for the mobile workforce | Operating systems and mobile apps | Tolerant to downtime | Mobile device security controls | Moderate | | On-premises servers for automated software testing | Firmware, server OS, virtualization software, guest operating systems, applications | Usually tolerant to downtime | Network-based access controls and controls on the assets | Moderate | | Containers with customer-facing applications in the public cloud | Container operating systems, application modules | Highly tolerant to downtime | Controls on the container operating system | High | NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, section 3.4, attribute wording shortened, read 19 Nov 2026. A count of the table (this site's arithmetic, not NIST's) shows why outage restriction and impact are not enough to define a group. Six groups give only four distinct pairs of outage restriction and impact: laptops and smartphones share (tolerant, moderate), and the datacenter and legacy OT share (scheduled windows, high). NIST keeps each pair apart because the software to patch and the existing mitigations differ, and legacy OT has nothing to patch at all. ### Why unpatchable assets get a group NIST says "Instead of denoting certain assets or types of assets as 'exceptions,' there should be maintenance groups for them," because an asset that cannot be patched "still has software maintenance needs." For that group, section 3.5.4 asks for "an approved set of methods" that security architects reviewed in advance, and a periodic re-evaluation with two parts: a risk assessment of whether the alternatives to patching still work, and a cost-benefit analysis of the asset's value against the cost of mitigating, transferring or accepting the risk. The policy wording for what is recorded when a patch is skipped is in the [exceptions clause template](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-exceptions-clause/). ### Start-up sequence and the record each step leaves 1. Assign every asset to a group (section 3.4). Record: the [inventory](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/inventory/) export with a group field filled for every asset, and a count of assets with the field blank (the target is zero). 2. Give each unpatchable asset a group of its own (3.4, 3.5.4). Record: the approved mitigation set for that group and the date the architects reviewed it. 3. Write a plan for each group and each applicable scenario (3.5). Record: the plan with the "timeframes for beginning and ending each action", plus the risk assessment process that decides which plan applies and when to switch. 4. Name the canary assets and the grace period (3.5.1). Record: the canary membership list and the date after which installation is forced, directly or by blocking network access. 5. Choose metrics per audience (3.6). Record: one metric definition for each audience, because NIST notes that a bare percentage patched is not actionable; see [patch compliance rate](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/patch-compliance-rate/). 6. Reassess the groups periodically (3.4). Record: the date of each reassessment and the groups added, merged or removed. The [NIST SP 800-40 page](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/nist-sp-800-40/) covers the four scenarios in full, and the [policy sections](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/) and [procedure template](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-management-procedure/) carry the written side. Who owns each record is a choice the policy makes by role name; NIST names seven audiences for metrics in section 3.6 but assigns no owners. ### Questions **patch management program** A patch management program is the standing set of groups, plans, records and reports that carry out the policy. In NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 it starts from maintenance groups, each with a plan for routine patching, emergency patching, emergency mitigation and unpatchable assets. **what is patch management program** It is the recurring work of keeping each group of assets patched or mitigated, with a record for each step. The start-up sequence above lists six steps and the record each one leaves. **what is patch management process** It is the repeated sequence of identifying, prioritizing, acquiring, installing and verifying patches. The steps are laid out in [the process](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/). ### Sources - [NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Planning (April 2022)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Patch Management Policy Sections: The Nine to Include](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/) - [Patch Management Procedure Template, Nine Steps](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-management-procedure/) - [Patch Management Policy Exceptions Clause Template](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-exceptions-clause/) - [Step 1: Patch Management Asset Inventory](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/inventory/) - [NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4: What It Sets for Patch Timing](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/nist-sp-800-40/) --- # Patch management practices, each with its source Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/patch-management-practices/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Patch management practices, each with its source Ten patch management practices follow, each with its clause and the record that shows it is done, read on 19 Nov 2026. They include maintenance groups and canaries (NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4), a 14 day window (Cyber Essentials v3.3) and an AWS approval delay that can run from 0 to 360 days. ### Practices, sources and the record that proves each | Practice | Source | What it says | Record that proves it | |---|---|---|---| | Group assets by maintenance needs | NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, 3.4 | A maintenance group has "the same software maintenance needs" | Inventory field naming the group for every asset | | Write a plan per group and scenario | NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, 3.5 | "define a maintenance plan for each maintenance group" | Plan with start and end times for each action | | Patch a small set first | NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, 3.5.1 | "These assets act as canaries" | Canary membership list and the date the rollout widened | | Automate OS and application updates | CIS Controls v8, 7.3 and 7.4 | Monthly, or more frequent | Tool schedule export showing the cadence | | Set a window for critical and high | Cyber Essentials v3.3 | Within 14 days of release | Install date beside vendor release date, per asset | | Name the clock start | CISA BOD 26-04 | KEV listing or identification, whichever is first | Ticket field holding the start date and which event set it | | Document skipped patches | NIS2 Implementing Regulation 2024/2690, 6.6.2 | Derogation when disadvantages outweigh benefits | Written derogation with its stated reason | | Escalate missed deadlines | DORA RTS 2024/1774, Article 10(4)(d) | "escalation procedures" | Escalation log entry with date and recipient | | Include third-party components | NIST SP 800-218 v1.1, PW.4.4 | Verify "throughout their life cycles" | Component list with the version each build uses | | Keep exceptions under watch | NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, 3.5.5 | "reviewed regularly" | Exceptions register with the last recheck date | Read 19 Nov 2026. Quotes shortened. The last column is this site's drafting of the record each clause implies; none of the sources prescribes a format. ### One setting with a range: the approval delay A tool's approval delay is where a practice meets a number. In AWS Systems Manager Patch Manager, a baseline's `ApproveAfterDays` is "the number of days after the release date of each patch matched by the rule that the patch is marked as approved," with a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 360 ([AWS PatchRule reference](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/systems-manager/latest/APIReference/API_PatchRule.html)). AWS evaluates release dates in UTC: its own example is a patch released at 2025-11-09T18:00:00Z with a value of 7, approved after 2025-11-16T18:00:00Z. AWS also cautions that for Windows Server baselines a value that is too broad can leave crucial patches uninstalled, because superseded updates are removed. The arithmetic belongs in the policy. Under a 14 day window from release (Cyber Essentials v3.3), a 7 day approval delay leaves 7 days for scheduling and installing; a 14 day delay leaves none. That subtraction is this site's, not AWS's. The same window logic for each asset class is in [patching by asset class](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/), and the defaults other platforms ship with are in [automated patch management](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/automated-patch-management/). ### Where each practice sits Groups and plans are worked through in the [program guide](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/patch-management-program/), windows in the [patch window table](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/), and the written record for a skipped patch in the [exceptions clause](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-exceptions-clause/). Vendor pages in the [directory](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/tools/) are read as that vendor's claims, and practices without a primary text behind them are not listed. ### Questions **why system patch management policy needed** A policy fixes deadlines, owners and exceptions in advance so patching is not renegotiated per patch. NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 treats patching as preventive maintenance and asks for a plan per maintenance group. **what is a security patch management process** It is the identify, prioritize, acquire, install and verify cycle applied to security fixes. The deadline per severity is set in the policy. ### Sources - [NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Planning (April 2022)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CIS Controls v8 (August 2023 guide), Control 7 safeguards](https://storage.pardot.com/799323/1693938137QgfIAdmE/CIS_Controls__v8__Critical_Security_Controls__2023_08.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NCSC, Cyber Essentials Requirements for IT Infrastructure v3.3, Security Update Management](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/sites/default/files/2026-11/Cyber-Essentials-Requirements-for-IT-Infrastructure-v3-3.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CISA, BOD 26-04, Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk), read 19 Nov 2026 - [EUR-Lex, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2690, Annex points 6.6.1 and 6.6.2](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L_202402690), read 19 Nov 2026 - [EUR-Lex, Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1774, Article 10(4)(d)](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32024R1774), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NIST SP 800-218 v1.1, Secure Software Development Framework, PW.4.4, RV.1.1, RV.2.2](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-218.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [AWS Systems Manager API Reference, PatchRule (ApproveAfterDays, ApproveUntilDate)](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/systems-manager/latest/APIReference/API_PatchRule.html), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Patch Management Program: Six Groups and What Proves Each](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/patch-management-program/) - [Patch Window Table: Deadlines in 12 Frameworks](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/) - [Patch Management Policy Exceptions Clause Template](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-exceptions-clause/) - [Patch Management Process in 9 Steps (NIST SP 800-40r4)](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/) - [Automated Patch Management: Defaults a Policy Must Set](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/automated-patch-management/) --- # Patch Management Policy FAQ: 17 Questions Answered Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/faq/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Patch management policy questions Seventeen questions follow, each answered in a few sentences from sources read on 19 Nov 2026. Examples: patch monthly at a minimum, with 14 days of release for critical or high fixes under Cyber Essentials v3.3; the second lifecycle phase is prioritizing; the CISA KEV catalog held 1,786 entries. ### How to use this page Each answer is the short form; the link beside it goes to the page with the clause, the quote and the read date. Questions are grouped by what they ask about: policy and process, measures, software and scale. - Policy and process: [what a policy is](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/what-is-a-patch-management-policy/), [how to write one](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/how-to-write-a-patch-management-policy/), [the lifecycle](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/patch-management-lifecycle/). - Measures: [how often](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/how-often-to-patch/), [rate](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/patch-compliance-rate/), [evidence](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/proving-patch-compliance-to-an-auditor/). - Software and scale: [automation](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/automated-patch-management/), [definition](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/what-is-patch-management/), [tools](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/tools/). Questions about a particular vendor's product, a cloud provider's service or a different meaning of the word patch are not answered here; the [guides index](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/) lists what is covered. ### Questions **how often should you perform patch management** Monthly at a minimum, with a shorter deadline for critical or high fixes. CIS Controls v8 asks for monthly or more frequent updates; Cyber Essentials v3.3 asks for 14 days of release. The next Patch Tuesday dates are 8 Dec 2026 and 12 Jan 2027. See [how often to patch](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/how-often-to-patch/). **how to create a patch management policy** Write nine sections in order and set the windows last, from the frameworks that bind you. Group assets first, then write a plan for each scenario. The steps and a skeleton are in [how to write a patch management policy](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/how-to-write-a-patch-management-policy/). **what is a patch management policy** It is the approved document that makes patching mandatory: scope, roles, deadlines by severity, exceptions and review. The steps that carry it out go in a separate procedure. See [what a patch management policy is](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/what-is-a-patch-management-policy/). **what is a patch management procedure** It is the step-by-step instruction for carrying out the policy: how to stage, approve, deploy and verify. It changes when tools change, while the policy changes at review. The [procedure template](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-management-procedure/) has the full text. **what is a security patch management process** It is the identify, prioritize, acquire, install and verify cycle applied to security fixes, with a faster path for urgent ones. NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 gives that definition. Each step has a page under [the process](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/). **what is patch compliance** Patch compliance is whether assets have the required patches installed within the deadline a policy or framework sets. It is measured per asset and summarized as a rate. See [patch compliance rate](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/patch-compliance-rate/). **what is patch compliance rate** It is the assets patched within the deadline divided by the assets whose deadline has passed. None of the clauses read on 19 Nov 2026 sets a target percentage, and the clock start differs by framework. The formula and variants are in [the rate guide](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/patch-compliance-rate/). **what is patch compliance report** It is a per-asset record of the fix, the date it became available, the install date and the deadline applied. It can be tested only if the clock start and exceptions appear on it. See [the evidence guide](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/proving-patch-compliance-to-an-auditor/). **what is patch management** It is the process of identifying, prioritizing, acquiring, installing and verifying patches, updates and upgrades across an organization, per NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 (April 2022). See [what is patch management](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/what-is-patch-management/). **what is patch management and why is it important** It is the routine of installing and verifying fixes, and it matters because attackers use known flaws. Mandiant measured an average of five days from disclosure to exploitation for 2023 (published 15 Oct 2024), against 63 days across 2018 to 2019; without excluding 15 outliers the 2023 average is 47 days. **what is patch management in cyber security** It is how known software flaws are removed before they are used. On 19 Nov 2026 the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog held 1,786 entries, and BOD 26-04 sets federal timelines of 3, 14 or 60 days. See [the BOD 26-04 page](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/cisa-bod-26-04/). **what is patch management software** It is a tool that finds missing patches, stages them, installs them and reports the result. The [directory](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/tools/) reads 31 tools from their own pages, 16 that deploy patches and 15 that prioritize and prepare them, kept apart and listed alphabetically. **what does patch management software do** It detects missing patches, applies them in rings or on a schedule, restarts devices under rules, and reports installed, failed and pending counts. Those are vendor statements; the reporting fields for each tool are in the [directory](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/tools/). See [automated patch management](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/automated-patch-management/). **what is the second phase of the patch management process lifecycle** Prioritizing. NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 lists the phases as identifying, prioritizing, acquiring, installing and verifying. Other sources split them differently. See [the lifecycle guide](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/patch-management-lifecycle/). **why system patch management policy needed** A policy fixes deadlines, owners and exceptions in advance. NIST says routine patching "is often postponed and neglected", which gives attackers windows, and DORA, NIS2 and HIPAA's proposal all ask for documented patch rules. See [the policy guide](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/what-is-a-patch-management-policy/). **what is vulnerability and patch management** It is the pair of functions: finding and triaging weaknesses, then installing the fixes. Patching is one response among several. The [comparison](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/patch-management-vs-vulnerability-management/) shows where each starts. **what is patch management process** It is the repeated sequence of identifying, prioritizing, acquiring, installing and verifying patches, with a report and a review at the end. This site splits it into nine steps; start at [the process](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/). ### Sources - [NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Planning (April 2022)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NCSC, Cyber Essentials Requirements for IT Infrastructure v3.3, Security Update Management](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/sites/default/files/2026-11/Cyber-Essentials-Requirements-for-IT-Infrastructure-v3-3.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CISA, BOD 26-04, Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CISA, Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog JSON feed](https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json), read 19 Nov 2026 - [Google Cloud / Mandiant, Time-to-Exploit Trends 2023 (15 Oct 2024)](https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/time-to-exploit-trends-2023), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CIS Controls v8 (August 2023 guide), Control 7 safeguards](https://storage.pardot.com/799323/1693938137QgfIAdmE/CIS_Controls__v8__Critical_Security_Controls__2023_08.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Patch Management Guides: 13 Guides, Each Sourced](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/) - [Patch Management Policy Template Set, 10 Documents](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/) - [Patch Window Table: Deadlines in 12 Frameworks](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/) - [Patch Management Process in 9 Steps (NIST SP 800-40r4)](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/) --- # Patch Management Guides: 13 Guides, Each Sourced Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/ Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026 ## Patch management guides Thirteen guides, each answering one question about patching from sources read on 19 Nov 2026. They run from the definition of a patch management policy to the compliance rate and the difference between patch and vulnerability management. Each guide names its sources and the texts that could not be read. ### The guides - [What a patch management policy is](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/what-is-a-patch-management-policy/): the parts a policy must have and the clause behind each. - [How to write a patch management policy](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/how-to-write-a-patch-management-policy/): nine sections in order, a fill-in skeleton and the NIST scenarios. - [Patch management lifecycle](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/patch-management-lifecycle/): the five NIST phases and the process page for each. - [Patch management vs vulnerability management](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/patch-management-vs-vulnerability-management/): a question-by-question comparison with CIS Control 7 and SSDF. - [Hotfix vs patch](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/hotfix-vs-patch/): NIST's glossary entries for patch and hotfix, and the one-line definition a policy needs. - [How often to patch](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/how-often-to-patch/): cadence by source and Patch Tuesday dates to February 2027. - [Proving patch compliance to an auditor](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/proving-patch-compliance-to-an-auditor/): the evidence record, one row per asset per patch. - [Patch compliance rate](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/patch-compliance-rate/): formula, three variants and why clocks differ. - [Third-party and open source patching](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/third-party-and-open-source-patching/): SSDF clauses and policy wording for components. - [Automated patch management](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/automated-patch-management/): the default approval delays and severity filters in AWS, Azure and Autopatch, and the policy lines they touch. - [What is patch management](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/what-is-patch-management/): the definition and scale figures for 19 Nov 2026. - [Patch management program](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/patch-management-program/): NIST's six example maintenance groups and a start-up sequence with a record for each step. - [Patch management practices, each with its source](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/patch-management-practices/): ten practices, the clause behind each and the record that proves it. ### Reading order For a new policy: start with [what it is](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/what-is-a-patch-management-policy/), then [how to write it](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/how-to-write-a-patch-management-policy/), then fill the [template](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-management-policy-template/). For an audit: [evidence](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/proving-patch-compliance-to-an-auditor/) and [rate](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/patch-compliance-rate/). For definitions: [what is patch management](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/what-is-patch-management/) and [hotfix vs patch](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/guides/hotfix-vs-patch/). One guide is narrow on purpose: the vulnerability management comparison covers where the two functions meet, not how to build a vulnerability program. Short answers to 17 common questions are in the [FAQ](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/faq/). ### Related sections The [patch window table](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/) has one page per framework. The [process](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/) has nine steps, [patching by asset class](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patching/) has eleven classes, and the [glossary](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/glossary/) has the terms. ### Sources - [NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Planning (April 2022)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [NCSC, Cyber Essentials Requirements for IT Infrastructure v3.3, Security Update Management](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/sites/default/files/2026-11/Cyber-Essentials-Requirements-for-IT-Infrastructure-v3-3.pdf), read 19 Nov 2026 - [CISA, BOD 26-04, Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk), read 19 Nov 2026 Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026 ### Related pages - [Patch Management Policy FAQ: 17 Questions Answered](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/faq/) - [Patch Management Policy Template Set, 10 Documents](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/) - [Patch Window Table: Deadlines in 12 Frameworks](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/) - [Patch Management Process in 9 Steps (NIST SP 800-40r4)](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/process/)