# NIS2 Patch Management: Point 6.6 of Regulation 2024/2690

Canonical: https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/nis2/
Last reviewed: 19 Nov 2026

## NIS2 patch management

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2690, point 6.6, requires security patches to be applied "within a reasonable time after they become available", tested first and taken from trusted sources, with a documented derogation when harm outweighs benefit. It sets no day count. Adopted 17 Oct 2024; read 19 Nov 2026.

### Whom the text covers

Regulation 2024/2690 was adopted on 17 Oct 2024 and published in the Official Journal on 18 Oct 2024, under Article 21(5) of the NIS 2 Directive. Its Annex applies to DNS service providers, TLD name registries, cloud computing service providers, data centre service providers, content delivery network providers, managed service providers, managed security service providers, providers of online marketplaces, online search engines and social networking platforms, and trust service providers. Other NIS2 entities are governed by their national transposition, which this page does not read.

### Point 6.6, clause by clause

Point 6.6.1 asks entities to "specify and apply procedures, coherent with the change management procedures" and with vulnerability, risk and other management procedures, "for ensuring that":

| Clause | Verbatim text | What it fixes |
|---|---|---|
| 6.6.1(a) | "security patches are applied within a reasonable time after they become available" | Timing: reasonable time, counted from availability; no day count |
| 6.6.1(b) | "security patches are tested before being applied in production systems" | A test step before production |
| 6.6.1(c) | "security patches come from trusted sources and are checked for integrity" | Provenance and integrity check |
| 6.6.1(d) | "additional measures are implemented and residual risks are accepted in cases where a patch is not available or not applied pursuant to point 6.6.2" | Fallback when no patch or a derogation applies |

Regulation (EU) 2024/2690, Annex, point 6.6.1, read on EUR-Lex on 19 Nov 2026.

Point 6.6.2 allows a derogation: entities "may choose not to apply security patches when the disadvantages of applying the security patches outweigh the cybersecurity benefits," and "shall duly document and substantiate the reasons for any such decision."

### Related points that bear on a patch window

- **6.4.2 and 6.4.3, change management:** changes to software and hardware in operation must be documented and, based on the risk assessment, "tested and assessed in view of the potential impact before being implemented." If an emergency prevents the regular procedure, the entity documents the result and why the procedure could not be followed.
- **6.10.2(c), vulnerability handling:** entities shall "address, without undue delay, vulnerabilities identified by the relevant entities as critical to their operations." This is the only timing wording in the Annex tighter than "reasonable time", and it attaches to vulnerabilities critical to operations rather than to patches.
- **6.10.3:** when justified by impact the entity creates and implements a mitigation plan; otherwise it documents and substantiates why the vulnerability "does not require remediation."

### Recital 16 behind it

Recital 16 explains the intent: "to avoid significant disruption and harm caused by the exploitation of unpatched vulnerabilities," entities should apply patch procedures aligned with their change, vulnerability and risk management, and take measures "proportionate to their resources to ensure that security patches do not introduce additional vulnerabilities or instabilities." Where an update makes a service inaccessible by plan, entities "are encouraged to duly inform customers in advance." That sentence is encouragement, not a requirement.

### What a policy must write

1. A patch procedure that cross-refers to the change, vulnerability and risk procedures by name.
2. A stated time standard. The text says reasonable time, so the policy supplies the number; [DORA](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/dora/) takes the same approach and [Cyber Essentials](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/cyber-essentials/) fixes 14 days for critical or high items.
3. A test step before production and a source-and-integrity check for every patch.
4. A derogation rule that requires a written reason weighing disadvantages against benefit, and the additional measures that apply while the patch is not applied.
5. A separate target for vulnerabilities critical to operations, worded as without undue delay.

### Evidence

The Annex names records, not an inspector's checklist: the documented procedures, the documented and substantiated reason for every derogation, the change records showing tests and impact assessment, and the residual risk acceptance in 6.6.1(d). How a national authority audits these is set nationally and was not read. The derogation record is the same object a policy's exceptions step produces; see [patch exceptions clause](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-exceptions-clause/), and the other frameworks side by side in the [Patch Window Table](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/).

### Sources

- [EUR-Lex, Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2690, Annex points 6.4, 6.6 and 6.10 and recital 16](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L_202402690), read 19 Nov 2026

Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026

### Related pages

- [Patch Window Table: Deadlines in 12 Frameworks](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/)
- [DORA Patch Management: Article 10 of RTS 2024/1774](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/dora/)
- [Cyber Essentials 14 Day Patching Rule (v3.3, April 2026)](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/patch-windows/cyber-essentials/)
- [Patch Management Policy Exceptions Clause Template](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/templates/patch-exceptions-clause/)
- [Emergency Patch Policy Clause for a Patch Policy](https://patchmanagementpolicy.com/policy-sections/emergency-patch-clause/)
